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ABSTRACT 
Until after the Civil War the primary peacetime mission 
of the American N~·.vy was the protection of the nation 1 s 
maritime commerce. Piracy in the Mediterranean led Congress, 
in 1794, to authorize the construction of the first six 
frigates of the United States Navy. After the suppression 
of piracy in the West Indies, an expanding maritime com-
merce led merchants to demand naval protection of the sea 
lanes against possible attacks. This mission was implemented 
by deploying ships and squadrons to foreign statioLs where 
they would be more readily available to aid American ship-
ping. By 1843 six squadrons had been created. 
Also in 1794 the United States passed the first in a 
series of laws designed to inhibit the African slave trade. 
The first merely prohibited the building or fitting out of 
slavers in the United States for the foreign slave trade. 
In 1800 the Navy was given a new mission: the actual sup-
pression of the slave trade. At first this was limited to 
American waters, but the role expanded and in 1819 the Navy 
began patrolling African waters. In 1820 the slave trade 
was equated with piracy and conviction of engaging in it 
carried the death penalty. 
Historians have seen a conflict in this duality of mis-
sion. Their argument has been that the United States Navy 
was small--about forty vessels were in active service. 
Dividing the available ships among six squadrons subtracted 
from the effectiveness of the squadrons involved in the 
suppression of the slave trade. 
It is the contention of this study that deploying ships 
to foreign squadrons for the protection of commerce actually 
aided the Navy's war against slavers. Over a period of 
twenty-four years vessels were occasionally detached from the 
West India station to visit Africa. These hit-or-miss 
efforts, between 1819 and 1843, to suppress the slave trade, 
without deploying a permanent squadron, resulted in the cap-
ture of few slavers and the trade continued. 
Although intended to protect America's maritime com-
merce, the more permanent arrangement of deployed squadrons 
in the West Indies, off Brazil, and off Africa after 184), 
was better able to cope with the slave trade. Vessels more 
constantly in the vicinity of the slave trade routes provided 
the basis for more effectual suppression of the African 
slave trade. 
X 
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INTRODUCTION 
Charles Oscar Paullin ha.s said that the chief "na.va.l 
wa.r" of the years between the end of the Wa.r of 1812 a.nd the 
Mexican Wa.r wa.s the one against pirates in the West Indies. 
The accuracy of this description depends upon the criteria. 
used to define "chief." I believe that except for the years 
of active hostilities, as in the War of 1812 and the Mexican 
War, the Na.vy•s wa.r with slave traders is entitled more than 
the suppression of piracy to the claim of being the chief 
naval wa.r of the period between 1800 and 1862. 1 
The original purpose of thic study was to examine the 
involvement of the United States Navy in the suppression 
of the slave trade. That, indeed, has remained its basic 
aim. But the more I examined this role the more I came 
to believe that a.n understanding of the Navy•s mission 
could not be fully comprehended without considering the 
primary duty of a. peacetime navy: protecting the legitimate 
commerce and interests of the nation. 
Several earlier authors have briefly addressed them-
selves to this relationship. W. E. B. DuBois and Warren 
s. Howard, one of the first and one of the latest students 
1Cha.rles Oscar Paullin, Pa.ullin 1 ~ History of Naval 
Administration, 1112-12ll: A Collection of Articles from 
the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis, 196sr;-
-m:5. 
2 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of the slave trade, have viewed it thus: the Navy did not 
do a satisfactory job in suppressing the slave trade because 
the few ships in active service were deployed all over the 
world to protect commerce and too few were deployed to 
patrol adequately against slavers. Protection of commerce 
is seen as subtracting from the Navy's efforts to suppress 
the slave trad~. 2 
It seems to me that this argument may be stood on its 
head: the Navy was able to accomplish what it did because 
its ships had been deployed to stations athwart the slaver 
routes, not to suppress the slave trade, but to protect 
American maritime commerce. To show this it is necessary 
to explain the two roles. The first part of this study 
will show that commerce protection was the Navy's most 
important duty, why ships were deployed to foreign stations, 
and what the Navy's obligations were to suppress the slave 
trade. The second part will apply these considerations to 
each of the three stations involved in the suppression of 
the slave trade. 
This leaves the question of whether or not the Navy 
was successful in suppressing the traffic in slaves. But 
what is the measure of success, what is satisfactory? 
Certainly, a complete stoppage of the traffic would be 
lw. E. Burghardt DuBois, The Suppression of the African 
Slave-Trade to the United States of America, 1bJ7-1S70 
(New York, 1~6~eprint, 1969), 138-60; and WarrenS. 
Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, l§JZ-1862 (Berkeley, 1963), 41. ------ --- ----
3 
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considered successful, but is anything less a failure? I 
believe that given the conditions governing the naval role 
and under which the Navy operated that it was quite suc-
cessful in prosecuting its dual missions of commerce pro-
tection and slave trade suppression. This cannot be shown 
definitively, but a rough, rule of thumb assessment can be 
made of the Navy's contribution to the suppression of the 
traffic in slaves. 
4 
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PAR·r ONE 
SAILING ORDERS 
A naval officer assigned command of a ship was issued 
"Sailing Orders" by the Secretary of the Navy. These 
stated the purpose of the cruise, the force under his 
command, and any particular regulations of which he must be 
aware. Such is the purpose of the first part of this study, 
to examine the factors governing the employment of the Navy 
in the suppression of the slave trade. 
Most important of these factors was the Navy's concern 
with the protection of the legitimate maritime commerce 
of the United States. The Navy was created and maintained 
in response to the needs of the nation's mercantile 
population and the first chapter will outline this long-
term relationship. Chapter II will deal with the concept 
of a cruiser navy, the types of vessels employed in the 
United States Navy and their capabilities. Finally, the 
national laws against the slave trade, as they pertained to 
the Nayy will be examined. 
.5 
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CHAPTER I 
11 MOST CERTAIN AND AMPLE PROTECTION 11 
The obligation of the Navy to protect American 
reercantile interests antedated even the creation of the 
Union. From antiquity, governments had an interest in 
maintaining tranquility in the sea lanes, preserving the 
trade routes to markets or to sources of raw materials. 
For the young United States, commerce was its life blood, 
bringing to its shores the goods and manufactures of more 
industrialized countries, the luxuries of exotic lands, 
and exporting in trade the raw materials of its agricul-
tural and extractive processes. 
In order to maintain the requisite preacefulness, 
governments sent to sea cruisers that patrolled the 
coasts and sea lanes, offering protection to merchants 
and seamen engaged in the nation's commerce. ·rhe navies 
of ancient Greece and Rome provided such services. 1 And 
during the long period of Anglo-F'r·ench warfare in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, merchant shipping 
from England's American colonies plied the Atlantic, 
Caribbean, and Mediterranean protected by the Royal Navy 
from enemies--French and Spanish cruisers, privateers, 
1clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: ·rhe History and 
Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York, 1974), 2-4, 7-8. 
6 
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and pirates. 2 
But independence deprived the United States of that 
protection, and when, in 1785,Congress sold out of service 
the last Continental vessel, the frigate ~lliance, the 
American merchant marine was deprived of the protection of 
its own Navy. Even so, American merchants were expanding 
the frontiers of their trade, forced to do so by their 
exclusion from former markets in the British West Indian 
colonies; markets that accounted for the bulk of their 
pre-Revolutionary War trade.J 
Within five years of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, 
vessels bearing the ensign of the United States were 
exploring new markets and new routes. For example, vessels 
belonging to Elias Basket Derby of Salem, Massachusetts, 
had been to Cronstadt, the port of St. Petersburg, Russia, 
visited the Cape of Good Hope, and were pushing eastward 
A 
to the Ile de France and Canton. Ships from New York, 
Boston, and Philadelphia were shaping their courses west-
ward, around Cape Horn, to the northwest coast--now the 
states of Washington and Oregon. ~here the ships loaded 
2samuel W. Bryant, The Sea and the States: A Maritime 
History of the American Peepre-(New York, 1947; reprint 
1967), 3~ 5b: 
)James Duncan Phillips, Salem and the Indies: The 
Story of the Great Commercial Era of the City (Cambridge, 
Mass., 19~; and Salem in the Eighteenth Century (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1937). These two volumes cover in detail 
Salem and the voyages of its merchants. See also: Samuel 
Eliot Morison, Th~ Maritlme History of Massachusetts, 11§]-
1860 (Boston, 1921; reprint 1961), Jl. 
7 
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sea otter pelts received in trade with the Indians. In 
Canton the pelts were exchanged for tea and china ware. 4 
The exotic trade with the Far East was small compared 
with the more mundane trade with the French and Spanish 
Caribbean islands, Europe, and the Mediterranean. Mean-
while, whale fisheries were expanding. Ships from New 
Bedford and Nantucket soon entered the Pacific in search of 
the prey that made their names synonomous with whaling.5 
But the lack of a Navy meant trouble for the fledgling 
American merchant ~arine, especially in the Mediterranean 
where Barbary corsairs preyed upon the shipping passing 
through the Straits of Gibraltar. Many European nations 
paid a tribute--or bribe--to the Barbary states for free 
--or not so free--passage through the Middle Sea. rhe 
United States did not. In 1785 the merchant vessels Maria 
and Dauphine were seized and their crews enslaved. 6 
Thomas Jefferson, the United States minister to 
France, referred to the situation in a letter to John 
Adams at the Court of St. James: 
If it is decided that we shall buy a peace, I know 
no reason for delaying the operation, but should 
rather think it ought to be hastened; but I should 
prefAr the obtaining it by war. 1. Justice is in 
favor of this operation. 2. Honor favors it. ). 
It will procure us respect in Europe; and respect 
4Morison, Maritime History, 52-6). 
5Ibid., 157; and Bryant, Sea and States, 226-28. 
6Robert Greenhalgh Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 
~-1947 (Office of Naval History, 1950; on microfilm, 
Harvard University Library), 365. 
8 
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is a safe guard to interest.? 
Jefferson was advocating government protection of 
commerce, either by paying tribute to the Barbary states 
or by using the armed might of the nation to enforce the 
safety of its merchant marine. But in reality the United 
States could not do either. rhere was no navy and there 
were no funds for either building one or for purchasing 
peace. rhis lack was a result of the feelings of state 
sovereignty, on the one hand, and the economic relation-
ship between the states and the Confederation government, 
on the other. At the conclusion of the War for Independence 
the general government was $50,000,000 in debt and only 
through the graciousness of the individual sovereign states 
could it raise money. As early as 1781 Superintendent of 
Finance Robert Morris realized the inability of the 
Confederation to pay its debts and urged that a duty be 
levied on imports for the national benefit. rhe states 
refused, saying that taxation by a central government in 
America was as much to be feared as taxation by Parliament 
in London. Morris again called for an impost in January 
178J. rhe following year he resigned when the states still 
refused the central government a power of taxation. 8 
In 1786 Congress proposed that it be allowed to impose 
customs duties. The proposition was accepted by all the 
?Quoted in ibid., )66. 
8John c. Miller, roward a More Perfect Union: rhe 
American Republic, 178~-1815 TGlenview, Ill., 1970),-r9-2o. 
9 
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states but New York, thus vetoing the measure. The country 
was near bankruptcy. The next spring Dutch bankers warned 
that the United States would get no more loans unless their 
previous loans were repaid. Without funds from Holland the 
American government could hardly continue to function, much 
less send warships to the Mediterranean.9 
Such a situation, however, could not, and did not, 
last long. In 1786 the Virginia House of Delegates called 
for a convention to meet in Annapolis to formulate a 
uniform system of commercial regulations. Delegates of 
only six states met, too few to carry out the proposed 
business. Alexander Hamilton used the occasion to call for 
another convention to meet the following year in Philadel-
Phia. Instead of limiting themselves to matters of commerce 
and changes to the Articles of Confederation, the delegates 
to the Constitutional Convention formed a new government, 
which, among other powers, had the right "to lay and 
collect ·raxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises." rhe financial 
difficulties of the nation were being met. 
The Constitution also gave Congress the power "to 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," and that body was 
not long in putting its power to u~e for the benefit of 
American shippers. A month following the inauguration of 
George Washington a comprehensive tariff schedule was 
approved enabling the American merchant marine to compete 
9Ibid., 45. 
10 
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more favorably with foreign shipping. American vessels were 
granted a ten percent discount on import duties on most 
items, while teas entering United States ports in foreign 
bottoms were required to pay twice the duty paid by 
American ships. The following July Congress further 
aided American shippers when it passed a merchant marine 
bill establishing a duty on American vessels of six cents 
per ton payable once a year, whereas foreign vessels had 
to pay fifty cents per ton each time they entered an 
American port. 10 Another act passed in 1789 was the 
Registry Act. 'rhis limited American documentation to 
American-built vessels. rherefore, ships registered in 
foreign trade, or enrolled in the domestic trade, had to be 
American built and American owned. 11 
The effects of this legislation were two-fold. First 
by granting tax breaks, it made American vessels in over-
seas trade more than competitive with foreign shipping to 
the United States, fostering the growth of the American 
merchant marine. With the exception of a few brief periods, 
such as the Embargo of 1807 and the War of 1812, the 
mercantile marine entered a period of great expansion lasting 
until almost the Civil War. Given an initial impetus by the 
Anglo-French wars of 1793 to 1815, in which the United 
10Ibid., 88-89; and Morison, Maritime History, 165. 
11John Greenwood Brown Hutchins, rhe American Maritime 
Industries and Public Policy, 1}89-(914: An Economic 
History (Cambridge, Mass., 1941 , 249-50. 
11 
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States provided much of the neutral shipping required by 
the belligerents, it was maintained by the advent of the 
American packet lines sailing on a fixed schedule, im-
migration, and the development of the clipper ship. 12 
In 1795 the United States had 748,000 tons of shipping, 
of which 529,000 was engaged in foreign trade. This ship-
ping carried 48 million dollars worth of exports and 70 
millions in imports. By 1860 American foreign tonnage had 
increased almost 500 percent, to 2,)79,000 tons. rhe 
value of exports had increased about 650 percent to JJ4 
million dollars and imports had increased proportionately. 13 
Ey the Navigation Acts of 1789 the government followed in 
the wake of the older maritime nations and instituted a 
mercantile system of its own. 
rhe second and most important effect of the legis-
lation was to raise revenue. For 1789 to 1791, of the 
nearly 4.5 million dollars in federal revenue, almost all 
of it came from customs duties. 14 Congress thus laid the 
basis for a steady national income and fostered a merchant 
marine that would carry the commodities that provided the 
tax base for the national income. 
12carl C. Cutler, Queens of the Western Ocean: The 
~ of America'~~ and Passenger Lines {Annapolis, 
1961), )16; Bryant, Sea and States, 146, 216-21; and 
Morison, Maritime History, 169-70. 
13u.s., Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics 
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1221 (Washington, 
Dl.c--.,--1960), 445, 5J8. --
14rbid., 712. 
12 
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The mercantile navy of the United States expanded, but 
it again met with difficulties and without a navy for 
protection, merchant captains had little recourse. In 
1793 war broke out between revolutionary France and 
Great Britain. American merchants were not uninterested 
by-standers watching the conflict from afar. rhey seized 
the opportunity to carry goods to both combatants and got 
caught in the middle. In the West Indies, Europe, and the 
Far Eas~ British warships began seizing American vessels 
carrying goods to France or from French possessions. In 
like measure, France seized American vessels enroute to 
or from English ports. In the Mediterranean the Barbary 
corsairs took advantage of the Anglo-French preoccupation 
and renewed their attacks on shipping. In the fall of 
1793 eleven American vessels were captured and their 
crews enslaved. 15 
~homas Jefferson had earlier recommended war against 
the Barbary powers. Alexander Hamilton went a bit further 
and recommended the construction of a navy. "rhe want of 
a navy," he wrote in his Report on Manufactures: 
to protect our external commerce, as long as it [the 
lack of a navy] shall continue, must render it [the 
merchant marine] a peculiarly precarious 1geliance for the supply of essential articles • • • • 
In response to the attacks on American shipping and 
l5Albion, Makers, 16, 367. 
16rbid., 367; and Alexander Hamil ton, "Report on 
Manufactures," in Daniel J. Boorstin, ed., An American 
Primer (New York, 1966), 205. 
13 
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the urgings of Hamilton and others, Congress, on 27 March 
1794, approved the construction of six frigates. rhese 
frigates, to be the best of their class in the world, were 
intended for operations against the Algerines, but con-
struction was delayed when a treaty betweenAlgiersand the 
United States was signed in 1796. 17 
But another treaty would, indirectly, lead to their 
completion. In 1794 Chief Justice John Jay was sent to 
London to negotiate issues between the United States and 
England, among them impressment of American sailors by the 
Royal Navy and the seizure of American merchantmen carrying 
neutral cargoes. Jay's ·rreaty said nothing about impress-
ment, but England agreed to compensate American merchants 
for the loss of their cargoes and ships seized in 1793 and 
1794. In addition, the United States agreed to remain 
neutral in the conflict between England and France. To 
the French this was a repudiation of the Franco-American 
rreaty of Amnity and Commerce signed during the Revolutionary 
War. ·rhe French Directory, in an attempt to compel the 
United States to renounce Jay's ·rreaty, turned French 
privateers loose on American shipping. Within a few 
months over three hundred American merchantmen were seized 
and condemned. 18 
17Albion, Makers, 369. 
18Bryant, Sea and States, 118-22; and Alexander De Conde, 
The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomac~ of the Undeclared 
War with France, 1798-1801 (New York, 196 )--, 4~1, 124. 
14 
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Although President John Adams kept the United States 
from a formal declaration of war, shooting broke out in 
the Caribbean and the American frigates were rushed to 
completion. In 1798 a Department of the Navy was created. 
Its first Secretary, Benjamin Stoddert, was a Georgetown 
merchant • 19 
The United States Navy was created out of a need to 
protect commerce on the seas. ·rhe merchant marine had been 
fostered by Congress; its paths had been cleared of com-
petition from foreign shipping by Congress; and now it was 
being protected from harassment through action of Congress. 
The Navy was the child of the merchant interests in 
Congress, and its guardian was a merchant, as would be 
many subsequent Secretaries of the Navy. The similarity 
of problems of fitting out and manning merchant and naval 
vessels made this a reasonable situation. Hobert G. Albion 
points out that "so closely were naval matters geared to 
that 'big business' of the young republic that such men 
would already be familiar with most of their dutie:..." 20 
This need to protect American commerce became the one 
stable, long-·lasting policy guiding the operations of the 
Navy. Soon after the turn of the century the procedure of 
19Harold & Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval 
Power, 1112-1918 (Princeton, 1939; reprint, 1967), 39; and 
Charles Oscar Paullin, Paullin'! History of Naval Adminis-
tration, 1112-1211, ~ Collection of Articles From the Q. ~· Naval Institute Proceedings-rAnnapolis,-r9b8~103. 
20Albion, Makers, unnumbered page, 19; and Paullin, 
Naval Administration, 160. 
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making extended deployments in foreign waters was ini-
tiated by President Jefferson. On 21 May 1801 he gave 
notice to the Bashaw of ·rripoli that the United States was 
sending ships to patrol the Mediterranean. "We have found 
it expedient," he said, "to detach a squadron of observation 
into the Mediterranean sea to superintend the safety of our 
commerce there, . . . . 
The use of squadrons to protect American commerce was 
easily expanded, and eventually squadrons were stationed 
in the West Indies, the Pacific, the East Indies, and off 
Brazil and Africa. Aside from this employment, the Navy's 
duties, except in wartime, were limited to responding to 
various crises generally affecting the safety of American 
22 
commerce. 
Thus by the first years of the nineteenth century the 
United States had a growing maritime commerce whose flagE 
were seen in all parts of the globe, and a navy whose 
mission was to safeguard that overseas commerce~ rhis 
mission was implemented by deploying cruisers to foreign 
stations, and easily expanded from time to time so that 
naval cruisers, by the 1840s were assigned to one of the 
six stations. 23 Unifying all this activity was the theme 
of "protection of Ameriaan commerce and interests." 
But what was meant by this phrase? It was used often, 
21Albion, Makers, 576. 
22Ibid., 571, 589. 
23Ibid. ' 584. 
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and without definition, in the nineteenth century. In a 
fundamental sense, it was the raison g'Atre of a naval 
force. In Alfred Thayer Mahan's philosophy, a "sea power" 
was a state able to use the sea in defiance of commercial 
competitors or military rivals. 24 This was accomplished 
through the interrelationship of the mercantile marine and 
the military marine: 
The [merchant] ships that thus sail to and fro must 
have secure ports to which to return, and must, as 
far as possible be followed by the protection of their 
country throughout the voyage. • • • ·rhe necessity 
of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs, 
therefore, from the existence o~5a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, •••• 
The more dependent a nation is upon the importation 
of food supplies and raw materials, the more concerned it 
is with the preservation of the uninterrupted flow of these 
goods upon the seas. Nations have thus depended upon an 
armed marine to police the sea lanes and preserve that flow. 
Clark Reynolds points out that such police operations are 
a primary mission of the naval forces of both major and 
minor powers. 26 
"Protection of Commerce" can therefore be defined as 
a primary mission of all maritime states, regardless of 
size or aspirations, entailing the maintenance of open 
24E. B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: ~Naval History 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.,-r96o), 19. 
25Alfred ·rhayer Mahan, 'l'he Influence of Sea Power Upon 
History, 1660-1783 (New Yor~1S90; reprint,-r95?), 2)-.---
26Reynolds, Command of the Sea, 4, 15. 
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lines of communications and commerce upon the seas between 
the sources of raw materials and markets for finished goods 
upon which a nation is dependent. 11 Interests" include the 
established policy of the nation as well as the safety and 
well-being of its citizens--often involved in mercantile 
affairs--upon the seas or in foreign countries. In the case 
of the United States, this mission was implemented by the 
stationing of naval cruisers in foreign waters where they 
would be available on relatively short notice to aid and 
safeguard American lives or property. 
rhe years 1800 to 1860 saw the implementation a.nd 
expansion of this policy, and they can be divided into two 
overlapping periods. The first, to 1843, was a period 
when the cruiser squadrons were established. rhe second 
period, commencing in the mid-18)0s, was one in which the 
squadrons were expanded and innovations in naval architec-
ture were introduced, not so much in response to attacks on 
commerce, but to the possibility that the rapidly increasing 
commerce of the United States was more susceptible to attack 
and that the navy should. be prepared to respond in case 
of need. 
Of the six squadrons that were established by 184;, 27 
all were created expressly to protect commerce. ·rhe African 
squadron, stationed in fulfillment of treaty obligations, 
27~here were actually seven squadrons established during 
this period, but since the Home squadron was essentially an 
expansion of the West India squadron, they will be considered 
as one. 
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was responsible for the suppression of the slave trade 
equally as much as for commerce protection. Of the six 
squadrons, two, in addition to the African, became con-
cerned with the suppression of the slave trade because of 
their positions athwart the slaver routes: the Brazilian 
and the West India/Home squadrons. 
During the War of 1812, when the United States Navy 
was fighting the Royal Navy, the Dey of Algiers took 
advantage of the unprotected state of American commerce 
again to seize American merchant shipping. Peace with 
England brought little respite for the American Navy. On 
2 March 1815 the United States declared war on Algiers and 
in May a squadron, the forerunner of the present United 
States Sixth Fleet, sailed for the Mediterranean under 
Commodore Stephen Decatur. 28 rhe capture of the Dey's 
flagship and the gun~:; of the squadron aimed at the Dey's 
capital soon resulted in a peace treaty. In 1821, however, 
President James Monroe stated his concern that if the 
squadron were withdrawn the Barbary states would "recommence 
their hostilities and depreda.tions upon our commerce." 29 
rhe Mediterranean squadron was not withdrawn. 
In 1824 President John Quincy Adams' Navy Secretary, 
28Paullin, Naval Administration, 185-86. 
29James Monroe, "Fifth Annual Message," J December 1821, 
James D. Richardson, A Com~il~~1pn of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, ~-1827, 10 vols. (Washington, 
1901), II, 108-09; and Albion, Makers, 58J. 
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Samuel Southard, warned that deteriorating conditions 
between Algiers and some of the European powers might 
redound adversely upon America's commercial interests in 
the Mediterranean, hence it was necessary to augment the 
naval force there.3° In 1828 Southard requested two 
additional sloops-of-war to convoy merchant vessels between 
Malta and Smyrna because of the threat of attack from 
Greek pirates.31 
While the Navy was waging gunboat diplomacy in the 
Mediterranean, new problems arose closer to home. rhe 
Latin American wars of independence created the classical 
conditions for the rise of piracy, and the Caribbean became 
the scene of wide-spread attacks on commercial shipping. 
Between 1815 and 1823 over three thousand piratical attacks 
were made on American merchant vessels in the Caribbean.32 
·rhe Navy began patrolling the area in 1816 and in 1821 the 
West India squadron began what Charles Oscar Paullin has 
called. "the chief 'naval war' of the period" between 1815 
and 1842.33 Oliver Hazard Perry, the hero of the War of 1812, 
30"Condition of the Navy and the Narine Corps," Samuel 
L. Southard, 1 December 1824, American State Papers: Naval 
Affairs, I, 1003-04; hereafter cited ASP:NA. 
31s. Smith to Samuel L. Southard, 11 March 1828, "On 
the Expediency of Sending ·rwo Additional Sloops-of-War to 
the Mediterranean Sea, for the Suppression of Piracy by 
the (}reeks, 11 and Sam'l L. Southard to Sam'l Smith, 17 March 
1828, ASP:NA, III, 175. 
3Zsryant, Sea and States, 211-12. 
33Paullin, Naval Administration, 186. 
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commanded American efforts to eradicate the pirates, and 
many of the Navy's future leaders participated: James 
Biddle, David G. Farragut, Matthew C. Perry, and David 
Parter. 
By 1826 West Indian piracy was under control, but in 
November of the following year the commander of the Mexican 
naval forces offered privateer commissions to anyone willing 
to cruise against the enemies of Mexico. American merchants 
looked with alarm at the possibility that this might lead 
to another outbreak of piracy. Few commissions were 
issued and a Mexican-American treaty eased the situation.34 
Nevertheless, the threat of renewed piracy helped keep the 
Navy patrolling West Indian waters. 
In 1837 Secretary of the Navy James K. Paulding 
indicated in his annual message to Congress that there was 
a need to aid and protect commerce on the American coast, 
not so much from piratical attacks, but from the ravages 
of the sea. He recommended, and a few weeks later a bill 
was enacted authorizing, the employment of public vessels 
to cruise the Atlantic coasts in winter to provide aid 
to merchantmen in distress. In 1842 a Home squadron 
consisting of eight ships was organized to continue aid 
to merchant vessels, carry out the duties of the West India 
Squadron, and also provide training for naval ships and 
34 "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Showing 
the Condition of the Navy in the Year 1828," Samuel L. 
Southard, 27 November 1828, ASP:NA, III, 214. 
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crews.l5 
Wars in South America led to the establishment of the 
Pacific and Brazilian squadrons in order to protect American 
commerce passing near the South American coasts or entering 
its ports. The Latin American wars of independence came 
rapidly to a head after 1815. By 1818 Argentina was virtually 
independent, but the leader of the rebels in southern South 
America, Jose de San Martin, realized that the Spanish hold 
on Peru had to be broken. Organizing his naval forces at 
Buenos Aires, attacks were launched around Cape Horn on 
Chile, which soon fell to the rebel forces. San Martin then 
made Lord Thomas Cochrane, an outstanding but flamboyant 
and temperamental British naval officer turned sailor-of-
fortune, commander of the Chilean Navy. In 1819 Cochrane 
declared a blockade of Peru and two years later the combined 
forces of Cochrane and San Martin invaded and expelled the 
Spanish from that country.36 
American merchants, fearful that the warfare and 
blockade of the southern continent's west coast might lead 
to attacks upon American whaling fisheries or the developing 
trade in the Pacific, urged the protection of the Navy. A 
35Martin Van Buren, "First Annual Message," 5 December 
1837, Richardson, Messages and Papers, III, 392-93; U.S., 
Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of the Navy (1838], 
S. Doc. 1, 25th Cong., 3rd sess., 597; Albion, Makers, 585; 
and Paullin, Naval Administration, 187. 
36F. C. Lynch, "Admiral Lord Cochrane: A Hero for 
·roday's Professionals, 11 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 
CI:2 (February, 1975), 73; and Reynolds, Command of the 
Sea, )60-62. - --
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few naval vessels had earlier rounded Cape Horn, the frigate 
Essex being the first. However, the Pacific squadron was 
established the same year that Peru achieved its indepen-
dence. Commodore Charles Stewart, in command of two vessels, 
was given the responsibility for safeguarding United States 
merchantmen from Cape Horn to Puget Sound westward to the 
Hawaiian Islands.37 
On the Atlantic side of the South American continent 
similar conditions led to the stationing of a Brazilian 
squadron. ·rhe Brazilian struggle for independence between 
1821 and 1825, and then in 1826 war between Buenos Aires 
and Brazil,gave "rise to very great irregularities among 
the naval officers of the latter, by whom principles in 
relation to blockades and neutral navigation have been 
brought forward to which we cannot subscribe and which our 
commanders have found it necessary to resist." In February 
and March 1826 every representative from Massachusetts 
joined with Boston and Philadelphia merchants in petitions 
to the Secretary of the Navy for additional naval v~ssels 
to patrol the Brazilian coast.38 However, the "very useful 
and friendly commercial intercourse" between the United 
States and Brazil made an amicable settlement possible. 
Although the sloop-of-war Cyane patrolled the coast as early 
37Paullin, Naval Administration, 187. 
38John Reed and Others to S. L. Southard, 15 February 
1826, "On the Necessity of Increasing the Naval Force for 
the Protection of Commerce of the United States with 
Brazil and Buenos Ayres, 11 ASP: NA, I I , 647. 
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as 1821, to ensure the continued safety of American merchants 
in the waters eastward of Brazil and Argentina, a more 
substantial naval force was kept on the station beginning 
in 1825.39 
'rhe last squadron, except for the African, to be 
established was one for the eastern Pacific and Indian 
Oceans. In this region independence movements did not 
cause the demand for a squadron, but rather an increasingly 
valuable traffic with the Pacific Islands, East Indies, 
China, and India, and the possibility of attacks by local 
pirates or natives. Peacock was in the East Indies in 1815, 
followed by Congress in 1819. Not until 1829 and 1830 was 
another American ship-of-war in the Far East. rhe sloop-
of-war Vincennes, Master Commandant William B. Finch, cruised 
the Pacific and Far East, visiting the Society and Hawaiian 
Islands, Macao, Manila, and the Straits of Sunda. In Macao 
Finch was told by the American consul at Canton: 
We feel no hesitation in assuring you that it is not 
only our wish to have frequent visits by our national 
ships, attended as we believe they would be by benefit 
to the commerce of this port; • • • special care 
would be observed by all not to encroach on our rights, 
knowing that the power was at hand to appe~0 to, and that the appeal would not be made in vain. 
Early the next year the Salem ship Friendship, Captain 
39John Quincy Adams, "Second Annual Message," 5 December 
1826, Richardson, Messages and Pa~ers, II, 362-63; and 
Paullin, Naval Administration, 18 • 
40ibid., 187; and E. Mowbray rate, "American I1erchant 
and Naval Contacts with China, 1784-1850, 11 rhe American 
Neptune, XXXI (1971), 179-82. 
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Charles M. Endicott, was on the coast of Sumatra gathering 
the pepper that had given Salem a monopoly in the East 
Indian spice. On 9 February the natives attacked 
Friendship, killing nine of the fourteen man crew. Cap-
tain Endicott and his four crewmen reached three American 
ships the next morning and eventually the United States. 
Endicott demanded that the government punish the pirates. 
On 9 August the frigate Potomac, Captain John Downes, set 
sail for Sumatra with orders to seek reparations and 
punish the guilty parties. Downes exceeded his orders. 
He made a landing at Quallah Battoo and destroyed the town 
before receiving its surrender. American commerce and 
interests in Sumatra were protected for the future. 41 
In his Annual Report of December 18)1 Secretary of the 
Navy Levi Woodbury used the incident to urge the creation 
of a Far East squadron. "rhe great value of our commerc~ 
in India and China, exceeding five millions annually, and 
its constant exposure, with many valuable lives, to 
insult and rapine, furnish a strong appeal to the Govern-
ment for the protection of a naval force." In 1835 the 
sloop-of-war Peacock and schooner Enterprise under 
Commodore Edward P. Kennedy were the first vessels of the 
41 This incident is related, among other places, in 
Celia Woodworth, "The USS Potomac and the Pepper Pirates," 
in Clayton R. Barrow, Jr., ed., America Spreads Her Sails: 
U.§. Seapower in the 19th Century (Annapolis, l973), 56-
b'9; and 11 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 
Showing the Condition of the Navy in the Year 1831," ASP:NA, 
IV, 10. 
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East India squadron.42 
The African squadron, the last to be deployed, was 
established in 1843 in compliance with the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty of the previous year. Naval vessels 
had visited the African coast since 1817 in an attempt 
to suppress the slave trade. A legitimate, and growing, 
exchange was developing with Africa, but Secretary Abel 
P. Upshur reported in 1842 that several vessels had been 
seized by the natives and their crews "barbarously 
murdered." Commander Ramsey of the sloop-of-war Vandalia 
was ordered to Beribee, about ninety miles south of Cape 
Palmas, to demand reparations for an attack upon the 
schooner Mary Carver. Similar orders were given to 
Commodore Matthew C. Perry the next year when he took 
command of the fi~st American squadron off the African 
coast. 43 
With the creation of the African squadron the first 
period, that of establishing stations in response to the 
necessity to maintain open lines of communications for the 
nation•s maritime commerce, came to an end. rhe second 
period, that of expansion of the squadrons, had already 
begun. This growth was justified by a belief that the 
42Ibid. 
43u.s. Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy [1837j, s. Doc. 1, 25th Cong., 2nd seas., 762; ibid., 
House, Report of the Secretary of the Njvy [1841], H. Doc. 2, 
27th Cong., 2nd sess., 349; ibid. [IS42 , 3rd sess., 538; 
and Paullin, Naval Adminstration, 187. 
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rapid increase in the size of the merchant marine, and the 
possibility of interference with the free flow of goods, 
demanded a corresponding increase in the number of naval 
vessels on station. Not only were greater numbers desired, 
but also new innovations, particularly steam-powered vessels. 
Steam power could increase the usefulness of the squadrons. 
Independence from the wind would enable steam vessels to 
patrol closer to shores and penetrate more easily into 
rivers. 
The change from first period to second was expressed 
by President Andrew Jackson and his Navy Secretary. In the 
early years of the administration they reported that the 
naval force of the United States on distant stations was 
ample for the protection of commerce. In his first Annual 
Message Jackson stated that "in time of peace we have need 
of no mere ships of war than are requisite to the protection 
of our commerce." 44 Three years later he was able to point 
~l~h some pride to the fact that increased protection had 
been given to commerce without any increase in the size of 
the naval force. ·rhis was effected, he said, by the collec-
tion of materials for ship building in the event of future 
emergency. 45 
By the time of his seventh Annual Message in 1835 
44Andrew Jackson, "First An..YJ.ual Message," 8 December 
1829, Richardson, Messages and Papers, II, 456-60. 
45Jackson, "Fourth Annual Message," 4 December 18)2, 
ibid., 604-05. 
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Jackson had reversed his original position. "It appears 
. . • that our naval force at present in commission, with 
all the activity which can be given it, is inadequate to 
the protection of our rapidly increasing commerce. ·rhis 
consideration ••• strongly urge[s] . . • a speedy 
increase of the force which has been heretofore employed 
abroad and at home." 46 
There was little apparent justification for extension 
of the naval patrols. Piratical activities in the 
Mediterranean and West Indies had been quieted and the 
Latin American wars of independence had been concluded. 
Few annual messages of the Presidents or their Navy Secre-
taries report any disruption of American commerce. This 
freedom of the sea lanes was attributed to the activity of 
American naval cruisers. 47 
Instead of the actual interference, a new justifica-
tion was needed for the maintenance of the cruisers on 
station. Jackson hit upon this in his seventh message. 
The quantity of American commerce was increasing and this, 
of necessity, required a parallel increase in the number 
of cruisers. Secretary Abel Upshur made the most extensive 
enunciation of this role in 1841. Estimating that the 
46Jackson, "Seventh Annual Message," ibid., III, 173. 
47For example see: Jackson, "Eighth Annual Message," 
5 December 1836, ibid., 257; Van Buren, "Third Annual 
Message," 2 December 1839, ibid., 537-38; Zachary Taylor, 
"First Annual Message," 4 December 1849, ibid., V, 21; 
and Millard Fillmore, "Second Annual Message, 11 2 December 
1851, ibid., 132. 
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United States had close to a hundred and fifty million 
dollars worth of shipping each year upon the seas, he 
stated, "so large an interest is entitled to demand, 
and justly expects to receive the most certain and ample 
protection • • • • Trade is never secure, unless it can, 
at all times and in all places, appeal for support of the 
national flag; II But the United States was "far . . . . 
behind all the considerable nations of the world in this 
respect." England, whose maritime commerce was less than 
twice the American•s, had eight times as many warships; 
and France, with an overseas commerce only a third that 
of the United States, had a navy five times the size of 
the United States Navy. 48 
To meet the needs of this great and expanding trade 
there were repeated calls for additional vessels. Pres-
ident Martin Van Buren, in 1838, urged an increase in the 
number of small vessels in addition to his request for a 
Home squadron. 49 James K. Polk spoke of this need in 
several of his annual messages. In his first he pointed 
out that the United States had a maritime commerce 
second but to one other country and it needed greater 
protection than was currently given to it. Polk used 
this opportunity also to call for the building of several 
48u.s., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy [1841J, H. Doc. 2, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 357-58. 
49van Buren, "Second Annual Message," 3 December 1838, 
Richardson, Messages and Papers, III, 502. 
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steamers. The following year he recommended that a steamer 
be assigned to each of the squadrons.5° 
Zachary Taylor's naval secretary, William B. Preston, 
stated that a steam navy was "necessary to maintain our 
rights and to afford the protection to our commerce • • • • 
By 1855 six steam frigates had been authorized and con-
struction on them was proceeding.51 Despite this increase 
President Franklin Pierce called for six additional steam 
" 
sloop~of-war, and his successor, James Buchanan, requested 
"ten small war steamers of light draft." 'rhe Navy, he said, 
had no vessels capable of navigating the rivers of China 
and few that could enter any of the ports south of Norfolk, 
"although many millions of foreigl. and domestic commerce 
annually pass in and out of these harbors."52 
In the post-1840 period the Navy maintained vessels on 
foreign stations although shipping was not as subject to 
attacks as it had been. New activities also kept the Navy 
busy, many of these also benefitted the merchant marine. 
Lieutenant Charles Wilkes, in command of a squadron of 
exploration, visited the Fiji Islands in 1841 and established 
5°James K. Polk, "First Annual Message, 11 2 December 
1845, ibid.4 IV, 412-13; and "Second Annual Message,
11 8 
December 18 6, ibid., 505. 
51u.s.j Congress House, Report of the Secretar~ of the 
Navy [1839 , H. Ex. Doc. 5, 31st Cong., 1st sess.,38T and 
Franklin Pierce, 11 'l'hird Annual Message, 11 31 December 1855, 
Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 339. 
52James Buchanan, "First Annual Messe.ge, 11 8 December 
1857, ibid., 459. 
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"useful regulations of trade and intercourse with some of 
the principal chiefs.n53 In the same year Commander French 
Forrest interceded in behalf of American and British citizens 
in California who had been accused by Mexican authorities 
of conspiring to separate California from Mexico. Lieu-
tenant A. Bigelow, in the schooner Shark, cruised off Peru 
duriug that country's civil war to protect 11 the property 
of American citizens, exposed to the rapacity and lawless 
violence of contending factions ...... 54 In 1847 Commander 
James Glynn, of the sloop-of-war Preble, rescued some 
sailors from a whaler that had been wrecked on a Japanese 
island and imprisoned in Nagasaki.55 In each of these 
instances, the American Navy was on the scene to intercede 
in behalf of American commerce. 
In the 1850s the Navy continued its aid to American 
mercantile inte:r."ests. Lieutenant Issac G. Strain, in 1854, 
and Lieutenant T. A. M. Craven, in 1857 and 1858, explored 
the isthmus of Panama seeking an all-water route from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific. The former lost his life in the 
attempt.56 More successful was the effort of Commodore 
Matthew C. Perry to open trade relations with Japan in 
53 U.S.~ Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy [1841J, H. Doc. 2, 27th Cong., 2nd seas., 348. - --
54 6 Ibid., 34 • 
55Albion, Makers, 600. 
56Lawrence c. Allin, "Lieutenant Strain's Ordeal, 11 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, C:2 (1974), 83-86; and 
Paullin, Naval Administration, 245. 
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1854. Four years later the government responded to the 
request of an American merchant in Paraguay, and the attack 
upon an American naval steamer exploring the Paraguay River, 
and mounted a large naval expedition against the South 
American country. Gunboat diplomacy had the desired results 
and American commercial interests reaped great advantages 
from the intercession of American warships.57 
From the establishment of the Federal government to 
the Civil War there were two constants in the history of 
the Navy. The first was that it should exist and grow. 
This growth was two-fold: in numbers of vessels and in 
areas of operation. The second constant was that the Navy 
existed for the benefit of the commercial maritime interests 
of the nation. The Navy was established to safeguard 
shipping from the attacks of Barbary corsairs, and expanded 
to fight Latin American pirates. It did not matter that, 
after the Latin American wars of independence and the 
eradication of piracy in the West Indies, there was little 
real threat to American commerce. It would be difficult to 
prove that the Navy provided any real protection against 
the few sporadic attacks on individual ships after 18JO. 
Two vessels, charged with surveillance of the South Pacific, 
57These incidents are well known. A gcod summary of 
the for~er appears in Bryant, Sea and States, 274-80; and 
of the latter in Barrow, America-spreads Her Sails, 70-79; 
and Clare V. McKanna, "The Water Witch Incident," rhe 
American Neptune, XXXI (1971), 7-18. -
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Japan, China, and the Indian Ocean could do little to 
inhibit random attacks on shipping. But protection of 
commerce was an argument for enlarging the Navy and for 
the introduction of steam power into ship propulsion. rha 
Navy continued, despite the lack of such attacks, in 
readiness to respond when needed, anywhere a ship could 
sail. Ship commanders and squadron commodores had in their 
orders statements regarding their responsibility to the 
protection of commerce. In a five year period, 18)8 to 
184), picked at random from the microfilm collection of 
the Secretary of the Navy's letters every set of "Sailing 
Orders•• pointed out the need to protect commerce. In some 
cases this duty was the primary task of the ship or squadron. 
In other cases it was secondary. But in all the orders it 
was important.58 
To carry out this duty the Navy had an average of 
about 40 vessels in service. These had to be divided 
among the six patrol stations with enough to carry out 
miscellaneous duties such as exploring the Bering Straits, 
the Pacific, or the Amazon, survey the coastal waters of 
the United States, or to be in transit from the United 
States to an assigned station. 
Such devotion, on the part of the government, to the 
protection of commerce was not a matter of disinterested 
58Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Office~s, 
1798-1868 (M-149), Rolls 25 to )4, Naval Records Collection 
of the Office of Naval Records and Library, Record Group 45, 
National Archives. See Appendix A for sample extracts. 
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philanthropy. Ninety percent of the Federal government's 
annual income came from customs duties on commercial 
shipping. In 1795, out of a total Federal revenue of 
$6,115,000 five and a half millions came from customs 
receipts, and in 1860 almost ninety-five percent of the 
$56,065,000 of government income came from duties on com-
merce.59 It is little wonder then that the major peacetime 
function of the Navy should be the protection of commerce, 
for this was merely protecting the source of the nation's 
income. 
59Historical Statistics, 712. 
J4 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPrER II 
A CRUISER NAVY 
W. E. B. DuBois, in his pioneer work on the suppres-
sion of the slave trade, has stated that instead 
of a number of small light vessels, which by the 
reports of experts were reportedly to be the only 
efficient craft [for the anti-slaver patrols] the 
government, until 1859, persi~ted in sending out 
three or four great frigates. 
More recently Hugh G. Soulsby echoed DuBois. rhe "American 
squadron [off Africa] seldom exceeded four or five cruisers, 
--clumsy, heavy ships, • ." and "the vessels sent out 
were of the wrong type[, l]arge, heavily armed, slow 
. ., i f u2 sa1~ ng men-o -war, •••• 
·rwo authorities have made statements describing the 
naval vessels assigned to patrol against slavers. DuBois 
is wrong and Soulsby is misleading. ·rhe United States Navy 
did indeed send cruisers to the African coast. But they 
were not necessarily frigates and certainly not what Soulsby 
described. 
·rhe term 11 cruiser" dates to the mid-eighteenth century 
1w. E. Burghardt DuBois, ·rhe Suppression of the African 
Slave-Trade to the United States-or America, 1bJ8-1870 (New 
York, 1896; reprint, 1965), 186. 
2Hugh G. Soulsby, The Right of Search and the Slave 
Trade in Anglo-American Relations-,-1814-1862, II rhe Johns 
Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political 
Science," Series LI No. 2 (Baltimore, 19JJ), 87, 10). 
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when England's First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Anson, 
divided the Royal Navy into two categories of ships. Those 
able to take a place in the line of battle because of their 
heavy construction and armament were called battleships or 
ships of the line. rhe remainder, thosewhoseprincipal uses 
were scouting, relaying messages for the fleet, or commerce 
raiding were termed cruisers.) It was this category, divided 
among several types of vessels, which constituted the great 
majority of ships in the American Navy. 
Classifying sailing vessels is confusing at best and 
often impossible. 4 Terms used in one period changed their 
meaning in another, one word could have more than one 
meaning~ and classification was often a mere matter of 
degree. However, a few generalizations can be made. Vessels 
were early classified by rig, either square-rigged or fore-
and-aft rigged. And they could be classified by hull form. 
Ship, brig, and schooner denote specific combinations or 
rig. A ship had three masts--fore, main, and mizzen--each 
divided into three sections--lower, top, and topgallant. 
3a. J. Marcus, A Naval History of ~land, vol. I: 
The Formative Years TBoston, 1961), ~1~. 
4Most of the information concerning ship types and 
their development is derived from two works by Howard I. 
Chapelle: The History of American Sailing Ships {New York, 
1935) and The History of the American Saili~ Navy: The 
Ships and Their Developmenr-(New York, 1949~ Also helpful 
is Bjorn Landstrom The Ship: An Illustrated History 
(Garden City, 1961~. In my opinion this is the best "picture 
book" on the development of ships through the ages. Bio-
graphies of specific U.S. Navy ships may be found in :U.S., 
Naval History Division, Dictionary of American Naval Fighting 
Ships, 6 vola. to date (Washington, D.C., 1959-1976). 
)6 
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Each mast carried square sails suspended from yards (not 
yardarms) which crossed the midline of the hull roughly 
at right angles. A brig was similar to the ship but had 
only two masts, the fore and main. A ketch had the main 
and mizzen masts. In both cases the main mast was the 
largest. 
Sloops and schocners carried their sails in line with 
the length of the hull, or fore and aft. Sloops had one 
37 
mast; schooners two or more. In addition, schooners could 
carry square sails above their lower fore and aft sails, 
giving rise to terms such as "fore and main topsail schooner," 
describing a vessel that carried topsails and possibly 
topgallants. The ultimate schooner was 'rhomas W. Lawson, 
a seven-master, built in 1902. 
By the 1840s the development of brigs and schooners 
had made the two types quite similar. A brig could carry 
fore and aft sails on each mast and the schooner could 
cross a square lower sail on the yard used to spread the 
tacks, or lower corners, of the topsails. 'rhe difference 
between the two types became only a matter of the length 
of the lower mast. A different variation was a cross 
between a brig and a schooner called a brigantine, or 
hermaphrodite brig, that had a square-rigged foremast and 
a fore-and-aft rigged main, each mast susceptible to the 
mutations of its parent's types. 
To confuse matters even more, vessels were sometimes 
described by hull form. Originally "frigate" and "galley" 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
denoted certain characteristics of hull. Frigates began 
as small, swift, oared vessels used in the Nediterranean. 
By the late eighteenth century the term referred to a 
vessel, not necessarily a ship, that had a detached fore-
castle and quarter deck above a complete main deck. By 
the mid-nineteenth century frigate was a large ship-of-
war mounting its main battery on a complete covered main 
deck and on the exposed quarter deck and forecastle. 
11 Sloop 11 had two meanings. Used alone the word denoted 
a single-masted fore-and-aft rigged vessel. In the Royal 
Navy during the Napoleonic wars a sloop was a vessel 
commanded by an officer who had not been 11 posted" captain, 
or put in line for automatic promotion. But in the United 
States sailing navy it referred to a small ship-rigged 
vessel mounting guns on one deck. In this case the term 
was usually modified into sloop-of-war or ship-sloop. 
Sailing combatants in the United States Navy can be 
divided into six broad types based primarily on size and 
rig: ships of the line, frigates, sloop~o~war, brigs, 
brigantines, and schooners. 5 ·rhe first three classes were 
ships, their main difference being their size and armament. 
rhe ship of the line was the battleship of the era. ·rhe 
typical ship of this class displaced two to three thousand 
tons, mounted its guns in broadsides on two or three 
complete decks, and carried 500 to 1000 men. rhe battle-
ship fleet was typical of a nation with a far-flung empire 
5see Appendix B for plans of representative vessels. 
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that needed protection and which would use its navy to 
contend for mastery of the sea. A neutral or poor nation or 
one that wanted to remain aloof from major naval wars, had 
little need for ships of the line. ·rhe United States 
commissioned only nine between 1775 and 1860, and these 
were little used. Ranging from America of 1,982 tons, built 
during the Revolutionary War, to Pennsylvania, the largest 
sailing ship built for the United States Navy at ),105 tons 
and 120 guns, these huge ships were seldom used at sea. 
They spent much of their careers laid up--"in ordinary"--
or as receiving ships at the various naval stations. Except 
for Pennsylvania all were rated at 74 guns. 
For the Navy's primary mission of protecting commerce, 
ships of the line were virtually useless, and except for 
a few deployments to "show the flag" or impress smaller 
powers like Algeria and the South American nations, they 
seldom went to sea. The cost of building, arming, and 
manning a battleship was too great for the nation considering 
the benefit derived from their deployment. 
·rhe frigate was the largest of the cruisers. Dis-
placing 800 to 1500 tons, and armed with 28 to 50 guns, 
the frigate combined fire power, endurance, and speed. 
This was a class in which the United States excelled. ·rhe 
first frigates authorized for the United States Navy, as 
opposed to the ContinentalNavy, the Constitution and 
Constellation classes, epitomized American ideas in warship 
construction. They were intended to be the largest, 
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strongest, and most heavily armed frigates in the world, 
and they met their expectations. The success of the large 
frigates against the Barbary pirates, the French and the 
British in single ship combat ensured their popularity--
and their growth. By the 1840s "double-banked" frigates 
were being built. These had in addition to the fully 
armed main deck a fully armed upper deck created by joining 
the quarter deck and forecastle with broad gangways. 
These were large ships, and when it came to hunting 
pirates or chasing slavers using a frigate was like using 
a sledge hammer to kill a fly. They had many of the same 
problems as ships of the line; lack of maneuverabill ty anci. 
too deep a draft. These problems became especially 
apparent in 1803 when the Navy found itself with a fleet 
of frigates and but one small vessel, a schooner, to fight 
Barbary pirates. This situation led to the building of a 
very versatile class of ship, the sloop-of-war. About half 
the tonnage of a frigate, the ship-sloops carried 16 to 24 
guns on a single deck. l'he first built for the United 
States Navy were Hornet and Wasp. Originally designed as 
brigs it was found that their rig was too lofty and they 
were converted to ships. In 1813 Peacock was built by 
Adam and Noah Brown of New York. So successful was this 
ship that her design was the basis of ship-sloop construc-
tion for the next quarter century. Peacock's performance 
was also responsible for increasing the interest of naval 
officers in this class. After the War of 1812 the 
40 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ship-sloop was the dominate class of American war vessel. 
The sloop-of-war was a good, all around cruiser; moderate 
size, armament, and crew, but with great endurance at sea. 
In the 1840s the sloop-of-war was so popular that many of 
the older frigates were rearmed as ship-sloops. rhe 
American trend of bigger and bigger in ship construction 
led to the building of "first class sloops," which like 
frigates had their armament on a covered main deck, but 
differing from frigates in that the upper deck was not 
armed. ·rhe Constellation that is now in Baltimore was 
built as a first-class sloop. In contrast to the frigates 
of the 1840s and 1850s, this sloop has been built up to a 
frigate. ·rhese large sloops and frigate-sloops suffered 
from many of the same problems as frigates, but the smaller 
sloops were almost ideal peacetime cruisers. 
The smallest classes of cruisers, the brig, brigantine, 
and schooners, were best employed where it was necessary to 
operate in shoal waters, penetrate rivers, or stay near the 
coasts. ·rheir small size made them less sui table on 
extended employments, but they were found at one time or 
other on all the stations. 
As in frigate and sloop-of-war design, American 
builders developed outstanding models of schooners. During 
the War of 1812 American schooners based on the Baltimore 
clipper model had a distinct speed advantage over foreign-
built schooners. By 1821 these war-built vessels were 
getting old, and the Navy needed many small vessels to 
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fight pirates in the Caribbean. Four schooners were built 
to plans drawn by Samuel Humphreys, son of Joshua Humphreys 
builder of the Revolutionary War frigate Randolph and later 
President. A fifth schooner, Grampus, was designed by 
Henry Eckforci. 
Aside from Wasp and Hornet, which were converted to 
ships, not many brigs were built until the 1840s. In 1842 
Somers, Bainbridge, and Truxton were launched with Perry 
coming down the ways the following year. ·rhey were all 
fast vessels and Perry had a reputation as one of the fast-
est vessels in the Navy. In hull form these vessels 
differed little from the schooners of the period. ·rhe 
armament of these small cruisers varied greatly, from one 
or two guns on some of the small schooners purchased to 
suppress West Indian pirac~ to sixteen or eighteen guns on 
the larger brigs and schooners. 
The United States Navy, in the years between 1815 and 
1860 had about 100 sailing men-of-war, excluding certain 
vessels purchased for e~:ploring expeditions, surveying, or 
operating only on inland waters. Except for the eight ships 
of the line commissioned in this period they were all 
considered cruisers. This group can be broken down as 
twenty frigates, thirty-five sloop~of-war, eleven brigs, 
two brigantines, and twenty-seven schooners. ·rhe vast 
majority are thus seen to be the smaller classes of 
cruisers. 
What then were these "clumsy, heavy ships," these 
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"large, heavily armed, slow sailing men-of-war" that 
Soulsby and DuBois com};lain about. ·rhe simple fact of the 
matter is that they were wrong, just as many other writers 
on the subject have been. Daniel P. Mannix called the 
third class sloop-of-war Yorktown a frigate. Even such an 
eminent naval historian as Samuel Eliot Morison incorrectly 
identifies Macedonian, a ship in Perry's squadron off 
Africa, as being "the prize ship of 1812, which had been 
razeed to a 36-gun sloop, . . . . ·rhe original Macedonian 
had been broken up at the Norfolk Navy Yard in 1835 and 1836 
and a new 36-gun frigate built of the same name. Between 
1849 and 1852 she was razeed to a 24-gun ship-sloop.? 
The sloop-of-war was the class of vessel that dominated 
the slave trade patrols. During the years in which the 
squadron was stationed on the coast of Africa only four 
frigates made cruises to Africa to suppress the trade: 
Macedonian, Constitution, United States, and Cumberland. 8 
·rhe last of these was part of the squadron on two occasions, 
6Daniel P. Mannix, Black Cargoes: A History of the 
Atlantic Slave Trade, 1518-1~61, in collaboration with 
Malcolm Cowley (New York, 19 5 , 221; and Samuel Eliot 
Morison, "Old Bruin," Commodore Matthew C. Perry,~-
1858 (Boston, 1967), 164. -
?chapelle, Sailing Navy, 46)-64; and "Macedonian," 
Dictionary of Fighting Ships, IV, 179-80. 
8u.s., Congress, House, Report of the Committee 2n the 
Suppression of the Slave Trade, H. Rept. 92, 17th Cong., 
1st sess.; ibid., Afr~can Squadron, H. Ex. Doc., 73, Jlst 
Cong., 1st seas.; and ibid., Instructions to the African 
Squadron, H. Ex. Doc.~ 35th Cong., 2nd sess. See also 
Appendix C for the dimensions of vessels deploying to 
Africa. 
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the first time, in 184;, as a 44-gun frigate. Before her 
second deployment she had been razeed. Almost one-half of 
the vessels that participated in the African patrols were 
sloops-of-war, the remainder consisted of brigs, brigantines, 
schooners, and a few frigates. Never was there more than 
one frigate on the African station at a time.9 
The desirability of employing these small ships for 
the suppression of the slave trade and protection of com-
merce is obvious: large ships cost more money to build, 
equip, supply, and they absorbed more men. On station small 
vessels were more maneuverable and could go places the large 
ones could not. With a merchant marine trading with every 
area of the world and requiring protection of a naval force, 
the most practical and effective force which the United 
States could afford was one made up of small ships-of-war. 
rhe fact that pirates and slavers generally employed small, 
lightly armed vessels made the employment of naval vessels 
of the small ocean-going classes practical. 
rhe conditions experienced by men-of-war on stations as 
varied as those in the Mediterranean, East India, and off 
Brazil had to be considered before deploying brigs and 
schooners. Could they safely double Cape Horn, or keep the 
sea in a storm? Could they support a large number of 
men for long periods without reprovisioning? Such con-
9see Appendix D. This table lists by name and class 
the vessels assigned to Africa with a numerical comparison 
of the vessels assigned to other squadrons or duties. 
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erations led to the construction of all purpose ships such 
as the sloop-of-war. 
These then were the cruisers Soulsby complained of as 
being too large for the job of pursuing slavers. Indeed, 
almost every vessel in the United States Navy was a cruiser, 
and they were of all types and sizes, but they were 
predominently sloops-of-war. 
Soulsby also condemned these ships as slow and clumsy, 
a phrase that tends to give the impression that large ships--
his idea of a cruiser being a large vessel--were innately 
slow and clumsy. It is interesting to note that almost 
all of the speed records held by sailing vessels are held 
by large ships, the clipper ship records being the best 
examples. The schooner Grampus and brig Perry, both small 
vessels, were noted as being fast sailers, but the frigate 
Constitution also had the reputation of being a fast ship 
as did a number of the ship-sloops. 
To state that small vessels, such as slavers, were 
faster than large ships neglects a great many factors, and 
what Howard I. Chapelle states "is an axiom in naval 
architecture that 'other things being equal, the largest 
(or longest) ship is the fastest.''' Wind and sea conditions 
and the trim of a vessel--how it sits in the water--determine, 
to a great extent, whether a ship will be particularly fast 
or slow on a given day. In mild weather the smaller ship 
would usually have an advantage for the simple reason that 
it takes less wind to move a small vessel, but with any kind 
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of sea rising or with more than a moderate breeze the large 
ship may well have the advantage in speed. 10 
Winds have another effect. In conjunction with the 
ocean currents they create sea lanes, paths that vessels 
traversing great distances almost had to follow. In terms 
of miles, however, the path might be far longer than a 
direct, straight line route. An example was the route 
from South America to the west coast of Africa. In 1042 
Lieutenants Charles H. Bell and John S. Paine pointed this 
out to Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State: 
Vessels bound from the coast of Brazil or the West 
Indies to the coast of Africa are obliged, in 
consequence of the trade winds, to run north as far 
as the latitude of thirty or thirty-five, to get 
into the variable winds; thence to the eastward, 
until they reach the longitude of Cape Verde islands; 
then steer to the southward to their port of destin-
ation; and, if bound as far to the eastward as the 
Gulf of Guinea, usualt1 make the land near Cape 
Mount or Cape Palmas. 
Bell and Paine had made two cruises to the African 
coast in 18)9 and 1841 and their observations are worth 
noting, for until about 1850 the west coast of Africa 
supplied a considerable portion of the slaves. Howard 
points out that Porto Praia, the American base in the Cape 
Verde Islands, was not even close to the remaining slave 
10chapelle, American Sailing Ships, 49. See also his 
·rhe Search for Speed Under Sail, 1700-1§22 (New York, 1967) 
for an in depth discussion of the factors which comprise 
a fast sailing vessel. 
11 C. H. Bell and J. S. Paine to D. Webster, 10 May 1842, 
U.S., Congress, House, African Colonization--Slave rrade--
Commerce, H. Rept. 28), 27th Cong., Jrd.sess., 770, hereafter 
cited H. Rept. 28). 
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coast north of the Equator and that cruisers spent too 
much time merely sailing between the coast and the depot. 12 
Plotting the route outlined by Bell and Paine on a 
chart makes it quite clear that slavers had to pass through 
or near the Cape Verde Islands and make their landfall on 
the Liberian coast. rhis track describes the same route 
travelled by American cruisers. Porto Praia seen in this 
light becomes a strategic location, covering the routes 
used by all sailing vessels, naval cruisers as well as 
slavers, and indeed several slavers were captured by American 
naval vessels near that port. 13 
Wind conditions in the Gulf of Guinea did favor the 
smaller vessels. The wind there is often light or non-
existent.14 In the former case a small vessel would have 
a definite advantage, in the latter neither large nor small 
vessels would have any advantage--unless their motive power 
were independent of the wind. If there was a means by 
which the government might have improved the capabilities 
of all the squadrons it was the utilization of this new form 
of propulsion. 'fhe advantages of steam appeared obvious: 
giving a ship the ability to sail to any point of the compass 
12warren s. Howard, American Slavers and the Federal 
Law, ~-1862 (Berkeley, 1963), 42-43. 
13see Appendix E for a list of slavers captured by 
American men-of-war. 
14u.s., Naval Oceanographic Office, Sailing Directions 
for Southwest Coast of Africa: C)pe Palmas to Cape of Good 
Hope, H. 0. Pub. 50, 5th ed (1969 , 25-37. 
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at a speed not dependent on the wind. But steam-powered 
vessels, whether paddle wheel or propeller, were not used 
to any great extent until the 1850s, despite the urgings of 
naval officers. 
In their letter to Secretary of State Webster, Bell 
and Paine recommended that the force on the west African 
coast consist of: 
One first class sloop-of-war. 
One steamer of 200 to JOO tons burden. 
rwo (eight or ten-gun) brigs or schooners. 
Ten Schooners of about one hundred tons, each with 
four guns. . 1.5 
One Store-ship of 2.50 to JOO tons. 
Many naval and diplomatic officers made similar requests 
in the following years, but with the brief exception of 
Alleghany on the Brazil station these urgings went unheeded 
until 1~.58 when steamers acquired for the Paraguan expedition 
were deployed to Africa and Cuba. 
rhe absence of American steamers as part of the African 
squadron WAS emphasized by the inclusion of steamers in 
the British contingent. Perry wrote to the Secretary of 
the Navy in March 1844 that Royal Navy officers had informed 
him that Great Britain had "ordered to be equipped for the 
African station thirty fast-sailing vessels, eleven of which 
are to be steamers, . . . . As early as 1846 Her Majestys' 
1.5 H. Hept. 28). 770. 
16u.s., Congress, Senate, Message from the President of 
the United States ••• relative to the ••• squadron on 
the west Coast of Africa, s. Ex. Doc. 1.50, 28th Cong., 2nd 
sess:-;-8); and Michael H. Bouquet, "Capture of the 'Sunny 
South' Slaver," History Today, X (1960), .57.5. 
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steamer Penelope was capturing slavers off Africa. 
The desirability of steam men-of-war was readily 
apparent and the question arises as to why they were not 
employed in American squadrons, especially the African, 
prior to 1858. One reason must certainly be the conserv-
atism of the Navy Department. In January 1839 the Secretary 
of the Navy, James K. Paulding, wrote: 
However powerful and various in its application, 
steam can never become the universal agent, nor 
supersede the operations of the elements of nature, 
and all the powers of human life. ·rhere are, and 
must be, limits to its agency; and it seems to me 
it would neither be wise nor politic to abandon 
entirely a system of naval architecture, under which 
the United States have acquired so much honor, and 
so many advantages, in order to adopt in its stead 
a different one, which, • • • has not yet stood 
the test of time and experience.l? 
The Navy began experimenting with steam vessels about 
the time this was written. In the early 1840s Matthew 
C. Perry, as commanding officer of Fulton, gained a great 
deal of experience with steam. Lieutenant William W. 
Hunter, the former commander of Alleghany, proposed a vessel 
driven by submerged horizontal wheels. A vessel was built 
to Hunter's specifications but it proved to be slow and 
inefficient. It was generally acknowledged in the 1840s that 
11 no invention as yet rivals the paddlewheel in speed, • . 
Some of these paddle-wheel steamers could achieve a fair 
17u.s., Congress, Senate, Report gn Construction of 
Steam War Vessels, S. Doc., 267, 25th Cong., )rd sess., J. 
18Ibid., House, Report on War Steamers, H. Rept. 681, 
29th Cong., 1st sess., 7, hereafter cited H. Rept. 681. 
• • 
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turn of speed for short periods. For instance, the steamer 
Powhatan, one of the finest vessels in the Navy at the time, 
could achieve a speed of about 11.5 knots under steam alone 
and about 12.; knots with both steam and sails. To sustain 
this speed required 4,450 to 4,500 pounds of coal per hour. 
Her best speed, however, was reached with a moderate breeze 
and her bunkers half-full of coal. 19 Even so, in a moderate 
breeze a fast saili~~ vessel stood a good chance of escaping. 
There was also the problem of reliability. ·rhe prim-
itive engines employed in these vessels were prone to 
break down. Frequent repairs were required. Powhatan, 
which by June 1853 had only been in commission ten months, 
had by that time been repaired once at a cost of seven 
thousand dollars. rhe other extreme was reached by Missis-
sippi, in 1853 an old ship having over seven years commis-
sioned service. She had been repaired nineteen times at 
a cost of nearly half a million dollars. 20 Even after the 
Civil War problems plagued the steam navy, and this form 
propulsion was little used. 21 
Frequent breakdowns required constant attention, and 
often the assistance of a repair facility. But facilities 
with the requisite industrial and technical knowledge to 
19Ibid. 
20Ibid., 4. 
21Lance C. Buhl, "Mariners and Machines: Resistance to 
Technological Change in the American Navy, 1865-1869," 
Journal of American History, LXI (1974), 706, 708-10. 
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repair these engines were not common, and mechanical failure 
could leave the ship without its engine. Therefore many of 
the steam ships remained in the Home squadron. But 
Mississippi, Powhatan, and Susquehanna did make cruises 
to the East Indies, Water Witch explored rivers in South 
America, and Hancock surveyed the Bering Straits. 22 All 
these places were far removed from adequate repair facilities. 
Low endurance, short cruising range, and slow speed 
under sail alone are not sufficient reasons for the absence 
of steamers in the African squadron. While these are not 
the most desirable qualities in a man-of-war, these dis-
advantages would have been more than overcome by the 
advantage of being independent of the wind. There is a 
fairly high proportion of days throughout the year which 
have little or no wind, bad conditions for a vessel under 
only sails, but conditions that would make the employment 
of steamers on the African coast highly practical. 
The most important reason why steam ships were not 
employed prior to 1858 is that, while a navy costs a great 
deal of money to build and maintain, a steam navy costs 
even more. Mahan says, "in a representative government 
any military expenditure must have a strongly represented 
interest behind it, convinced of its necessity." 2) 
The maintenance of a peace time navy is a good 
22H. Rept. 681, 16-17. 
23Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon 
History, 1660-1783 (New Yor~1890; reprint 1957), 88. 
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illustration of Mahan's statement. In 1859 the United 
States had some six thousand merchant vessels trading with 
almost every port in the world. 'ro protect American 
interests there were about forty commissioned vessels in 
the American fleet. The section of the country that most 
benefitt~~ and was most interested in maintaining and 
expanding the Navy was that area in which the maritime 
commerce was centered, the Atlantic seaboard, particularly 
the Northeast. rhe majority of the states had no direct 
interest in the protection of commerce. rhis is the crux 
of the problem. Since there was little interest in the 
expansion of the naval service, and no enemies threatened 
the nation, there was little money available for funding 
additional ships. As a House Report put it, "the support 
of a large navy in time of peace would impose burdens 
upon the people unnecessary to be borne, .. 24 Except 
for the Civil War the United States Navy would remain small--
a cruiser navy--until the nation had an overseas empire 
to protect. 
24 H. Rept. 681, ). 
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CHAPTER III 
SETTING THE COURSE 
From almost the beginning of the English colonies in 
North America there were two concurrent but divergent trends 
affecting slavery. The first was the entrenchment of slavery 
in the life and economy of the Southern States. On the 
other hand, there were many who opposed slavery and the slave 
trade. W. E. B. DuBois analyzes the latter trend and 
divides the colonial and pre-Federal period of the United 
States into three general periods, each characterized by a 
differing attitude toward the slave trade. 1 The first period, 
from 16J8 to 1664, was characterized by a tendency to take 
a moral position opposing the trade. The second period, 
1664 to 1760, was marked by no specific tendencies other 
than the imposition of duties on the importation of slaves. 
The purpose of these duties varied from encouragement to 
prohibition of the trade, but on the whole the morality of 
the traffic was not questioned. 2 
It is the last period, 1760 to 1787, which is most 
1 W. E. Burghardt DuBois, The Suppression of the African 
Slave-Trade to the United States of America, 1bJ8-1870 (New 
York, 1896; reprint 1 1965), 39. 
~or a brief summary of the measures intended to impede 
the slave trade prior to the Revolution, see: William 
Renwick Riddell, "Encouragement of the Slave Trade," Journal 
of Negro History, XII (1927), 22-32. 
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important to this study, for during these years there was 
begun an effort to limit or prohibit the trade through 
joint action of the colonies. In part, these prohibitions 
were taken as a means of economic retaliation against 
England. As such they were specific in purpose and tem-
porary in duration. Nevertheless, they were precedents for 
the national laws which followed and which, at a later date, 
did outlaw the slave trade to the United States. 
In the 1760s the British Parliament passed a number of 
measures--the Sugar, the Currency, and the Stamp Acts--
designed to strengthen English mercantilist policies with 
regard to the colonies. Responding to the last measure, 
delegates of the colonies met in New York on 7 October 1765 
in what has become known as the Stamp Act Congress. One of 
the first actions by the colonial delegates was to agree on 
a policy of non-importation of English goods. The result 
of this policy was that in the summer of 1766 American 
commissions for English goods were £600,000 lower than had 
been known for some thirty years.J Part of this loss of 
revenue was due to the reduced number of African slaves 
shipped from the British West Indies to the mainland colonies. 
Parliament reacted to the non-importation policy and the 
outcries of English merchants by repealing the act. The 
English slave trade, which had been seriously curtailed by 
)Arthur Meier Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants and 
the American Revolution, 112J-1776 (New York, 1918; reprint 
1959), 8o. 
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the American action, soon recovered and by the eve of the 
Revolution, English slave traders were sending out 167 ships 
a year to Afr1ca. 4 
While these measures were economic in nature there was 
a growing concern over the morality of the traffic. 'rhe 
Pennsylvania Abolition Society was the first organization 
to concern itself with helping the Negro and with the 
legitimacy of the "peculiar institution." Benjamin Franklin 
was a member throughout the latter part of his life and 
was at one time president of the society.5 
The Revolution, however, gave the greatest moral impetus 
toward the abolition of slavery and the slave trade. rhe 
ideals for which many of the patriots fought were obviously 
incompatible with the institution of slavery, and this 
encouraged a change in attitude. No longer was abolition 
of slavery and the trade based only on economic reasons. 6 
As the state of affairs worsened between England and 
her American colonies, the colonials, following the prece-
dent of the Stamp Act Congress, met in Philadelphia on 
5 September 1774. One of the first orders of business of 
this, the first Continental Congress, was the establishment 
4DuBois, Suppression of the Slave-rrade, 40-41. 
5Matthew T. Mellon, Early American Views £g Negro 
Slavery, From the Letters and PaEers of the Founders of 
the Republic (New York, 19b9T, 1 -20. 
6winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American 
Attitudes Toward the Negro, liiQ-1812 (Baltimore, 1969), 
270. 
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of a new non-importation policy toward Great Britain and 
Ireland. On 20 October 1774, "rhe Association," a policy 
statement that has been called the most significant action 
of the first Continental Congress, was adopted. The 
Association reviewed the actions of the British Crown toward 
the colonies and the colonists' grievances. But while 
it reaffirmed the allegiance of the colonies to the Crown, 
the Association also agreed to a stringent non-importation 
of British goods, not only from Great Britain and Ireland, 
but the British West Indies as well.? The inclusion of an 
article dealing with the slave trade indicates that 
abolition of the traffic was an economic measure designed 
to obtain redress of grievances. Article ·rwo states: 
We will neither import nor purchase, any slave imported 
after the first day of December next; after which 
time, we will wholly discontinue the slave trade, and 
will neither be concerned in it ourselves, nor will 
we hire our vessels, nor sell our commodities §r 
manufactures to those who are concerned in it. 
This article prohibited other countries from importing 
slaves into the United States as well as the participation i, 
the trade by Americans. Colonial participation in the slave 
trade was not extensive, and was generally considered part 
of the British trade. Philip D. Curtin estimates that ships 
?worthington Chauncy Ford, ed., Journals of the 
Continental Congress (Washington, 1904), I, 4);-Max Savelle, 
A History of Colonial America, revised by Robert Middlekauf 
TNew York,-r964), 51)-14; and Schlesinger, Colonial 
Merchants, 42). 
8~. Cont. Cong., I, 77. This non-importion resulted 
in a loss to British merchants of over £2,000,000. 
Schlesinger, Colonial Merchants, 535-)6. 
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from the mainland colonies carried 6.1 percent of the slaves 
from Africa to the Americas in 1768 while Great Britain 
carried 51.0 percent of the traffic. Over the fifty year 
period from 1761 to 1810 vessels of colonial/United States 
ownership carried an average of J.J percent of the traffic, 
this figure being reduced during the years of the Revolu-
tionary War when the traffic was negligable. Since British 
shipping carried the bulk of the slaves to the colonies, 
Article Two was obviously intended to hurt British interests 
more than American.9 On 6 April 1776 the colonies reaf-
firmed the principle of non-importation of slaves by 
resolving: "That no slaves be imported into any of the 
thirteen United Colonies." 10 
There were many reasons why these resolutions were 
accepted and the abolition of the slave trade was success-
ful at this time. 11 rhe decline of slavery in the Eastern 
and Middle States was seen as a portent of the future. The 
Revolutionary philosophy of the freedom and rights of man 
also had a considerable influence and many of the founders 
of the nation were disturbed by the inconsistency of keeping 
slaves and fighting for those rights for themselves. George 
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, all slave 
9Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A 
Census (Madison, 1969), 212-14. 
10 Jour. Cont. Cong., IV, 258. 
11 DuBois, Suppression of the Slave-Trade, 41-42. 
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holders, were aware of the inconsistency between their battle 
for human freedom and the owning of slaves, and tried to 
find solutions to the problem. 12 
Hostilities with England gave rise to fears of British 
sponsored slave insurrections or the possibility that the 
slaves would be set free by the British, fears that lessened 
the objections of slave dealers regarding abolition of the 
trade. Additionally, in 1774 and 1775 the slave markets 
were overstocked; and this, in conjunction with the wartime 
decline of tobacco, rice, and indigo production and exporta-
tion, reduced not only the value of slaves but also resistance 
to their emancipation. 13 Finally, opposition to the slave 
trade became part of the economic retaliation against 
England as symbolized by the non-importation article of 
the Association. 
·rhere was, however, no national legislation passed 
prior to the Constitutional Convention regarding the slave 
trade. Such action was undertaken by the states on an 
individual basis. Connecticut, Vermont, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, and Virginia had, by 1778, prohibited the further 
importation of slaves. In the rest of New England, and in 
the Middle States--including Maryland--importation had 
practically ceased of itself. And although there was an 
12Mellon, Early American Views, 64-6?, 76-79, 122-1), 
and 129. See Also Francis Butler Simkins, ~ History of the 
Soutb, )rd ed. (New York, 1963), 116-17. 
13Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution 
(Chapel Hill, 1961), ix. 
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increased need for slaves in the South after the war, North 
Carolina, in 1786, imposed a duty prohibitive of the further 
importation of slaves. A year later South Carolina passed a 
series of acts which, until 1803, forbade the entry of slaves 
into that state. 14 
Many of those who met to frame a new system of govern-
ment in 1787 believed that slavery was a dying institution. 
'rhey felt that within the forseeable future, the nation 
which they had established on the principle of the equality 
of man would no longer be blighted by an obvious contradic-
tion of principles. While this opinion was widely held, 
some members, particularly from South Carolina and Georgia, 
viewed the institution as a necessary evil. rhey made no 
attempt to justify slavery, but considered it necessary in 
order to preserve their society and way of life. Without 
slave labor South Carolina and Georgia could not survive 
economically, and their delegates were willing to fight or 
withdraw from the Union in order to preserve their right 
to permit slavery and the slave trade. 15 
·rhe debates concluded i~ a compromise in which the 
federal government agreed to do nothing to prohibit the 
importation of "such persons as the states think proper 11 
14ouBois, Suppression of the Slave-rrade, 51-52. 
15James Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention, ed. 
by E. H. Scott (Chicago, 1898~ 577. John Rutledge of 
South Carolina stated during the debates in the Convention 
that the "true question at present is whether the Southern 
States shall or shall not be parties to the Union." 
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until at least 1808. 16 But while the states could still 
admit slaves, there were intermediate measures which the 
federal government could enact to reduce American partici-
pation in the slave trade. In 1794 two events came together 
which resulted in the first national act limiting the 
traffic. First was the debate in 1789 and 1790 over the 
powers of Congress to enact any legislation curtailing the 
slave trade. The outcome was that on 23 March 1790 a House 
Committee of the Whole adopted, by a narrow margin, a report 
detailing congressional powers with regard to the traffic 
in human beings. The four sections reiterated the Consti-
tutional ban against interfering with the slave trade; that 
Congress could not interfere in the emancipation of slaves; 
but Congress could prohibit American citizens from engaging 
in the slave trade to other countries; and could prohibit 
foreigners from using American ports for fitting out for 
the trade. The immediate result of this report was a flurry 
of petitions from abolition societies denouncing the slave 
trade. 17 
The second event was the slave rebellion in Haiti in 
1794, led by Toussaint L'Ouverture who succeeded in 
establishing a black nation in the Caribbean. In the process 
whites were killed and the climate of fear generated in 
16 U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 9. 
17DuBois, Suppression of the Slave rrade, 74-80; and 
Thomas E. Drake, ~uakers and Slavery in America (New Haven, 
1950; reprint, 19 5), 107. 
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the United States created an atmosphere favorable to early 
action against the introduction of Africans into the United 
States. Responding to a Quaker petition, Congress approved, 
without debate, and the President signed into law on 22 March 
1794 "An Act to prohibit the carrying on of the slave trade 
from the United States to any foreign place or country." 
Under the Constitution this act coald not forbid the importa-
tion of slaves into the country, but it did make it illegal 
for persons residing in the United States, citizen or alien, 
to "build, fit, equip, load, or otherwise prepare, any ship 
or vessel, within any port or place of the said United 
States, nor shall cause any ship or vessel to sail from any 
port or place within the same, for the purpose of carrying 
on any trade or traffic in slaves to any foreign country; 
•••• 
11 upon penalty of $2,000. 18 Policing of this 
"supportive participation" was, as a rule, the responsibility 
of law enforcement personnel ashore. 
The law of 1794 merely prohibited Americans from 
participating in the trade and laid a fine on violators, but 
in 1800 a law was passed that provided for stronger enforce-
ment.19 This act recognized "personal participation," 
making it illegal "for any citizen of the United States, or 
other persons residing therein, to serve on board any vessel 
18Annals of Congress, )rd Cong., 1794, 72, 48), app. 
1425. See Appendix F for the portions of these acts 
pertaining to the Navy. 
19 6 Ibid., th Cong., 1800, X, app. 1513. 
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of the United States employed or made use of in the trans-
portation or carrying of slaves, from one foreign country 
or place to another; 
" 
The slave trade act of 1800 . . 
continued the edicts against supportive participation, but 
it expanded the injunctions to prohibit individual activity 
on board slave vessels. And it added two years imprisonment 
to the $2,000 penalty for violations of the law. 
Section Four made it possible for the President to 
order vessels of the Navy and Revenue Marine to apprehend 
vessels engaged in the slave trade contrary to the pro-
visions of the act. If the courts found the ship and its 
crew guilty or engaging in the trade,the proceeds from 
condemnation would be divided amongst officers and crew of 
the government vessel in 11 proportion directed in the case 
of prize " 
·rhe bill passed the House on 3 May 1800 with but five 
dissenting votes. John Brown, one of the five, of Rhode 
Island was concerned with the effect that abolition of the 
slave trade would have on the rum industry in his home 
state. 20 With the passage of this act the United States 
21 Navy began to seize vessels engaged in the slave trade. 
In his Annual Message of December 1806, President 
20Ibid. 
21There is a possible case where the Revenue Marine may 
have taken a slaver before this date, however, the circum-
stances and evidence are not clear. The first active role 
of the U. S. Navy, other than relaying information, did not 
begin until after the passage of the act of 1800. 
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Thomas Jefferson reminded the members of Congress that the 
time at which they could constitutionally prohibit the slave 
trade to the United States was near. 22 In the debates that 
ensued there was a near consensus that the slave trade would 
be abolished and the only problem was how best to effect 
the abolition. This difficulty was overcome and on 2 March 
1807 President Jefferson signed into law "An Act to prohibit 
the importation of slaves into any port or place within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, from and after the first 
day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight 
hundred and eight. " 
The Act of 1807, the most important of the United 
States laws against the slave trade, was intended to end 
completely the introduction of slaves into the United States 
and its territories. It maintained the provisions against 
supportive and personal participation, but extended the 
concept of violation to include a sense of locality. 
Section Five stated that "if any citizen or citizens of the 
United States, or any other person resident within the 
jurisdiction of the same, shall ••• take on board any 
ship or vessel from any of the coasts or kingdoms of Africa, 
••• any negro, mulatto, or person of color, with intent 
to sell him, her, or the, for a slave or slaves, ••• and 
shall transport the same to any port or place within the 
22Thomas Jefferson, "Sixth Annual Message, " in Fred 
L. Israel, ed., The State of the Union Messages of the 
Presidents, I (New York, 19b71-,-86-87. 
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jurisdiction of the United States, ••• every such offender 
shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor; •••• " 
Section Seven authorized the President to employ public 
vessels of the United States to patrol the coastal waters 
and seize vessels violating the provisions of the act. The 
key to this act was the location of the vessel. Whereas 
in the 1800 law persons were guilty by service in an 
American slaver, the act of 1807 made the individual guilty 
even if he were in a foreign ship operating in American 
terri to1•ial waters with the intent of landing the slaves in 
the United States. 
Section Seven also stated that prize money from the 
sale of condemned slavers should be divided between the 
crew of the ship that made the capture and the United States 
and that in order to be entitled to the money the "officers 
and men, ••• shall safe keep every negro, mulatto, or 
person of color, ••• and shall deliver every such negro, 
mulatto, or person of color, to such person or persons as 
shall be appointed by the respective States to receive 
the same." 23 
But the trade was not so easily suppressed. Within 
three years of its passage it was known that the Act of 1807 
had not succeeded. In his second Annual Message, James 
Madison stated: "Among the commercial abuses still committed 
under the American flag, ••• it appears that American 
23 Ann. Cong., 9th Cong., 2nd sess., 1807, XVI, app. 
1268-69. 
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citizens are instrumental in carrying on a traffic in 
enslaved Africans, •••• "24 Responding to the President's 
admonitiOil, the House of Representatives committed that part 
of the President•s message "as related to the violation of 
the laws interdicting the slave trade" to the Committee 
on Commerce and Manufactures. 25 Soon, however, the United 
States could take no effective or forcible action against 
the slave trade. Europe was at war and when the United 
States became involved in the war against Great Britain in 
1812 slaving was definitely an unprofitable business. No 
flag could protect a slaver. Most Atlantic nations had 
become allied with either Britain or France and a slaver, 
like any other ship under any flag, was susceptible to 
capture by the cruisers of either nation. Immediately upon 
the end of hostilities, however, there was a rapid increase 
in the traffic in slaves in order to make up the deficit 
caused by the lack of imports during the war years. 26 
In his last Annual Message to Congress, James Madison 
took note of this growth and recommended to Congress that 
the applicable laws against the slave trade be strengthened. 
The Senate appointed a committee "with leave to report by 
bill or otherwise" a solution to the problem of the re-in-
vigorated trade, but apparently the committee did "otherwise" 
24James Madison, "Second Annual Message," Israel, State 
of the Union Messages, I, 108-09. 
25Ann. Cong., 11th Cong., Jrd sess., 1810, XXII, 387. 
26DuBois, Suppression of the Slave-'rrade, 109-10. 
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for nothing further came from this group. 27 
In the summer of 1817 there occurred an event which made 
visible the infractions of laws prohibiting the introduction 
of slaves into the United States then taking place at Amelia 
Island in Spanish Florida. ·rhe American government had 
been negotiating with Spain for a number of years in an 
attempt to obtain East Florida. But while the Spanish were 
reluctant to part with the territory, they had little effec-
tive control over it. When several Spanish colonies sought 
their independence, conditions were further aggravated. 
The problems thus created for the United States were 
reported to Congress by 1817 by President James Monroe: 
An expedition was set on foot against East Florida by 
persons claiming to act under the authority of some of 
the [Spanish] colonies who took possession of Amelia 
Island, at the mouth of the St. Marys River, near the 
boundary of the State of Georgia. • •• it has assumed 
a more marked character of unfriendliness to us, the 
island being made a channel for the illicit untrod~c­
tion of slaves from Africa into the United States. ~ 
With such an obvious violation of United States law 
right on the national door step, Congress finally began to 
take some action to strengthen the slave trade laws. The 
House of Representatives appointed a select committee of 
seven members from southern states and one northerner, with 
"leave to report by bill or otherwise. 1129 
27James Madison, "Eighth Annual Message," Israel, State 
of the Union Messages, I, 14); and Ann. Cong., 14th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1816, XXX, JJ. 
28James Monroe, "First Annual Message," ibid., I, 150. 
29 4 Ann.~., 15th Cong., 1st sess., 1818, XXXI, 02-05. 
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rhree weeks after the appointment of the committee the 
President ordered Army, Navy, and Marine units to invade 
Amelia Island and eliminate it as a base for the introduc-
tion of slaves. The select committee's report to the House 
on 10 January 1818 supported the President. Representative 
Henry Middleton, a South Carolinian on the committee, 
reported an additional bill intended to prohibit the intro-
duction of slaves. The bill went through two readings.3° 
The Senate did not appoint a committee on the subject 
of the slave trade until 17 March 1818. Within a month, 
however, the Senate bill passed both houses of Congress with 
but two amendments. This act, signed into law 20 April 1818, 
made no direct reference to the Navy, but the next year a 
bill was enacted extending the Navy's patrols in the suppres-
sion of the slave trade to the African coast.31 
rhe bill approved in 1819 originated in a message from 
the President. On 18 November 1818 a House committee was 
appointed on the slave trade. Mr. Middleton, of the committee, 
reported a bill on lJ January 1819 which was read twice and 
submitted to the Committee of the Whole.32 On 1 March the 
bill was presented to the House for debate. George F. 
Strother of Virginia opposed a section which provided bounties 
for the officers and crews of ships that captured slavers. 
JOibid., 646-50. 
Jlibid., 267; and XXXII, 1740. 
32Ibid., 15th Cong., 2nd seas., 1819, XXXIII, 29), 540. 
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He emphasized, however, that his opposition was for 
"various reasons of expediency, and not from unwillingness 
to destroy the traffic." Hugh Nelson, also of Virginia, 
opposed the bill because the penalties were not strong 
encugh, stating that he felt slaving ought to be punishable 
by death. Another Virginian, James Pindall, remedied that 
fault with an amendment making conviction of slaving 
punishable by death. This would have been a very strong act 
against the slave trade except that when the bill was sent 
to the Senate it was approved without the death penalty. 
The House agreed to the change and the bill was signed into 
law by the President on 3 March. 
The most important provision of this bill authorized 
the President to employ armed vessels of the United States 
to cruise the coasts of Africa to suppress the slave trade. 
It also provided for a bounty of twenty-five dollars to be 
paid to the officers and crew of a government vessel for 
each slave recaptured from a slave ship. And the vessel 
had to be returned to a port in its home state or territory 
for adjudication. Finally, one hundred thousand dollars was 
authorized to carry the law into effect.JJ 
In December 1819 the President again directed the 
attention of Congress toward the continuing violations of 
the slave trade laws. The House committee formed to inquire 
into the problem had met with little success when, in April 
JJibid., XXXIV, 14)0-)1; XXXIII, 280; and app. 2544-46. 
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1820, a bill to provide for the continuance of an act against 
piracy, a crime punishable by death, was introduced and 
passed in the Senate. In the House a select committee on 
the slave trade proposed to amend the Senate bill so as 
to equate the slave trade with piracy. ·rheir report 
maintained: 
Your committee cannot perceive wherein the offense 
of kidnapping an unoffending inhabitant of a foreign 
country; of chaining him down for a series of days, 
weeks, and months, amidst the dying and the dead, to 
the pestilential hold of a slave ship; of consigning 
him, if he chance to live out the voyage, to per-
petual slavery, in a remote and unknown land, 
differs in malignity from piracy, or why a milder 
punishm~nt should follow the one, than the other 
crime.J 
On 11 May 1820 the House Committee of the Whole concur-
red with the recommendations of the select committee and 
the following day the bill was approved by the House. It 
was then returned to the Senate which agreed to the change. 
On 15 May the act was signed into law.J5 
Sections Four and Five reinforced the injunctions 
against American personal participation. "Any citizen of 
the United States, being of the crew or ship's company of 
any foreign s~ip or vessel engaged in the slave trade, or 
any person whatever, being of the crew or ship's company 
of any ship or vessel owned in whole or in part, or 
navigated for, or in behalf of, any citizen or citizens of 
the United States ••• [engaged in the slave trade] shall 
J4Ibid., 16th Cong., 1st sess., 1820, XXXVI, 2209-10. 
35Ibid., 22)1; and XXXV, 69)-94. 
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be adjudged a pirate, • II • • • 
Closely related to personal participation was "carrier 
participation." The law of 1820 clearly forbade American 
citizens from operating in foreign vessels and it forbade 
foreign citizens from operating in American vessels engaged 
in the slave trade. The employment of the vessel thus 
became a determinant in assessing guilt. ·rhis form of 
participation led to problems. What was an American vessel? 
The act defined this as "any ship or vessel owned in whole 
or in part, or navigated for, or in behalf of, any citizen 
or citizens of the United States." And by the Registry Act 
of 1789 any vessel registered as American had to be built 
in the United States. But ships could easily change hands, 
and many did in Cuba and Brazil. ·rhrough a number of legal 
procedures an American-built vessel could end up with a 
foreign registry, hence safe from the United States Navy. 
But she could also carry an American flag and false papers, 
giving her a certain immunity from seizure by foreign 
naval vessels. rhis wearing of an American flag by slavers 
was considered to bring disgrace upon the nation and was 
referred to as "prostituting" the flag. In fact, most of 
the "American" slavers were fraudulently wearing the flag 
of the United States. WarrenS. Howard estimates that some 
ninety-nine percent of the vessels in the slave trade 
identified as American were actually foreign owned and 
were falsely flying the American ensign.36 In the slave 
36warren S. Howard, American Slavars and the Federal 
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trade the definition of "American" was a continuing problem. 
In looking at the incidences of seizure of slave 
vessels by the American Navy it is well to realize that the 
types of participation cannot, in reality, be so easily 
categorized as the descriptions may indicate. rhe slave 
trade was an illegal occupation and every possible means was 
used to conceal participation and give a vessel and crew an 
aura of legitimacy. Very often a vessel had to be released 
by the inspecting officers because, within the confines 
of court interpretation, the vessel, regardless of circum-
stantial evidence, was not breaking the law unless there 
was absolute proof that it was engaged in the slave trade. 
Such evidence was usually considered to be the presence on 
board of African slaves. The investigations of Howard for 
the period 1837 to 1862 show that fully half of the 
individuals arrested by naval officers were released by the 
courts.37 But by 1820 the United States had at least enacted 
a set of very stringent laws against the slave trade. It 
was illegal to build and fit a vessel for a slaving voyage. 
It was illegal for Americans to participate in a slaving 
voyage. It was illegal for anyone to introduce slaves into 
any part of the United States or its territories. And 
participation was punishable by death. 
By 1820 the prostitution of the American flag had become 
so common that the House of Representatives passed, on 12 
Law, 1837-1862 (Berkeley, 1963), 20. 
J?Ibid., 224-)5. 
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May, a resolution requesting the Chief Executive to "consult 
and negotiate with all the Governments, where Ministers of 
the United States are, or shall be accredited, on the means 
of effecting an entire and immediate abolition of the 
African slave trade." Although the resolution failed 
passage in the Senate three days later, it did mark the 
entry of the United States into a new phase of anti-slave 
trade efforts; an attempt to cooperate on an international 
level for the suppression of the traffic. 38 ·rhree years 
later, on 23 February 1823, Representative Charles F. 
Mercer urged the President to discuss with the other 
maritime nations on how best to suppress the international 
slave trade. Mercer, to support his claim that something 
must be done, stated that not less than thirteen thousand 
slaves had been smuggled into the United States in 1818. 
The House resolution passed overwhelmingly.39 rhe support 
this measure received helped convince President James 
Monroe's cabinet that something must be done to effect a 
complete suppression of the trade. Nine months later, in 
January 1824, Anglo-American talks were begun, and on 13 
March a Convention was agreed upon by the American minister 
Richard Rush and British Foreign Secretary, George Canning. 40 
38 6 Ann. Cong., 1 th Cong., 1st sess., 1820, XXXVI, 2216, 
2236-37; and XXXV, 697-700. 
39Ibid., 17th Cong., 2nd sess., 1823, XL, 1148, 1155. 
40Register of Debates, 18th Cong., 2nd sess., 1825, I, 
app. 8. 
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The Convention appeared promising. England agreed to 
denounce the slave trade as piracy, slave traders would be 
tried in their own country, and vessels under convoy of a 
warship would be excluded from search. ·rhe United States 
agreed to the "right of search" and the tenet that a citizen 
of either country operating under the flag of a third 
country would be sent home for trial. rhe provisions of 
this convention were to be effective on the coasts of Africa, 
America, and the West Indies. 
It is remarkable that this convention contained a 
right of search provision. or the rallying cries of the 
War of 1812 defense of the freedom of the seas, neutral 
rights, and the demand for a British renunciation of 
impressment were some of the most popular. Therefore, to 
grant British naval officers a right to stop and search 
American merchant vessels on the high seas in peace time, 
a practice reminiscent of pre-1812 procedures, especially 
without a British renunciation of impressment, was to many 
Americans a denial of the very reasons for which they had 
gone to war with England. John Quincy Adams, as Secretary 
of State, expressed this sentiment when he was asked by 
Ca~ing if there was anything more evil than the slave 
trade. "Yes," answered Adams, "admitting the right of 
search by foreign officers of our vessels upon the seas in 
time of peace; for that would be making slaves of ourselves." 
The most Adams would concede at that time was a system of 
joint cruising whereby English and American naval vessels 
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would sail in pairs. 41 ·rhis system, which enabled two ships 
to be as effective as one, was supposed to make it difficult 
for a slaver to escape. If it hoisted an American flag, the 
American cruiser would be able to capture the slaver. If 
the slave ship hoisted a British flag, or that of a nation 
with which England had a mutual search treaty, the British 
man-of-war would have the distinction of making the capture. 
This was not the most efficient way for a patrol to be 
conducted and the United States never had a sufficient 
number of cruisers to make joint cruising a reality, but 
it was the most that the American government would concede 
for many years. 
The resolution for adoption of the Convention was 
passed by the Senate on 22 May 1824. But in accepting the 
Convention, the Senate amended it, excluding the coast of 
the United States as an area where the Royal Navy could 
exercise a right of search. Also removed was the provision 
allowing the capture of citizens of either nations sailing 
in a vessel of a third country. Elimination of the latter 
provided a very large loophole, and made the Convention 
objectionable to Canning. As a result the British refused 
to ratify. 42 
41Quoted in Arnold Whi tridge, "'rhe American Slave ·.rrade, 11 
History Today, VIII (1958), 470. 
42 Reg. Debates, 18th Gong., 2nd sess., 1825, I, app. 12-
22; Hugh G. Soulsby, The Right of Search and the Slave 
Trade in Anglo-American Relations, 1814-1862, "The Johns 
Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political 
Science," Series LI No. 2 (Baltimore, 19JJ), J7. 
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Charles F. Mercer still retained hope that cooperation 
with the other nations could be facilitated. On 28 
February 1825, he offered a resolution requesting the 
President to enter into "such negotiations with the maritime 
Powers of Europe ani America as he may deem expedient for 
the effectual abolition of the slave trade, II But . . . . 
on the second of March, when he called the resolution up 
for consideration by the House, that body refused. 43 
Six years later, to the day, Mercer had the satisfaction 
of seeing the House pass a resolution almost identical in 
wording as the one of 1825. Mercer's success was limited, 
for the resolution got no further than the House. It was 
another ten years before the United States was again to 
participate in any international effort to abolish the 
slave trade. 44 
When the United States did again enter the international 
arena to end the slave trade it came as part of the solution 
tomanydifficulties confronting Anglo-American relations. 
In 1837 a rebellion broke out in eastern Canada. When the 
rebels used American bases for their operations, Canadian 
officials retaliated by attacking across the Niagara River 
and burning the American steamer Caroline, which had been 
used to carry supplies to the rebels. In Maine, the 
indefiniteboundarybetween Canada and the United States led 
43Heg. Debates, 18th Cong., 2nd sess., 1825, I, 697, 
736. 
44 Ibid., 21st Cong., 2nd sess., 1831, VII, 850. 
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to conflict between lumberjacks of the two countries who 
desired the rich timber lands along the Aroostook River. 
In 1841 the American brig Creole was carrying slaves from 
Virginia to New Orleans in accordance to laws governing 
the domestic slave trade. The slaves rebelled and took 
the brig to Nassau where they were set free by British 
officials. 
The African slave trade also became one of the issues 
between the United States and Great Britain. The years 
from about 1837 and 1840 marked a period of increased 
activity by illegal slavers, spurring renewed efforts of 
the British Navy. When British officers searched some 
American ships off Africa the American government responded 
by dispatching the brigantine Dolphin, Commander Charles 
H. Bell, and the schooner Grampus, Lieutenant John S. Paine, 
to the African coast. However, the Royal Navy in searching 
suspected slavers, caused what Hugh Soulsby called "a 
numerous crop of unfortunate incidents."4.5 The detention 
of the American-flag vessels Douglas, Hero, and Iago caused 
a flurry of diplomatic correspondence, and a hardening of 
position on the part of both nations. John Forsyth, the 
Secretary of State, and the minister to Great Britain, 
Andrew Stevenson, were both unsympathetic to the anti-slave 
trade cause. 46 The situation was not helped by Lord 
4
.5soulsby, Hight of Search, .51. 
46
nuBois, Suppression of the Slave-Trade, 14.5, 15.5n. 
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Palmerston, the British Foreign Minister, who was not in the 
least conciliatory. While Palmerston admitted to Stevenson 
that British cruisers did not have a right of search in 
peace time, he added insultingly that "her Majesty•s 
Government do not mean thereby to say that a merchantman 
can exempt hemself from search by merely hoisting a piece 
of bunting with the United States emblems and colors upon 
it, • • In other words, while the British government 
did not recognize a peace time "right of search" the Royal 
Navy would not accept an American flag as prima facie 
evidence the vessel was American. And it was nearly impos-
sible to check the validity of the ensign without boarding 
the vessel in which it was flown. 
John Tyler•s State of the Union Message in December 
1841 maintained an equally hard line: 
However desirous the United States may be for the 
suppression of the slave trade, they cannot 
consent to interpolations into the maritime code, 
at the mere will and pleasure of other Governments. 
We deny the right of any such interpolation to 
anyone, or a49 the nations of the earth without 
our consent. 
However, in the new administration which had taken 
office the previous March, and which Tyler inherited from 
William Henry Harrison, there were some new personalities 
introduced to the international scene. Daniel Webster, the 
new Secretary of State, was more conciliatory toward Great 
47congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 1842, XI, 
app. 7. 
48 Ibid., app. 2. 
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Britain over the right of search, and he was more aware of 
the importance of America's growth as a maritime nation. In 
a letter to Edward Everett, the United States minister to 
Great Britain, dated 26 April 1842, Webster wrote: 
Our position in respect to these maritime 
questions is peculiar. Hitherto, we have been on 
the side of the neutral, and the minor naval powers, 
always most forward in contending for the freedom of 
the seas, in the utmost latitude of that freedom. 
But we are in the process of change. we4are no longer a minor commercial power, •••• 9 
Lord Ashburton, who had been sent to the United States 
to try and settle the problems that had arisen between the 
two countries, met with Webster. Their treaty, signed 9 
August 1842, was a compromise. It did not specifically 
mention the Caroline and Creole affairs, but it did 
establish the Canadian-United States boundary as far west as 
the Oregon rerritory. 
Article Eight, which concerned the slave trade, was 
also a compromise. The United States did not yield on its 
position that American ship could not be searched by foreign 
naval officers, but neither did England back down on its 
five hundred year old right to impress Englishmen into the 
naval service. The Article stipulated that each nation 
would maintain a naval squadron consisting of at least 
eighty guns on the west coast of Africa.5° One of the 
foundations of this article was a report written, at the 
49soulsby, Right of Search, 80. 
5°cong. Globe, 27th Gong., Jrd sess., 1843, XII, JO. 
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request of Webster, by Commander Bell and Lieutenant Paine, 
a paragraph of which recommended joint cruising as the best 
method by which units of the two navies could cooperate.51 
Only eleven days after the treaty was signed, it was approved 
by the Senate. 
The Webster-Ashburton Treaty established, on a regular 
basis, an American naval presence on the coast of Africa. 
Prior to this time warships had been sent to Africa on an 
irregular schedule or detached from the West India squadron 
to sail to Africa and back along the normal shipping routes. 
For the next twenty years, as a result of this treaty, 
there was an American naval force assigned to the African 
coast. 
For the next two decades there was little legislative 
activity concerning the slave trade, and that which did 
occur was generally aimed at refining provisions of earlier 
laws. In July 1854, Senator John M. Clayton of Delaware 
introduced a bill for the suppression of the slave trade in 
American-built vessels.52 It was the purpose of Clayton's 
51soulsby, Right of Search, 80. 
52It is difficult to ascertain where many of the slave 
vessels were built. British documents often refer to a 
"Virginia pilot boat" or "New York Pilot boat," but these 
terms refer to a style or type of vessel rather than to the 
place or origin. However, naval architect Howard I. Chapelle 
states that "Baltimore and the Chesapeake Bay counties seem 
to have been the most active building localities for slaving 
vessels. These craft were lightly built and in most in-
stances especially designed for the trade. Consular and 
British government reports repeatedly claim that the 
Chesapeake builders turned out most of the slave vessels, 
after about 1835-36." I' he Search for Speed Under ~. 1700-
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bill to strengthen and enforce previous laws against the 
practice of supplying American vessels for use in the 
foreign slave trade. The proposed bill was debated in the 
Senate and passed on 5 July 1854. But the House postponed 
consideration until the next session and no further action 
was taken upon it.53 
Two years later Senator John Slidell of Louisiana 
proposed to abrogate the Eighth Article of the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty. Slidell quoted Sir Charles Hotham, one 
of the British commanders on the African coast, who claimed 
that the Royal Navy had done little to suppress the slave 
trade. ·rhe purpose of his resolution, Slidell said, was 
not necessarily to remove the Navy from the coast of Africa, 
but rather to enable the President to make better use of the 
ships assigned to that squadron.54 
Within a few years the Civil War did force the recall 
of much of the American Navy to home waters. But even 
before the recall of the squadrons those wishing Great 
Britain to abandon its claim to a right of search had their 
way. In 1858 the lioyal Navy began vigourously to inspect 
suspected slavers in the West Indies. Numerous American 
merchantmen were stopped and searched in the Gulf of Mexico 
and along the United States coasts by English men-of-war • 
.!.§...2..2 {New York, 1967), 301. 
53Gong. Globe, 33rd Gong., 1st sess., 1854, XXIII, 1604, 
21)9. 
54rbid., 34th Gong., 1st sess., 1856, XXV, 1477 
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President James Buchanan responded to these British trans-
gressions by increasing the American naval presence around 
Cuba and off Africa. The United States Navy began it most 
successful campaign in the war against the slave trade. 
This campaign led to the last significant slave trade 
legislation that involved the Navy. In the first months of 
1860 the United States steamers Mohawk and Wyandotte 
captured off Cuba two vessels with a total of eleven hundred 
slaves on board. In accordance with the law of 1819, the 
freed slaves were taken to Key West and delivered to the 
district marshal, who, however, did not have the means to 
take care of them. To aid the Africans, a bill was intro-
duced in the Senate on 23 May 1860. Its purpose was three-
fold. First, it authorized the President to transport the 
freed Africans to some place in Africa, understood to be 
Liberia, and for the United States to support them for one 
year. Secondly, it authorized naval commanders to leave 
freed slaves in Africa in the care of an agent without first 
bringing them to the United States, and then to take the 
vessel and crew to the United States for adjudication. 
Finally, it provided specifically for the relief and trans-
portation of those Africans freed by Wyandotte and Mohawk.55 
The bill aroused considerable debate and opposition in 
the Senate, particularly from Jefferson Davis, who proposed 
to amend the bill: 
55Ibid., 36th Cong., 1st sess., 1860, XXIX, 2303, 
2)08, 2267, 2956, 
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by striking out all after the enacting clause, 
down to the last section, in order that the last 
section being adopted, the Africans now held by 
the United States may be sent back, though I do 
not see why on earth we should send them back. 
Davis was not specific as to what he felt should be 
done with the slaves. In earlier remarks he seemed to 
favor the British system of apprenticing recaptured slaves 
as laborers. He did state, however, that he saw no reason 
for not returning them from whence they came, i. e., the 
barracoons in Africa. His argument was that the United 
States only promised to stop the slave trade on the coast 
of Africa; that should slaves make it to America, it should 
be no concern of the United States government. However, if 
the government were to take the slaves back to Africa, there 
was no obligation to land them at any specific point. 
Therefore, their place of origin was as good as any other 
place, an argument which ignored the probability that they 
would again be sold into slavery. Theamendment was defeated.56 
An amendment was also proposed to make it mandatory for 
naval officers capturing slavers to take the Africans 
directly to Africa. Earlier acts specified that Africans 
from captured slavers first had to be delivered to an agent 
of the United States, regardless of where the ship was 
captured. This was not a hardship on the Africans because 
district marshals were appointed this duty in the United 
States and its territories, and an agent was appointed in 
56 Ibid., 2308. 
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Liberia for the same purpose. The avowed object of this 
amendment, to minimize the suffering of the Africans, 
however, would not have been achieved. Slaves recaptured 
off Cuba and sent directly to Liberia without a chance to 
obtain fresh provisions or an opportunity to regain their 
health would have suffered greatly in a second trans-Atlantic 
voyage. It was this sentiment that caused the rejection 
of the amendrnent.57 
On 24 May the bill passed the Senate and the following 
day it was introduced in the House where it was read twice 
and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Represen-
tative Lawrence O'B. Branch of North Carolina requested that 
the commitment of the bill to the committee be amended so 
as to enable the committee to report the bill at any time. 
This proposal initiated a number of counter proposals, many 
of which were ridiculous. One such proposition, that the 
Africans be liberated in Massachusetts to be taken care of, 
or sold in Florida, brought a round of laughter. Amid 
much jeering, confusing, and calls for "order" and "police," 
Branch's amendment was accepted.58 
The House Judiciary Committee reported the bill on 
5 June after having modified the Senate version by increasing 
the amount of money allotted for the support of each 
individual from $100.00 to $150.00, and the total approp-
57Ibid., 2)05, 2)08. 
58Ibid., 2)62. 
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riation from $200,000 to $2)0,000. In this form the bill 
passed the House. The Senate took up the House version on 
14 June, and while the Senate agreed to increase the total 
appropriation, it did not accept the sum allotted each 
person. The next day the House receded from its first 
amendment, bringing the two versions into accord.59 On the 
eighteenth the President signed the act into law. 
·rhe most significant changes to the American effort 
to eradicate the slave trade in the post-1820 period came 
upon T.he inauguration of Abraham Lincoln as president. He 
furthered the anti-slave trade cause by reorganizing and 
centralizing all American anti-slave trade activities under 
the Secretary of the Interior, Caleb Blood Smith. In 
addition, nine hundred thousand dollars were appropriated to 
enforce the laws, up to this time the most substantial 
single appropriation made for this purpose. 60 
But at the same time that organization and money made 
possible more strict enforcement of the laws, it became 
more difficult to enforce those laws. At the outbreak of the 
Civil War most of United States cruisers on the African and 
Brazilian coasts were recalled and it became almost impos-
sible to safeguard the use of the American flag, and it again 
became a refuge for slavers. 
In order to counter the effects of the American Navy's 
59 4 Ibid., 2913, 29 0. 
60Whitridge, "American Slave Trade," 472. 
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absence off Africa, in the South Atlantic, and the Carib-
bean, Secretary of State William H. Seward informed Lord 
Lyons, the British minister to Washington, on 10 May 1861, 
that the United States was willing to make some new arrange-
ments with Her Majesty's government to prevent the illegal 
use of the American flag by slavers. After consulting 
with his government, Lyons reported that the best means to 
effect this was for the United States to grant to English 
men-of-war the power to search and arrest slavers bearing 
the American ensign. Seward was hesitant in accepting 
Lyons• proposal, for he felt that the war would soon be 
over and the United States squadrons could then be re-estab-
lished on their stations. But, said Seward, the Lincoln 
administration would display "none of the squeamishness 
about allowing American vessels to be boarded and searched 
which had characterized their predicessors." 61 
It was soon evident that the war was going to last 
longer than expected. ·rhis, combined with British 
reluctance to accept an informal agreement, encouraged Her 
Majesty's government to propose again a treaty between the 
two countries which would grant the Royal Navy the requisite 
power to enforce abolition of the trade under the American 
flag. rhis time Seward was more receptive to the suggestion, 
but he stipulated that any such agreement must have the 
appearance of having been initiated by the United States. 
61A. Taylor Milne, "The Lyons-Seward Treaty of 1862," 
American Historical Review, XXXVIII (19JJ), 511-12. 
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A formal correspondence was thus begun that made it appear 
that Seward had opened the negotiations on 22 March 1862. 
·rhe proposal which the Secretary of State gave to Lyons 
was identical to that initially suggested by the British. 
Seward's purpose in this subterfuge was to enhance the 
treaty's chances of passing the Senate and being accepted 
by the public. He realized that if it appeared the British 
were again seeking a right of search, the treaty's chances 
of ratification would be reduced. On 11 April 1862 the 
treaty was submitted to the Senate and on the twenty-fifth 
it was unanimously approved. 62 
~he results of this cooperation were impressive. The 
number of slaves illegally imported into Cuba, the only 
place still importing slaves in great numbers, decreased 
from 30,473 in the twelve months following JO September 
1859 to 143 between the same dates of 1864 to 1865. 63 
Although the numbers may be open to question, the British 
were at least satisfied that the slave trade to Cuba was 
virtually extinct. 
By 1820 Congress had laid the foundations of the Navy's 
role in the suppression of the slave trade, although some 
modification of this role continued until the 1860s. rhis 
role was detailed in legislative enactments, in congressional 
62Ibid., 
1862, XXXII, 
6JM.l Ll ne, 
512-13; and Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., 
2941, 3155. 
"Lyons-Seward rreaty," 516. 
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resolutions to further international cooperation, and in 
the Senate's consent to treaties. As a result of these 
efforts United States men-of-war patrolled American, 
Caribbean, and African waters for slavers, and could arrest 
and send for trial in the United States persons engaged 
in the traffic under the American colors. 
These duties were not ~~=ompatible with the Navy's 
paramount duty of protecting the commerce and interests 
of the United States. ·ro fulfill that primary function ships 
had to be deployed to foreign stations. l'hese vessels, 
cruising in the Caribbean, and off Brazil and Africa, 
could enforce American laws against the slave trade as 
well as protect American interests. Indeed, ending the 
disgrace of having the slave trade conducted under the 
protection of the American flag could well be encompassed 
within the concept of "protection of American interests." 
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PART TWO 
ON STATION 
·rhe routes of slavers from Africa to the New World can 
be visualized as a large "V" spanning the equatorial 
Atlantic Ocean, the vertex on the African coast and a leg 
each ending at Cuba or Brazil. Between 1816 and 184) the 
United States Navy stationed squadrons to patrol each of 
the three points. This section will show the activities 
of the Navy in each of the areas, and that these squadrons 
were established first to protect the legitimate commerce 
of the United States, and then participated in the 
suppression of the slave trade. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE: AFRICA, 1819-1843 
In 1819 the United States Navy and the American 
Colonization Society entered into a marriage that combined 
their talents for the purpose of suppressing the slave 
trade on the coast of Africa. It was hoped by the backers 
of the Society that a de facto as well as a de jure end of 
American participation in the slave trade could be facili-
tated by this marriage of convenience. 
Since 1800 the first partner in this union, the United 
States Navy, had served as a sea-going police force to 
ensure observance of American laws prohibiting the partici-
pation of American citizens in the slave trade. ·rhis duty 
had been confined to the American coast, but in 1819 
Congress authorized commissioned vessels of the United 
States to patrol the coast of Africa for the same purpose. 
The second partner, the American Colonization Society, 
joined the union through the efforts of Representative 
Charles F. Mercer, one of the sponsors of the Slave ·rrade 
Act of 1819, and one of the leaders of the newly organized 
Society. Although the act did not mention the Colonization 
Society, several provisions of the act were clearly 
beneficial to it. The act stipulated that the "officers 
and men [of the vessel capturing a slaver] • • • shall 
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deliver every such negro, mulatto, or person of color, to 
the marshal of the district in which they are brought if 
into a port of the United States, or, if elsewhere, to such 
person or persons as shall be lawfully appointed by the 
President of the United States, • II The act also • • • 
appropriated one hundred thousand dollars "to carry this 
law into effect. 111 
It was hoped by the members of the Society that not 
only would what they considered a racial problem be solved 
by colonizing American blacks in Africa, but that the 
colony would also serve to inhibit the slave trade on the 
African coast. A naval force, if deployed to Africa, could 
serve many functions: it would help protect the colony, 
give it aid, and help enforce American laws against the 
slave trade. 2 A colony on the African coast would also 
indirectly benefit the United States government by providing 
a depository for blacks recaptured by American cruisers from 
slave ships. 
'ro carry out these plans, the Colonization Society 
made overtures to President James Monroe's administration 
to gain some or all of the appropriation. In December 
1819 the President called his cabinet together to determine 
what policy should be followed by the government in 
interpreting the act. Secretary of the rreasury William H. 
1P. J. Staudenraus, ·rhe African Colonization Movement, 
1816-1865 (New York, 1961r;-50-51. 
2 Ibid., 46-47. 
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Crawford, who was also vice-president of the Society, urged 
that the entire appropriation should be transferred to the 
Society. Crawford was able to convince Smith Thompson, the 
Secretary of the Navy, of the advisability of this procedure. 
However, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams objected on 
the grounds that there was no authority to spend money to 
support blacks in Africa, and that if the United States 
began doing so, it would 11 plunge us deep enough into the 
plan to bind the honor of the nation to further approp-
riations." He also believed that the American people were 
unaware of the consequences of establishing colonies, and 
he felt that the people transported to Africa would suffer 
more than if they remained in bondage., 3 
The President disregarded the opinions of Adams and 
agreed that fifteen hundred dollars should be paid for half 
the freight of a vessel then being readied to take colonists 
·' 
to Africa. 4 An in a memorandum dated 7 January 1820, 
President Monroe informed his Secretary of the Navy: 
As the execution of the law, for the suppression 
of the slave trade, is so intimately connected with 
our naval operations, I have, on full consideration, 
thought it most advisable, to commit the supervision 
of that portion of the duty which is to be performed 
on the coast of Africa, likewise to your care.S 
3John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Qu§ncr Adams, ed. 
Charles Francis Adams (Philadelphia,-rs74-1 77 , VI, 354, 
356, 475-76. 
4Ibid., 477; VIII, 309. 
5President James Monroe to Samuel L. Southard, 7 Jan. 
1820, Correspondence of the Secretary of the Navy Relating 
to African Colonization, 1819-1844 (M-205), Roll 2:3, Naval 
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·rhis message authorized the Secretary to appoint the 
agent on the African coast responsible for receiving recap-
tured Africans and also to supervise the expenditure of the 
one hundred thousand dollars appropriated for enforcement of 
the act. During the 1820s the initial appropriation was 
used in the most general manner and was often supplemented. 
Much of the initial and supplemental appropriations were 
used to transport colonists and to build the colony, 
functions not directly concerned with the suppression of 
the slave trade. After 18)4 the sum was used only to pay 
the salary of the government agent, an individual who was 
also the colony's governor. 6 
·ro implement the Slave Trade Act of 1819 it was neces-
sary to establish facilities for the reception of recaptured 
Africans. Several sites were established within the ter-
ritory of the United States, but for two years none was 
created in Africa. In 1821 Lieutenant Robert F. Stockton, 
a friend of the Colonization Society, persuaded the 
administration to assign him command of the schooner Alligator. 
Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and 
Library, Record Group 45, National Archives, hereafter cited 
African Letters. 
6staudenraus, African Colonization, 150, 186; 11Secretary 
of the Navy Annual Reports," American State Papers: Naval 
Affairs, passim, hereafter cited ASP:NA; and African Letters, 
passim. An example of the use of these appropriations is 
the following: 
You will be pleased to purchase and ship immediately 
to the Navy Agent in Norfolk 25 Barrels Pork and 25 
Barrels of Beef, and make a requisition upon the Depart-
ment for the amount under the head of "Prohibition of 
the Slave ·rrade. -- Southard to James Beatty, Baltimore 
Navy Agent, 8 Jan. 1825, African Letters, Roll 1:48. 
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Stockton was given orders to proceed to the African coast 
in company with the agent, Dr. Eli Ayres, and establish a 
facility at which recaptured Africans could be maintained. 
The Colonization Society also gave Stockton a free hand 
to act in its behalf to acquire territory for a colony.7 
Lieutenant Stockton and Dr. Ayres were successful in 
their mission. Dr. Ayres reported their results to the 
Secretary of the Navy: 
I proceeded in company with Lieut. Stockton, 
down the Coast; and on the 15th day of Decem, 1821, 
succeeded in accomplishing the long desired object, 
of procurin§, • • • an establishment for captured 
Africans.--
Earlier investigators had recommended the island of 
Sherbro as a site for locating the colony, but after 
consultation with the British at Freetown, Sierra Leone, 
Stockton and Ayres were convinced that the territory 
around Cape Mesurado would be more fertile and more health-
ful for the colonists. rhe native chief, King Peter, in 
whose territory the Cape was located, initially refused to 
sell the land or even to discuss terms, but refusing to be 
deterred from their objective, Stockton and Ayres landed at 
ftlesurado on 12 December 1821. For two days King Peter 
refused to meet with the Americans, finally sending word 
that he would neither sell the Cape nor hold a palaver.9 
?staudenraus, African Colonization, 63. 
8Eli Ayres to Smith Thompson, 15 Jan. 1823, African 
Letters, Roll 2:98; and "Condition of the Navy and Marine 
Corps," ASP:NA, I, 1005. 
9staudenraus, African Colonization, 6). 
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On the fourteenth Ayres and Stockton obtained guides 
and proceeded to the king 1s village. King Peter and his 
people were offended by this intrusion and threatened the 
party, accusing them of kidnaping Afrinans ann of destroying 
the slave trade. Stockton, his temper rising, and possibly 
thinking he and Ayres were in danger, drew a pistol, cocked 
it and handed it to Ayres, and then provided himself with 
one which he pointed at the king's head. As Stockton 
informed the Africans that he had come as their benefactor 
and wished only to help them, he raised his free hand toward 
the sky and at that moment the sun broke through the 
clouds. King Peter could not withstand the combination of 
"divine" intervention and a pistol aimed at him. He agreed 
that the next day he would cede the land around Cape 
Mesurado to the Colonization Society. 10 
rhe acquisition of land in Africa and the establishment 
of an agency for recaptured Africans were the final steps 
necessary to facilitate an active effort by the Navy to 
suppress the slave trade. It only remained for the govern-
ment to make use of the tools available. 
Historical writing has been consistent in ignoring the 
use of these tools by the Navy on the coast of Africa between 
1822 and 18,39. W. E. B. DuBois states that from 1826 "until 
18.39 this country probably had no slave-trade police upon 
the seas, except in the Gulf of Mexico." John R. Spears 
10Ibid., 6.3-65. 
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relates the well-known activities of the Navy between 1820 
and 1822, then concludes with the statement that, "there-
after the work of the navy in suppressing the slave-trade 
was confined to 'occasional visits' to Liberia until 18)9, 
II But he does not go into any detail concerning • • • • 
those viaits. Daniel P. Mannix says that on the African 
coast the Amer~.can government did little by way of suppres-
sing the slave trade. 11 
Dr. Eli Ayres claimed that having naval vessels 
occasionally visit the coast was next to useless. In a 
letter of 182) to the Secretary of the Navy Ayres said, 
"Altho [sic] for some years the Coast had been occasionally 
visited by our Cruisers, their short stay and seldom 
appearance, had made but slight impression on those 
t d 11 12 ra era, • • • • 
with contradictions. 
Ayres' letter, however, is replete 
In the same letter he wrote: 
I was informed by an American officer who had been 
on the Coast in 1820, that he had boarded twenty 
American vessels, in one morning, lying in the port 
of Galinas [sic], and fitted for the reception of 
slaves.-- It is a lamentable fact that most of the 
harbours between the Senegal and the line were visited 
by an equal number of American vessels and for the 
11w. E. Burghardt DuBois, The Suppression of the African 
Slave-Trade to the United States of America, 1b}8-1870 (New 
York, 1896; reprint 1965), 158; John H. Spears, The American 
Slave-Trade: An Account £f Its Origin, Growth and Sup-
pression (New York, 1900; reprint, 1967), 148-50; and Daniel 
P. Mannix, Black Cargoes: ! History of the Atlantic Slave 
Trade, 1518-1~6Y, in collaboration with Malcolm Cowley (New York, 19 2 , 202. 
12Ayres to Thompson, 24 Feb. 182), African Letters, 
Roll 2:101. 
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sole purpose of carrying away slaves. 13 
He then added that during the previous two years there had 
been only one slaver under American colors on the coast. In 
another letter written a year subsequent to this, Ayres 
stated that he had heard of only two American slavers on 
the coast for several years previous. Lieutenant Commandant 
Matthew c. Perry confirmed Ayres• estimate of the scarcity 
of American slavers by stating that while he was on the 
coast in 1822 he "could not ~ hear of an American 
slaving vessel; • . . . 
97 
One wonders, on the basis of these letters, what had 
h~ppened to the slave trade in the few years from 1820 to 
1823. The conclusion is that the trade was sharply curtailed 
by the activities of American cruisers in the years 1820 
to 1822, and that they made more than a "slight impression 
on these traders." 15 
rhe extent of the American slave trade in Africa is 
central to the consideration of whether a sufficiently 
large police force was available to prevent American 
slaving. One fact that should be considered, however, is 
that the American force was not permitted to capture all 
13Ibid.; also quoted in DuBois, Suppression of the Slave-
Trade, 125-26. 
14Ayres to Thompson, 24 Feb. 1823, African Letters, Roll 
2:101; Ayres to Thompson, 16 Feb. 1824, ibid., Roll 3:17; 
and "Extract of letters from Lieutenant Commandant M. C. 
Perry to the Secretary of the Navy, 11 ASP:NA, I, 1099. Italics 
in the original. See Appendix G on naval ranks. 
15ouBois, Suppression of the Slave-Trade, 123. 
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slavers, but only those who we~e American citizens or in 
American-owned vessels. By American law and international 
agreement, American men-of-war were not legally permitted 
to stop and search vessels carrying foreign flags. A 
slaver could escape capture by using various flags and 
carrying false papers, and this may account for the reason 
few American slavers were seen by American cruisers on the 
African coast. Even so, if there had been American slavers 
operating on the coast, American officials would almost 
certainly have heard of them through British authorities. 
rhe years 1825 through 1835'represent a low point of activity 
on the coast, at least in the vicinity of Liberia. DuBois 
acknowledges this decline, with considerable caution, and 
the agents' reports and naval officers' letters support him. 16 
Jehudi Ashmun, the government agent from 1825 to 1828, 
reported in February 1825 that the slave trade was reviving 
on that part of the coast and that the United States flag 
was occasionally used to protect a slaver. In April 1825 
he wrote that at Gallinas there were three schooners loading 
slaves which were manned mainly by Americans. And in 
December 1827 he wrote that there were many slavers on the 
coast, most under the Spanish flag, but one flying the 
American colors. 17 
16w. E. Burghardt DuBois, "Enforcement of the Slave-
Trade Laws," Annual Report of the American Historical 
Association (Washington, D.c.,-rB92), 169. 
17Jehudi Ashmun to Samuel Southard, 11 Feb. 1825, African 
Letters, Roll ):188-89, 211; and Ashmun to Southard, 22 Dec. 
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By the end of 1832 the trade had so nearly ceased that 
Joseph Michlin, the current agent, could write: 
It gives me great satisfaction to be enabled to 
state that [the] slave trade on this section of the 
coast has nearly ceased, between Sierra Leone and 
Cape Palmas there are at present but two [slavers] 
(both un~er French colours) engaged in the illicit 
traffic. ~ 
Captain E. P. Kennedy of the United States frigate Java 
indirectly confirmed Michlin 1 s optimistic report by stating 
that if the colony were provided with one ninety or one-
hundred ton schooner armed with three guns it would be 
11 sufficient to guard the coast against the piratical slave 
vessels.n 19 
After 1835 the illicit trade began to revive rapidly. 
The American Colonization Society in 1837 still felt con-
fident enough to quote in its organ, the African Repository, 
an article from the Liberian Herald to the effect that almost 
four hundred miles of coast line from Bissau to Cape Palmas 
had been cleared of all slave factories, with the exception 
of one on the River Gallinas. 20 
rhe African Repository seems only to have printed the 
1827, ibid., Roll 4:123. 
18Joseph Michlin to Levi Woodbury, 11 Feb. 1833, ibid., 
Roll 6:6. The portions in brackets were obscured on the 
microfilm. 
19American Colonization Society, The African Repository 
and Colonial Journal, VII:5 (18J1), 153-55 [New York, 
Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1967j; and "Annual Report of the 
Secretary of the Navy, Showing the Condition of the Navy in 
the Year 1831," ASP:NA, IV, 11. 
20African Repository, XIII:1 (1837), 14-15. 
99 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
more optimistic reports from Africa, for by 1837 slaving 
activity was definitely on the increase. In November 1836 
the Secretary of the Navy received a letter from A. D. 
Williams, agent of the American Colonization Society in 
Monrovia, who asserted that within five to twenty miles of 
the city there were four active slave factories. Elliott 
Cresson, also of the Society, stated that theslavetrade 
was on the increase and was carried on in American-built 
vessels and used the American flag to escape capture. Both 
Williams and Cresson requested that an armed vessel be made 
available to the colonists to be used to check the traffic. 21 
By 1838 such illegal activities had increased to serious 
proportions, and in December of that year an interesting 
correspondence was begun between Thomas Buchanan and the 
Secretary of the Navy, James Kirke Paulding. Buchanan, 
who was soon to become governor of the colony and the 
American agent, was in 1838 a member of the Pennsylvania 
Colonization Society. In a letter dated 15 December 1838 
he pointed out that the trade was increasing despite the 
efforts of British cruisers, and suggested that the United 
States dispatch a man-of-war to the Liberian coast. 22 
By May 1839 Buchanan had assumed his duties in Africa, 
and reported to the Navy Department: "Indeed there are 
21Elliott Cresson to Mahlon Dickerson, 16 Sept. 1836, 
African Letters, Roll 5:46; and A. D. Williams to Dickerson, 
24 Nov. 1836, ibid., Roll 5:47. 
2~homas Buchanan to James K. Paulding, 15 Dec. 1838, 
ibid., Roll 5:96. 
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v[ery] few, of the great number of vessels engaged in the 
slave trade on this C[oast] but what sail under American 
Col[ors] and shew Am. Papers.--n 23 ·rhe Secretary of the 
Navy reminded Buchanan that the United States did not 
recognize Liberia as a colony and was not bound to protect 
it. Furthermore, Buchanan was to confine his remarks to 
the Department to matters which related to his duties as 
agent for recaptured Africans and not to his duties as 
governor of the colony. 24 
In two subsequent letters Buchanan ignored Paulding's 
reprimand, and he listed eighteen slavers known to be using 
the American flag on the coast of Africa and urged the Navy 
to send a patrol to the coast to arrest the traffic. ~he 
Navy Secretary replied that it was not Buchanan's duty to 
inform the government that Americans were violating American 
laws prohibiting the slave trade. 25 Buchanan evidently 
learned that he was to receive no cooperation from the 
Secretary of the Navy and responded with apparent irony: 
I beg to assure you that in future I shall care-
fully avoid including in my letters any matter not 
23Buchanan to Paulding, 21 May 1839, ibid., Roll 5:104, 
the portions in Brackets were obscured in the microfilm. 
24Paulding to Buchanan, 22 July 1839, ibid., Roll1:205. 
25Buchanan to Paulding, 21 May 1839, ibid., Roll 5:106; 
Buchanan to Paulding, 12 Nov. 1839, ibid., Roll 5:118-19; 
Paulding to Buchanan, 31 Jan. 1840, ibid., Roll 1:209; and 
Paulding to Buchanan, 6 Apr. 1840, ibid., Roll 1:211. The 
slavers listed by Buchanan were: Mary Ann Cassard, ~ 
Euphrates, Venus, Traveller, Eagle, Victoria, Geo. Cook, 
Charleston, Mary Cushing, Rebecca, ~ Boy, Butterfly, 
ijyperion, Sarah and Priscilla, Mary, and an unnamed brig. 
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immediately connected with the duties of my office 
as pointed out by you, unless otherwise instructed.--
Allow me to offer an apology for having devoted so 
much of my correspondence to the subject of the 
slave trade; it arose from the idea, derived from one 
of your letters to me while at Philadelphia, that the 
Government was desirous of procuring information on 
that subject as connected with the abuse of the 
National flag--and I believed suc26facts as I could collect here would be acceptable. 
One must recognize that there is a built-in bias in 
viewing the trends in the slave trade from the Secretary of 
the Navy's correspondence. These letters deal only with 
Liberia and they ignore other regions known to be centers of 
the slave trade, especially the Bight of Benin and the Bight 
of Biafra. These portions of the coast due east of Cape 
Palmas had long supplied slaves, but the letter received 
by the Navy Department give no indication of the extent of 
American involvement or the use of the American flag in 
the slave trade along those parts of the coast. 
It would seem safe to assume, however, that the extent 
of slaving in the Bights would parallel the extent of slaving 
north of Cape Palmas. The British navy patrolled both 
areas, but that would not have deterred American slavers or 
those provided with American papers. Also the capability 
of Liberia to police its own coast line was minimal, for 
the colonies never had a vessel suitable for that purpose. 
To meet the needs of the colonists and to suppress the 
slave trade tha Navy provided a police force that visited 
the Liberian coast. This force was not permanent, nor did 
26Buchanan to Paulding, 5 Sept. 1840, ibid., Roll 5:140. 
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it remain, with few exceptions, longer than a few weeks. 
The naval force was most effective between 1820 and 1822 
when several vessels maintained an almost constant patrol 
of the coast, and its strength reflected the current 
requirements as manifested by the presence of slavers. 
In 1820 three ships cruised the coast, each of which 
captured slavers. 27 The most enterprising of these captures 
was undertaken by the United States sloop-of-war John Adams 
in company with His Britannic Majesty's brig Snapper. The 
logbook of John Adams provides only an outline of the 
events. While anchored of the Rio Pongas on 22 October 
1820, the log entry reads: 
Fhom ~ to 8 light and variable airs and pleasant at 
4 10 hoisted out the barge and 1st cutter at SAM 
lieut! Ramsay & Page, Midshipmen Jones, Weaver, 
Little and Gardner & Surgeons mate Balfour left the 
shiE in boats for the Rio Pongas, in company with 
CftP. Nash in the boat of H. B. M. brig Snapper ••• 
J 1om PM the American schooner Exch~ge anchored 
near us a prize to out boats •••• 2~ 
·rhe following year, 1821, the schooner Alligator, under 
Lieutenant Commandant Robert F. Stockton, captured four 
slavers near Sherbro Island. By the time Perry arrived in 
Shark the following year the slave trade had been sharply 
27nsuspension of the Stmding Appropriation for the 
Gradual Increase of the Navy," ASP:NA, I, 652; "Increase of 
the Navy," ibid., 676; and u.s., Congress, House, African 
Colonization--Slave Trade--Commerce, H. Rept. 28), 27th 
Cong., Jrd seas., )61-62. 
28Logbook John Adams, 7 Sept. 1820-23 Aug. 182), Naval 
Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and 
Library, National Archives, Record Group 80, logbook 
citations hereafter prefixed Logbook. 
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curtailed and Perry could say that he had heard of no 
American slavers on that part of the coast. 29 
In the spring of 182) the sloop-of-war Cyane returned 
to Liberia. While there it gave the colony many supplies 
and helped build its defenses. However, a fever tr~t killed 
forty men of the crew forced the ship to get underway before 
the fortifications were completed.JO Except for the deaths, 
the visit of Cyane was typical of many other visits of 
American cruisers. 
With the slave trade at a low level during those years 
the need for constant surveillance of the coast was minimized. 
·rhe government did not abandon completely its presence on 
the coast; rather it detailed vessels to visit the coast 
for short periods. In his Annual Report for 1824 the 
Secretary of the Navy outlined the procedure which was 
followed, with numerous variations, until 184). ·rhe commodore 
of the West India squadron was directed to dispatch "one 
of the vessels of his squadron to the coast of Africa, to 
touch at Cape Mesurado, minister to the wants of the agency 
there, and return by the usual track of the slave ships ... 31 
A year later Secretary of the Navy Sanuel L. Southard wrote 
to Dr. John w. Peaco, the agent for liberated Africans, that 
it was the intention of the government to send a ship-of-war 
29Logbook Alligator, J Mar. 1821-1 Jan. 1822; and DuBois, 
Suppression of the Slave-Trade, 126. 
3°staudenraus, African Colonization, 90. 
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31"Condition of the Navy and Marine Corps," ASP:NA,I, 1004. 
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to Liberia at intervals of three or four months.32 Almost 
every year before the establishment of the permanent squadron 
in 1843 saw commissioned vessels at Liberia, but never at 
the numbers anticipated by Southard. 
'rhe activities of the schooner Shark, Lieutenant Otho 
Norris, are typical of those visits and is exceptional only 
in that he detained a French slaver and turned her over to 
a French brig-of-war. The logbook of Shark reveals that 
she visited several towns on the Liberian coast and boarded 
several vessels in the vicinity. The logs of Porpoise 
indicate that in 1824 and 1833 her boarding parties visited 
not only American but also English and French vessels in 
the area. On one occasion Porpoise had to fire a shot across 
the bows of a British vessel in order to force her to stop 
and on another occasion the boarding party returned with a 
"black boy" taken from a schooner.33 
Most of these ships were not detached from the West 
Indian squadron as the Secretary of the Navy had proposed, 
but were often either going to or returning from another 
station. Many of the visits lasted several weeks, but that 
of Porpoise in 1833 appears to have been the shortest of 
10.5 
32southard to John w. Peaco, 28 Dec. 182.5, African Letters, 
Roll 1:64; "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 
Showing the Condition of the Navy in the Year 1826," ASP:NA, 
II, 750. See Appendix H for a list of American men-of-war 
visiting Africa between 1820 and 1842. 
33 11 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Showing 
the Condition of the Navy in the Year 1827, 11 ASP:NA, III,.58; 
Logbook Shark, 2 May 1826-31 Dec. 1826; and 23 Oct. 1832-
29 Nov. 1833. 
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the visits to Liberia. She had been sent from the Caribbean 
in pursuit of a pirate and touched at Monrovia only inciden-
tally. However, while there she boarded a number of vessels, 
apparently seeking to determine whether they were equipped 
for the slave trade. Not all ships were so active in such a 
brief period. If the log of the sloop-of-war Vandalia 
relates all events of importance, it appears that she spent 
most of the time between July and October 1842 riding at 
anchor in the harbors of Sierra Leone, Monrovia, and Cape 
Palmas. Her log mentions but one vessel boarded in that 
time, the schooner Gazelle from Boston bound to China.34 
Vandalia was the last of the cruisers to be sent to 
Africa before the establishment to the African squadron. 
But even before her deployment, the government's policy 
had begun to change. It was obvious that the slave trade 
was reviving as early as 18)6 and that some other system 
was necessary to provide ships to patrol against the 
slavers. 
The infrequent visits of American naval vessels to 
Africa had early led to the taking of measures by the 
colonial government which could not but embarrass the 
American government, even though the latter did disavow any 
responsibility for the settlement. In February 1822 the 
only American naval officer in Africa was ~lidshipman H. D. 
J4"Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Showing 
the Condition of the Navy in the Year 1827," ASP:NA, IV, 6; 
Logbook Porpoise, 2J Oct. 18)2-29 Nov. 18JJ; and Logbook 
Vandalia, 3 Feb. 1842-19 Apr. 184). 
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Hunter who commanded the colonial guarda costa schooner 
Augusta. A British cruiser had discovered the American 
slaver Dolphin in the Rio Pongas, and, prevented by Anglo-
American disagreements from seizing her, persuaded Hunter 
to lead a party of English on board Dolphin and take her 
for violating American law. The slaver was taken to Sierra 
Leone and then sent to New York for adjudication. In April 
1826 Dr. Peace made use of two Columbian privateers to 
raid the "Piratical Establishment" at Trade Town. ·rhe 
town was razed and the Columbiana took three vessels as 
prizes. On other occasions British cruisers delivered 
suspected American slavers to Monrovia, but since the 
Governor had no power and the agency no authority, they 
were forced to release them.35 
Cases such as these and the renewed activity in the 
slave trade caused the Colonization Society and Congress 
to bring pressure on the Navy Department. In 1839 the Navy 
Secretary responded in his Annual Message to these pressures: 
·rhe frequent and increasing violations of the 
laws for suppressing the slave trade on the Coast 
of Africa, by vessels owned by foreigners, but 
prostituting the flag of the United States to their 
nefarious purposes, induced you [Congress] to direct 
that two fast sailing vessels, of the smaller class 
should be fitted out, for the purpose of correcting 
35Midshipman Harry D. Hunter to Thompson, 19 Feb. 1827, 
African Letters, Roll 2:66; Ayres to Thompson, 24 Feb. 1823, 
ibid.4 Roll 2:101; Ashmun to Southard, 19 Apr. 1826, ibid., Roll :11; James Ramsey to Southard, 19 July 1826, ibid., 
Roll 4:22; Statement of John Chase as enclosure to Ramsey 
to Southard, 31 July 1826, ibid., Roll 4:26; Buchanan to 
Paulding, 31 Dec. 1839, ibid., Roll 5:129; and Buchanan 
to Paulding, 28 Jan. 1840, ibid., Roll 5:131-J2e 
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these violations of our laws •••• 36 
·rhe brig Dolphin and the schooner Grampus were deployed 
to Africa and spent several months, returned to the United 
States briefly, then made a second cruise to Africa. With 
the deployment of these vessels and Vandalia, the government 
recognized the fact that the system which had previously 
been used was not preventing Americans from taking slaves 
out of Africa, regardless of the Secretary's denial that 
Americans were active in the trade. ·rhe Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty of 1842 formalized what had already been recognized, 
that a permanent American squadron was required on the coast 
of Africa to suppress the slave trade. In 1843 the first 
such squadron was deployed. 
·rhe United States responded to the problem of extin-
guishing the slave trade in a way that attempted to reflect 
the actual need of a force on the African coast. When 
slavers were active, as in the early 1820s and late 1830s 
a substantial force was employed, and in the interim only 
a single vessel was occasionally sent to the coast. The 
force was never sufficient, however, to provide a constant 
surveillance of even the Liberian coast. During the twenty-
three years, there were visits by public vessels on about 
thirty occasions. These visits often were little more 
than perfunctory stops undertaken to satisfy the demands of 
36u .s. z, Congress, Sena~~., Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy [1839J, s. Ex. Doc. 1, 26th Cong., 1st sess. 
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the Colonization Society and to fulfill the promises of the 
Navy Secretaries that an American man-of-war would occasion-
ally visit the African coast. 
If, however, a cruiser station had been established 
off the Liberian coast at an earlier date, much could have 
been accomplished. A single vessel, with a supply depot 
at Cape Mesurado or Cape Palmas, could have met the needs 
of the colony and of the Navy. And the slave trade could 
have been largely suppressed during the greater part of the 
period. These measures would have gone a long way toward 
ensuring a more fruitful marriage. 
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CHAPTER V 
PIRATICAL SLAVERS: THE WEST INDIES, 1800-1862 
In no area was the connection between the Navy's 
obligations to protect commerce and suppress the slave 
trade more apparent than in the waters close to home. 
French depredations and Latin American piracies in the 
Caribbean gave rise to patrols of the area. These patrols 
led not only to the capture of pirates, but also to the 
seizure of vessels carrying slaves. Indeed, so intimately 
related were slave trading and piracy in the 1820s and 
18JOs that the two terms were used almost interchangeably. 
In many instances naval patrols protecting the nation's 
maritime commerce recaptured Africans taken by pirates as 
part of their booty. 
The earliest instance of the Navy's involvement with 
African slaves occurred during the Quasi-War with France, 
when a United States naval force was dispatched to the 
Caribbean. Several French vessels captured early in the 
conflict were taken to Philadelphia. Benjamin Stoddert, 
Secretary of the Navy, wrote to Captain Stephen Decatur 
in June 1798: 
The Vessels under Quarentine, near Fort Mifflin, 
have a number of Passengers on board, French Men 
and Negroes. The Negroes it seems are impatient 
to land and have discovered a disposition to out-
rage. • • • it is expedient they should be 
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1 prevented from landing, •••• 
'rhe first noted action, therefore, of the United States 
Navy in relation to the slave trade was to enforce federal 
and state laws forbidding blacks from entering the United 
States. 
In September 1799 the Secretary of the Navy addressed 
a circular to naval captains. Referring to an act of 1794 
that forbade the entry of blacks into the United States, 
Stoddert reminded them that it was the "duty of all Public 
Officers, to lend aid in supporting the just authority of 
the Laws • • 
" 
Since the Navy had not been given a 
direct responsibility in the suppression of the slave trade, 
Stoddert limited the duty of the naval officers merely to 
the collection of names and descriptions of vessels which 
might be engaged in the foreign slave trade. 2 Such 
information appears to have been turned over to the 
Secretary of the Treasur~ for on 13 November 1799 Stoddert 
notified Olover Wolcott of the employment in the trade of 
the snow Adventure of Boston. The following year similar 
communications mentioned five American vessels suspected of 
participating in the foreign slave trade.3 
1Benjamin Stoddert to Capt. Stephen Decatur, 28 June 
1798, Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Officers, 
1798-1868 (M-149), Roll 1:62, Naval Records Collection of the 
Office of Naval Records and Library, Record Group 45, National 
Archives, hereafter cited Officers, Ships of War. 
2circular from the Secretary of the Navy to Captains, 
in the Navy, 5 Sept. 1799, Officers, Ships of War, Roll 2: 
338-39 
3stoddert to Oliver Wolcott, 13 Nov. 1799, u.s., Office 
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Unfortunately there was little the Treasury Secretary 
could do except notify the collectors of the ports, as was 
done in June 1799, when Wolcott informed Benjamin Lincoln, 
collector at Boston, that the brig Dolphin of Boston was 
known to have transported one hundred forty to one hundred 
fifty slaves to Cuba. 4 During the war most, if not all the 
vessels of the Revenue Cutter Service, the forerunner of the 
Coast Guard, had been transferred from the control of 
the Treasury to the Navy Department, depriving the ·r1"easury 
of the means to stop slavers off shore. 
One of the cutters transferred to the Navy appears to 
have made a capture, but the evidence is not conclusive. 
On 19 July 1798 the United States Revenue Cutter Governor 
Jay, Captain John W. Leonard, was transferred to the Navy 
Department.; In June 1799 a judicial decision stated 
that: "Captain Leonard only says that he boarded this 
vessel at sea, that she had on boa~d ten slaves, and was 
going from Martinique to the Havana. "6 ·rhe apparent slaver, 
of Naval Records and Library, Naval Documents Related to the 
Quasi-War Between the United States and France: Naval Oper-
ations from February l121 to December 1801 (Washington, D.C., 
19)5-19~ IV, )90; and Wolcott to Stoddart, 18 Apr. 1800, 
ibid., V, 426, hereafter cited Naval Docs., Quasi-War. 
4Ibid., III, )2J. 
5stoddert to Capt. John w. Leonard, 19 July 1798, 
Officers, Ships of War, Roll 1:115; and Benjamin Stoddart 
"Naval Force and Expenditures," 24 Dec. 1798, American State 
Papers: Naval Affairs, I, 58, hereafter cited ASP:NA. 
6Helen Honor Catterall, ed., Judicial Cases Concerning 
American Slavery and the Negro (Washington, D.C., 1926-
19)7), II, 280. 
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Le Marsouin, was a French schooner captured by the U. S. 
ship Delaware on 4 March 1799. Governor Jay had been 
ordered to cruise with Delaware about this time and Le 
Marsouin and Governor Jay may have been sent to the United 
States in company. Several crewmen from the Revenue Cutter 
appear to have been part of the prize crew onboard the 
French vessel.? 
In 1800 the Navy was to get a more active role in the 
suppression of the trade. The Sixth Congress passed the 
addition to the act of 1794 which provided that commissioned 
vessels of the United States could seize American vessels 
involved in the foreign slave trade. Among the documents 
sent to the commanding officers of ships about to sail 
was a copy of the Slave ·rrade Act of 1800. ·rhe object of 
the Act was, as Stoddert said to Captain Samuel Barron of 
the frigate Chesapeake, "to annihilate that Trade." 8 
Results were soon forthcoming. The act was passed in 
May 1800 and in June Lieutenant William Maley of the U. s. 
schooner Experiment seized the sloop Betsy of Charleston 
with eighty-five slaves on board bound from Africa to 
Havana. Perhaps Captain Batemen Munro of Betsy was unaware 
of the Act of 1800 and believed there would be no hindrance 
to his journey. He departed Charleston on 13 February, 
7stoddert to Leonard, 30 May 1799, Naval Docs., Quasi-
War, I I I , 281 • 
8stoddert to Lt. John H. Jones, 6 Aug. 1800, ibid., 
IV, 226; and Stoddert to Capt. Samuel Barron, 8 Aug. 1800, 
ibid., VI, 232. 
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several months before the act had been passed, but he was 
in violation of the law passed in 1794, only now the act 
had some teeth to it.9 
The following month Lieutenant John Mullowny, commanding 
the United States ship Ganges, captured two American vessels 
taking slaves to Cuba. On the nineteenth Ganges chased and 
captured the schooner Prudent, Pardon Bennet, master, and 
two days later the schooner Phoebe, Captain Mills, was 
seized. Both vessels were sent to Philadelphia. 10 
The last American slaver taken by a United States Navy 
vessel during the Quasi-War period was a New England slaver 
deized by the frigate Chesapeake early in 1801. Chesapeake 
and her prize sailed for Hampton Roads and moored at 
Craney Island. 
These seizures presented a considerable difficulty 
because the laws for the suppression of the slave trade made 
no provision as to the disposition of the blacks. The 
situation is apparent in a letter from ·rhomas Newton to 
Virginia governor James rvlon:c•oe: 
Cap~ Baron [sic] of the Chesapeake Frigate has 
sent in here a vessel belonging to one of the 
N England Governments which had a cargo of Slaves 
on board bound to Havannah from Guinea • 
• • • none will be permitted to land, I shall 
be obliged to Yf Exc~ for instructions how 
9"Extract from journal of the U. s. schooner Experiment," 
Lt. William Maley, 25 June 1800, ibid., VI, 85. 
1011 Extract from journal of U.s. ship Ganges," Lt. John 
Mullowny $ 19 July ,.800, ibid., 163; and 21 July 1800, ibid., 
164. 
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I am to act on this subject, as it is a new 
case; Mr. Pennock [navy agent] has wrote to 
the Sec~ of the Navy on the Subject, but as 
our laws [Virginia's] prohibit the importation 
& the Law of Congress directs the Capture of 
vessels trading to Guinea I am at a loss how 
to act.--11 
Governor Monroe passed the question to the state 
Attorney General who maintained that the national and state 
laws did not conflict, the federal law made no provision 
for the disposition of the slaves, while Virginia's law of 
10 December 1793 stated that no slave could be introduced 
into the state from Africa or the West Indies, and if 
present, had to be removed from the state. 12 Although it 
is not known what happened to the blacks, they may have 
been sent to Philadelphia. It was the opinion of the Sec-
retary of the Navy that Congress intended slaves taken by 
naval vessels to be sold in those West Indian islands where 
slaves were treated most humanely. However, the Secretary 
did not issue any orders to that effect. Instead, he 
recommended to Lieutenant John Smith of Chesapeake that 
the slaves under his care should be well kept until better 
weather, then taken to Philadelphia where some slaves 
captured under similar conditions had been sent. "'rhe 
abolition society [in Philadelphia], much to their honor, 
11 Thomas Newton to Gov. James Monroe, 4 Feb. 1801, ibid., 
VII, 116-17; and Elizabeth Donnan, ed., Documents 
Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America 
(Washington, D: C:: 19J0-19J3T, IV, 165-66. --
12Att. Gen. Philip Norborne Nicholas to Monroe, 11 Feb. 
1801, Executive Papers, Jan.-Mar. 1801, Box 116, Governor 
James Monroe, Virginia State Library. 
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took the care of them, & I believe provided them with 
masters for a term of years." 13 
The end of hostilities with France brought a temporary 
end to the Navy's capture of slavers. The squadron had not 
yet been established in the Caribbean and the cruisers were 
called home. Not until after the War of 1812 is there any 
indication that the Navy patrolled for the suppression of 
the slave trade. Events in the interval would have made 
this difficult indeed. During Thomas Jefferson's admin-
istration the ships of the Navy were put in ordinary, or 
laid up. To maintain the ships at sea was an expense the 
country could ill afford. Instead the national defense was 
left to static coastal fortifications and gun boats. Amer-
ican merchant vessels trading in Europe during the Anglo-
French wars would have to depend upon the self interest of 
the belligerants--France and England--for their protection. 
Since both powers needed American shipping they would 
respect the neutrality of the vessels. When the United 
States did enter the conflict the ships were either too 
busy with British men-of-war or enjoying the enforced 
idleness of the blockade. 14 
During thig period, however, two laws were passed which 
would affect the Navy when it did resume its anti-slave 
13stoddert to Lt. John Smith, 4 Feb. 1801, Naval Docs., 
Quasi-War, VII, 116. 
14 Harold and Margaret Sprout, 'rhe Rise of American Naval 
Power, 1776-1918, (Princeton, 1939;-reprint-r96?), 58-60. 
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trade role. In 1807 Congress passed the law which forbade 
the introduction of slaves into the United States and 
authorized the Navy to cruise the waters of the United 
States and its territories co er~orce the law. By this 
act American men-of-war were to capcure vessels of any 
nation carrying slaves within the territorial waters of the 
country and to seize American vessels engaged in the 
traffic wherever found. 
The second law, passed 15 January 1811, had little to 
do with the slave trade, but had its origins in the fears 
of President James Madison that the Floridas might be 
occupied by some power stronger than the current holder, 
Spain. Madison said in a secret message to Congress on 
3 January 1811: 
I recommend to the consideration of Congress, the 
seasonableness of a declaration that the United 
States could not see, without serious inquietude, 
any part of neighboring territory, in which they 
have, in different respects, so deep and so just 
a concern, pass from the hands of Spain into those 
of any other foreign Power. 
A little less than two weeks later, Madison signed a secret 
bill which authorized the President to use the army and navy 
to occupy East Florida in the case of its occupation by 
any power other than Spain. 15 This second act was important 
in the justification of some of the Navy's activities after 
the War of 1812. 
Already the stage was being set. The St. Mary's River 
15Quoted in John A. Logan, Jr., No rransfer: An 
American Security Principle (New Haven, 1961), 118-20. 
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formed the border between Georgia and Spanish East Florida, 
and it was used as a base for smuggling into the United 
States. In January 1811 Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the 
Navy, wrote to H. C. Campbell, the commanding naval officer 
at Charleston, South Carolina, stating that since the gun-
boats had been withdrawn from the vicinity of the St. Mary's 
River slaves were being introduced into the United States 
in that region. Campbell was given specific instructions 
to seize all vessels carrying slaves within the territorial 
waters of the United States. 16 
At the end of the Napoleonic Wars several of the Latin 
American countries sought their independence and the 
continued strife between colonies and mother country was the 
occasion for an outbreak of privateering, which often became 
outright piracy. On Amelia Island in the St. Mary's River 
and at Galveston, Texas, groups of pirates established 
enclaves from which they could prey on shipping and intro-
duce captured goods, quite often including slaves, into the 
United States in violation of American law. 
In the summer of 1817 Fernandina on Amelia Island was 
occupied by a Scot, Gregor McGregor, who used the island as 
his base. In July orders were issued by Secretary of the 
Navy Benjamin W. Crowninshield to Captain John H. Elton, 
commanding the United States brig Saranac, to cruise off the 
16u.s., Congress, House, African Colonization--Slave 
Trade--Commerce, H. Rept. 283, 27th Cong., )rd sess., 230-
Jl, Paul Hamilton to H. G. Campbell, 22 Jan. 1811, hereafter 
cited H. Rept. 28). 
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St. Mary's and search all vessels entering the river and 
seize those carrying slaves. "rhe traffic in slaves," the 
n17 Secretary said, "is intended to be restrained, • • . . 
Although Elton's orders told him to "exercise your 
sound judgement" concerning vessels examined, they were not 
specific as to the status of the island itself. Elton 
wrote to Crowninshield asking clarification of the matter 
since one small Spanish vessel had entered Fernandina before 
Elton could inspect her. He would have gone into the harbor 
and taken her out, but he believed the island to be neutral 
territory and to do so would have been contrary to the 
wishes of the government. 18 
On 9 November a boat from Saranac attempted to board 
a vessel entering the St. Mary's and was f1red upon. Elton 
was still in a quandary as how to treat the people of 
Fernandina and did not consider it proper to attempt to 
destroy the establishment. Instead he sent Lieutenant 
Commandant E. H. ~l'Call "to bring back the privateer Jupiter, 
to remain as a pledge, • II A Slave vessel, Tentativa, 
was instead delivered to Elton by Luis Aury, then in command 
of the privateer's base, "in order to obviate difficulties, 
for the present, • II Elton had maintained a blockade . . . 
17Ibid., Message ••• [gn] the PossessjJn of Amelia 
Island •••• H. Hept. 47, 15th Cong., l~~ sess., 16, B. 
W. Crowninshield to Capt. John H. El~~~. 16 July 1817; and 
231, Crowninshield to Elton, 16 July 1817, hereafter cited 
H. Hept. 47. 
18Elton to Crowninshield, 10 Oct. 1817, American State 
Papers: Foreign Affairs, XI, 379, hereafter cited ASP:FA. 
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of Fernandina to intercept slavers and Aury was apparently 
trying to make his situation more comfortable by appeasing 
his opposition. Tentativa, with one hundred twenty slaves 
on board, was sent to Savannah where it arrived on the 
nineteenth of November. 19 
rhe government was not satisfied with the token 
surrender of one slave vessel. In November a larger naval 
force was ordered to St. Mary's under the command of 
Commodore John D. Henley. His orders were to remove the 
pirate/slave traders from Amelia Island. It was hoped this 
could be done peaceably, but "should the force ••• now in 
command of the island • • • resist and refuse absolutely to 
give up and abandon the same, you are in co-operation with 
the military force of the United States, to proceed and 
take possession of the island, in the name and by the author-
ity of the United States. 11 Henley was also required to 
seize all vessels with ·slaves on board 11 as the presumption 
is strong that they are intended to be smuggled into the 
United States.n 2° Captain Henley and Major James Bankhead, 
of the first Battalion of Artillery, demanded the surrender 
21 
of Fernandina. rhe next day, 23 December, Aury surrendered. 
19Elton to Crowninshield, 15 Nov. 1817, ASP:FA, XI, 380-
81; Auty to Elton, 12 Nov. 1817, ASP:FA, XI, 384; and A. S. 
Bullock toW. H. Crawford, 25 Nov. 1817, H. Rept. 283, 253-
54. On naval ranks, see Appendix G. 
20crowninshield to John D. Henley, 14 Nov. 1817, H. 
Rept. 47, 17; and Crowninshield to Henley, 14 Nov. 1817, 
H. Rept. 283, 232. 
21 H. Rept. 47, passim. 
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A House committee supported President Monroe's action, 
stating the belief that the smuggling of slaves into Georgia 
would have continued at an increasing rate. 22 It was not 
until after the settlement of the Amelia problem that the 
law of 15 January 1811 was used as justification for the 
administration's actions. Early in January 1818 the act 
was first made public by Henry Clay who was trying to obtain 
recognition of the newly independent Latin American states. 
rhe enterprise at Amelia Island was seen by him as a repu-
diation of the revolutionary forces, although there was 
little doubt that both McGregor and Aury had little, if 
any, support from any of the rebellious colonies. ·rhey were 
merely pirates smuggling slaves and other items into the 
United States. 
Monroe justified the occupation of Amelia Island on the 
grounds that Spain had no control over her colony in Florida 
and that it had been occupied by a foreign power. Under the 
provisions of the law of 1811 it was the President's respon-
sibility to ensure that there was no transfer of power in 
East Florida. The United States would merely hold the 
territory in safe keeping for Spain. 23 
One of the fears of some Americans was expressed by 
Captain Henley the same month, when he captured the English 
2Zu.s., Congress, House, Report of the Committee. 
ron] the Introduction of Slaves from Amelia Island, H. Rept. 
4~ 15th Cong., 1st sess., 1. 
23 4 4· H. Rept. 7, , and Logan, No rransfer, 133-35. 
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brig Neptune. Unaware that Aury's band was no longer in 
possession, Neptune attempted to land at Amelia Island eight 
convict slaves from Jamaica who had been sentenced to depor-
tation. Henly reported to the Secretary of the Navy that 
"it is evident that their object was to smuggle them into 
the State of Georgia, thus making a Botany Bay of the United 
States." 24 This was not the only case where slaves from 
Jamaica were meant to be smuggled into the country. In 1810 
Lieutenant Commandant B. F. Read seized the British brig 
Alexandrine attempting to take 127 slaves into Louisiana. 25 
At Galveston another establishment of pirates and 
smugglers had been created to facilitate the introduction 
of illicit goods into Louisiana. The Galveston base had 
been organized by Aury in 1817, but by November he had left 
and his place taken by Jean Lafitte. Galveston, like 
Fernandina, operated under the flag of one of the revolu-
tionary Spanish colonies. The flag was a cover for the 
activities of the pirates who used it to give some legit-
imacy to their privateering, and thus legal, operations. 
When, however, they preyed upon American merchantmen rather 
than Spanish vessels, their operations were no longer 
privateering, but were piracy, and the United States 
24Henley to Crowninshield, 24 Jan. 1818, H. Rept. 283, 
157. 
25oavid Porter to Paul Hamilton, 1 Jan. 1810, Letters 
Received by the Secretary of the Navy From Commanders, 1804-
1886 {M-147), Roll 4:1, Naval Record Collection of the 
Office of Naval Records and Library, Record Group 45, 
National Archives, hereafter cited Commander's Letters. 
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responded by sending men-of-war to the Gulf of Mexico to 
put an end to their depredations. 26 
In January 1817 Lieutenant Commandant B. V. Hoffman 
searched the privately armed Mexican schooner Eugene. As 
Eugene had slaves on board and was in American waters she 
was seized and sent to New Orleans for condemnation. 27 
Conditions were not favorable for the suppression of 
slave smuggling on the Gulf coast. Although Captain Charles 
Morris was pessimistic, he promised to make every exertion 
in an attempt to do so. Lieutenant Commandant John Porter, 
commanding the U. S. brig Boxer, reported on the difficul-
ties faced by the Navy to Secretary Crowninshield: 
The natural assumption is, they [the smugglers] 
will attempt the Sabine or Atchafalya rivers; 
the depth of the water off those rivers are 
very inaccurately represented on the charts, 
and it will not be in my power to approach 
nearer the shore than within ten miles off 
the Sabine, an~8not nearer than thirty off the Atchfalya. 
Boxer was a relatively shallow draft vessel, but the 
smugglers could use small boats and easily convey the 
slaves from Galveston into Louisiana. From a distance of 
ten to thirty miles they would have been impossible to 
26George P. Garrison, Texas: A Contest of Civilizations, 
American Commonwealth Series (Boston, 1903), 131-35; and 
Odie B. Faulk, The Last Year~ of Spanish rexas, 1~78-1821, 
Studies in American History (The Hague, 1964), 13 -38. 
27Lt. Comdt. B. V. Hoffman to Capt. Charles Morris, 18 
Jan. 1817, ASP:FA, XI, 363. 
28Ibid., 377; Morris to Crowninshield, 10 June 1817, 
H. Rept. 283, 257; and Lt. Comdt. John Porter to Crownin-
shield, 28 June 1817, H. Rept. 283, 377. 
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detect. ·rhe only hope was to catch larger vessels carrying 
slaves within American waters. Boxer did seize two small 
schooners in August and send them into New Orleans. 29 
Shortly after this, in June 1818, Isaac McKeever in 
command of the ketch Surprise, surprised the slavers Merino 
and Louisa off Pensacola, and after a five year litigation 
they were condemned. McKeever received $419.45 as his 
share of the prize money, but during the five years the 
case was in litigation he spent three thousand dollars 
of his own money participating in the trials. In 1826 
Congress voted to reimburse McKeever.J0 
By 1819 and 1820 the slave trade and piracy were 
intimately related. As Isaac Mayo wrote in 18)0, "we know 
that most piracies, recently committed, have been by vessels 
engaged in the [slave] traffic."J1 And piracy was on the 
increase. McGregor, Aury, and Lafitte were not the only 
pirates operating in the Gulf of Mexico. On the coast of 
Cuba, particularly around Matanzas, guarding the approach 
to Havana, and Cape San Antonio at the western end of Cuba, 
there were enclaves of pirates who preyed on unarmed 
merchant vessels. These pirates used small craft and open 
29Beverly Chew, Collector at New Orleans, to Crawford, 
JO Aug. 1817, ASP:FA, XI, )52. 
3°catterall, Judicial Cases, III, 1)2, "The Merino," 
and U.S., Congress, House, Lieutenant Isaac ~'Keever, H. 
Rept. 150, 19th Cong., 1st sess., 1. 
Jl"Circumstances leading to and attending the seizure 
of Fenix," ASP:NA, III, 866. 
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boats for their activities. 
The relationship between piracy and the slave trade 
was recognized in law in 1820 when Congress enacted legis-
lation continuing measures to protect commerce and punish 
piracy. The fourth and fifth sections of this act stip-
ulated that for Americans, participation in the slave trade 
in any way, was the same as bei~3 a pirate and provision 
was made for the death penalty. 
At the end of 1820 only three vessels were assigned 
to the West Indies for the suppression of the slave trade 
and piracy. One of those, the sloop-of-war Hornet, had 
cruised off the coast of Africa.32 By 1822 the West India 
squadron had been increased to eight vessels ranging from 
the frigate Congress to a gunboat, and two more vessels 
were readying for deployment.)) rhe Navy was beginning 
a campaign to suppress the West Indian pirates and along 
with them the trade in slaves to the United States. 
American men-of-war had to be wary in this enterprise. 
While pirates were enemies against humanity and could be 
punished by any nation, American law did not view the slave 
trade in the same light. American law did not condemn the 
slave trade as such, only the participation in it by 
citizens of the United States and the introduction of blacks 
into the country. ·rhis was the nature of the warning 
32"Increase of the Navy," ibid., I, 6?6. 
))"Condition of the Navy and Its Operations," ibid., 804. 
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received by Jesse Wilkinson, commanding the brig Spark, 
in August 1822: 
You will not consider your general instructions, 
under the laws of the United States, for the 
suppression of the slave trade, as authorizing 
you, at any place out of the waters of the 
United States, to search, capture, or, in any 
manner whatever, to interrupt ves~~ls under 
any other than the American flag • .J 
·rhus, in ftlarch 1822 when the American man-of -war 
Porpoise seized the American schooner Mary with seventeen 
slaves on board, the seizure could be considered legal 
under the laws of the United States although the blacks 
were not loaded or destined for the United States, and they 
were claimed to be the property of a Spanish subject. rhe 
schooner was sent to the United States for adjudication, 
apparently after going to Havana to discharge the slaves. 
·rhe captain of Mary was violating American law by merely 
transporting the blacks.35 
In most cases, when a vessel was seized in the West 
Indies with slaves on board, it is difficult to determine 
exactly why the vessel was taken. From the circumstances 
34John Boyle to Capt. Jesse Wilkinson, 7 Aug. 1822, 
ibid., III, l)J. 
35Messrs. J. r. Kilbee and H. F. Jameson to the Marquess 
of Londonderry, 6 May 1822, British Sessional Papers, Class 
B, 1823, XIX, 414, Edgar L. Erickson, ed. (New York: Readex 
Microprint, 1943-1967), hereafter citeu BSP. By treaty 
between England and Spain, several joint arbitration 
commissions were established to adjudicate cases arising 
from the seizure of slave vessels under the mutual right 
of search agreements. Kilbee and Jameson were the British 
commissioners at the court in Havana. 
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it must be presumed that the vessel was, in some way, 
involved in a piratical activity, either as the aggressor or 
having been captured and then recaptured by an American man-
of-war. In July 1822 Master Commandant Hobert Henley, in 
the sloop Hornet, recaptured the French brig ·rheodore 
after she had been taken by a Columbian privateer, General 
~· ·rheodore had one hundred sixty slaves on board 
when Hornet recaptured her, and she was sent into Charleston. 
There is no mention of the brig intending to take the slaves 
to the United States--she was taken by Hornet near Matanzas--
nor any mention of the vessel being American or with any 
American citizens on board. rheodore was probably considered 
a "military salvage" and returned to her owners with her 
cargo intact.36 A similar incident took place in 1827 when 
Hobert Henley, again in command of Hornet, recaptured two 
hundred twenty slaves taken from La Pense~ by the Columbian 
privateer Centinella.37 
On 5 June 18)0 Lieutenant Commandant Isaac Mayo in 
the United States schooner Grampus prevented a piratical 
attack upon the American merchant brig Kremlin. Off Cape 
Haiti, Santo Domingo, Grampus sighted Kremlin and upon 
36Ibid., 416-17; and Frederic L. Paxson, ·rhe Indepen-
dence of the South American Republics: ~ Study in Rec6~­
nition and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., (Philadelphia, 191 , 
119-20. For a discussion of military or prize salvage see: 
C. John Colombos, ·rhe International Law of the Sea, 6th 
rev. ed. (New York, 1967), 783-85; and Madeline Russell 
Robinton, An Introduction to the Papers of the New York 
Prize Court, 1861-1865 (NewYork, 1945) ,1)2-34-.- --
37"secretary of the Navy Annual Report," ASP:NA, III, 79. 
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closing discovered another sail on the far side of the 
brig. The commander of Kremlin reported that he had been 
followed for some time by the other vessel, which had once 
attempted to boar~ the American brig. Mayo gave chase to 
the unknown vessel, soon overhauled and boarded her. Fenix 
was seized for being a pirate and taken into New Orleans. 
·rhe pirate vessel was known to have sailed for Africa the 
previous year, presumably for slaves.J8 
These three cases illustrate the connection between 
the slave trade and piracy. Vessels operating as privateers 
under the Columbian flag could be called little more than 
pirates when they attacked French or American vessels. No 
doubt there were many more cases where slave cargoes 
exchanged hands in acts of piracy. Slaves were a very 
valuable cargo and for some it was unnecessary to sail all 
the way to Africa, spend several months in a hazardous 
climate to collect a cargo and return to the Caribbean to 
sell it. A vessel with slaves on board was as easy to seize 
as any other vessel. Although the United States Navy was 
primarily interested in ending piracy and protecting 
legitimate commerce in the Caribbean in the years between 
1820 and 1835, the intimate connection between piracy and 
the slave trade explains the inclusion of warnings about the 
traffic in the letters from the Secretary of the Navy to his 
3811 Circumstances leading to and attending the Seizure of 
Fenix," ibid., 866-70; and W. S. Macleay to the Earl of 
Aberdeen~ Aug., 18)0, BSP, Class A, 18)1, XIX, 449. 
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commanding officers. 
The year 18JS not only marked the effective suppression 
of the Latin American piracy in the Caribbean, but also the 
beginning of significant American participation in the slave 
trade to Cuba. ·rhe causes are readily apparent: the high 
price sugar was attaining and an Anglo-Spanish treaty. 
An American naval officer who was in Cuba in 18)6 
reported that the high price of colonial produce, especially 
sugar, created a correspondingly high demand for slaves 
to work the new sugar plantations. It was the 11 plain 
principle of political economy, that the demand regulates 
the supply. 11 39 
Equally important was the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 18)5. 
By this treaty, ratified 24 August, the Spanish agreed to 
a mutual right of search, and, in Articles ·.ren, Eleven, and 
·.rwel ve, agreed that the presence of slave equipment, such 
as a slave deck (or timber for constructing one), excessive 
food and water, shackles, or cooking coppers in excess of 
crew needs, was sufficient evidence for seizure of the 
vessel as a slaver. 40 As it would be in the case of the 
Brazilian slave trade a few years later, it was the actions 
of the British government, working with a humane object in 
J9[Horatio Bridge], Journal of ~ African Cruiser ••• 
]2z ~ Officer of they. S. Navy, ed. Nathaniel Hawthorne 
(New York, 1843T, 1J2-J4. 
40Arthur F. Corwin, Spain and the Abolition of Slavery 
in Cuba, 1§11-1886, Institute of Latin American Studies 
""(Austin, ·rex. ,1'9t)?), 51. 
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view, which brought about the use of the American flag in 
a foreign slave trade. 
As late as September 18,36 the British commissioners 
in Havana wrote that the Portuguese flag was predominant 
in the Cuban trade. But the next month the commissioners 
wrote to Lord Palmerston in alarm: 
During the months of August and September there 
arrived here, for sale, from the United States, 
several new schooners, some of which were already 
expressly fitted for the Slave Trade. 
Amongst them we have been able to ascertain the 
names of four, viz. "Emanuel," 11 Dolores," "Anaconda, 11 
and "Viper. 11 ·rhey vary in size from 5o to 1.50 tons; 
their construction is of the slightest possible des-
cription; their rig that of the New York pilot-boats, 
and such as is very muc~1in use by the coasting traders of this Island. 
Five of the fourteen vessels leaving Havana in October 
18,36 did so under the American flag, and according to the 
British commissioners there was no secret as to the purpose 
of the American vessels. "Some American citizens impunible 
violate every law, by embarking openly for the Coast of 
Africa under their national flag, with the avowed purpose 
of bringing slaves to this market." 42 
This trend was significantly different from that of 
the mid-1820s, and presaged continued growth of the trade 
41Macleay and E. W. H. Schenly to Palmerston, 1 Jan. 
18,36, BSP, Class A, 18,36, L, 206; Schenly and R. R. Madden 
to Palmerston, JO Sept, 18,36, ibid., 18.37, LIV, 200; and 
25 Oct. 18.36, ibid., 20.3. These were all built in or 
around Baltimore. Howard I. Chapelle~ ·rhe Search for Speed 
Under Sail, 1700-1§22 (New York, 1967J, ,301-02. 
42schenly and Madden to Palmerston, 2 Jan. 18.37, BSP, 
Class A, 18.37, LIV, 2,30. 
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to Cuba under the American flag. In January 1823 J. T. 
Kilbee and R. F. Jameson, the British commissioners to 
Havana, had written to Foreign Secretary Canning that 
within the last few months the traffic had declined, but 
''that this diminution is to be attributed solely to the 
general distress, as well agricultural as commercial, which 
has existed here for some time, and by no means to any 
increased exertions on the part of the Authorities for the 
suppression of the traffick. 1143 
This condition was not expected to last long and the 
British officials in Havana were suspicious of every one. 
In Februray 1824 Kilbee wrote to Secretary Canning concern-
ing a communication the former had with the governor of 
Cuba respecting some French vessels which had recently 
entered Havana harbor. If the vessels were not thoroughly 
searched, Kilbee maintained, the French might again renew 
the illicit trade to the island.44 
In the same year the United States government sent a 
Mr. Randall to Cuba to enquire into the possibility that 
American citizens were engaged in the Cuban slave trade. 
43Kilbee and Jameson to George Canning, 23 Jan 1823, 
ibid., Class B, 1823, XIX, 423. By treaty between England 
and Spain, several joint arbitration commissions were 
established to adjudicate cases arising from the seizure 
of slave vessels under the mutual right of search agree-
ments. Kilbee and Jameson were the British commissioners 
at the court in Havana. 
44Kilbee to Canning, 29 Feb. 1824, ibid., Class A. 
1825, XXVII, 397-98. 
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Kilbee informed Randall that he believed that the American 
flag was not used in the Cuban trade, but that he had heard 
there were some Americans living at Havana and Matanzas who 
were engaged in the traffic, however, using the flags of 
Spain or France.45 
By 1827 Kilbee's and Jameson's fears seemed to be 
realized, and the traffic was on the increase. In July 
four Spanish vessels left Havana for Africa and in September 
seven vessels left for the same destination, all presumably 
to acquire cargoes of slaves.46 
It was not until December 1829 that the British 
commissioners reported the first American vessel involved 
in the Cuban traffic. On the first of December the schooner 
William Gardner, W. F. Hill, master, sailed for Gallinas to 
assist some Spanish slavers blockaded by the Royal Navy in 
that river. 47 
For the next few years the trade in slaves between 
Africa and Cuba continued to rise and was carried on in 
French, Brazilian, and increasingly in Portuguese bottoms. 
In November 1834 W. s. Macleay wrote to Lord Palmerston 
that he had "never known this infamous traffic to be more 
vigorous in Cuba than at present." 'rhe trade was so common, 
4SKilbee to Canning, 29 May 1824, ibid., 400. 
46Kilbee and Jameson to Canning, J1 July 1827, ibid., 
1828, XXVI, 4J1; and Kilbee and Jameson to the Earl of 
Dudley, JO Sept, 1827, ibid., 438. 
47w. S. Macleay to the Earl of Aberdeen, 30 Dec. 1831, 
ibid., 1831, XIX, 409. 
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that slave vessels were insured by a company in Havana at 
twenty-two percent, thus offering financial protection to 
an illegal business. 48 
·rhroughout the last half of the 18JOs the use of the 
American flag continued to increase. In 1837 eleven 
American vessels were involved in the Cuban slave trade; 
in 18J8, nineteen; 1839 twenty-three; and between February 
and March 1840 eight of the twenty-one vessels departing 
Havana for Africa were American. Five of these were cleared 
out by Mr. Charles Tying, an American merchant in Havana. 49 
In 1842 the reports of the British commissioners 
indicate that the slave trade was declining. J. Kennedy 
and Campbell J. Dalrymple stated that in 1841 only thirty-
one vessels cleared Havana for Africa, "a decrease of full 
one-half of the average number of former years ...... so 
In reality it appears that, Cuban slavers were becoming more 
secretive in consequence of the Treaty of 1835· Along with 
assuming the American flag as a cover, Spanish and Cuban 
slave traders no longer openly advertized the nature of 
their business. The British commissioners could no longer 
depend upon the newspapers to report the arrival and 
48Macleay to Palmerston, 12 Dec. 1831, ibid., 1833, 
XLIII, 46; 2 Jan. 18J2, ibid., 48; and 1 Nov. 18)4, ibid., 
18)6, L,111. 
49J. Kennedy and c. J. Dalrymple to Palmerston, 13 
June 1840, ibid., 1841, XXX, 280-8). 
5°Kennedy and Dalrymple to Aberdeen, 2 Jan. 1834, ibid., 
1844, XLVIII, 97. 
1J4 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
departure of slavers.51 
Although there were American men-of-war in the West 
Indies, the efforts of the American government and the Navy 
to suppress the slave trade were negligible between 18)5 and 
1857. Several reasons are apparent for this absence of 
activity. First, with the end of the threats of piracy upon 
merchant vessels, there was a reduced need to patrol the area. 
Consequently, fewer cruisers were assigned to the West 
Indies. Then in 1842 a Home squadron was established, incor-
porating the area of responsibility of the West India 
squadron. The emphasis in naval aid to commerce shifted from 
the Caribbean to the North Atlantic. 
In 184) an African squadron was stationed off the west 
coast of Africa and the responsibility for ending the 
traffic in slaves was shifted to those vessels. When the 
squadron in the Caribbean was again enlarged, between 1846 
and 1848, it was in response tothe Mexican War. United 
States Navy vessels were then too preoccupied with the war 
to concern themselves with the trade in Africans to Cuba. 
Finally, Cubans were generally not inclined to end the 
traffic that provided such a necessary tool for their 
plantations. 
In the late 1850s, however, the American naval presence 
in the West Indies was increased in order to protect 
American shipping from the cruisers of a friendly power. 
51corwin, Slavery in Cuba, 62. 
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In January 1857 Her Majesty's commissioners at Havana 
complained to Lord Clarendon that it had been many years 
since a slaver had been seized by the Royal Navy and 
taken into Havana. They recognized the fact that there 
were few British cruisers in the West Indies, but even 
those were of the wrong class.52 Coincidently, the British 
were preparing for a reinvigorated campaign against the 
slave trade. 
It was common practice on the African coast for 
naval vessels to visit merchantmen of all nations, and the 
naval officers of both the United States and Great Britian 
were instructed, as Matthew C. Perry phrased it, to act with 
the utmost "suavity" toward the merchant captains. As long 
as these visits occurred far from home and proper tact was 
used, there was little objection to what was a technical 
violation of the agreement between the two nations.53 But 
in the spring of 1858 the British carried this practice to 
the West Indies. 
With the end of the Brazilian slave trade the Royal 
Navy began to concentrate its efforts around Cuba. The 
British had at least two small steamers in the West Indies 
that were instructed to stop and search all vessels they 
met. A number of American merchantmen were visited. On 
52crawford and F. Lousada to Clarendon, J1 Jan. 1857, 
BSP, Class A, 1857, XLIV, )8. 
53Richard w. Van Alstyne, 11Brit1sh Bight of Search and 
the African Slave Trade," Journal of Modern History, II 
(1930), )8-)9. 
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most occasions the boarding caused little problem and the 
American masters often offered the boarding officer a glass 
of gin or wine--which does not seem to have been refused.54 
But the visit of Mobile by Her Majesty's steamer Styx was 
not so friendly. In closing Mobile the British steamer 
fired not the blank cartridge usually employed to signal 
a vessel to heave to, but a shotted gun. Mobile hove to 
but Styx fired several more rounds into her. When the 
boarding officer was asked if he took Mobile to be a slaver 
he said no, but that he had orders to examine all vessels 
in the Gulf.55 
The right of search or visit had never been admitted 
by the United States. The exercise of this right by the 
British so close to home, accompanied by the firing upon 
of merchant vessels by the cruisers of the Royal Navy, 
caused the American government to send a large naval force 
to the West Indies to protect the American merchant marine 
from interference by the Royal Navy. The force consisted 
of the steam frigates Wabash and Colorado, the sloops 
Macedonian, Constellation, Jamestown, Saratoga, ~~d Plymouth, 
54 aoward Hazen Wilson, "Some Principal Aspects of 
British Efforts to Crush the African Slave Trade, 1807-
1929," American Journal of International Law, XLIV (1950), 
519; and U.S., Congress, Senate, Message of the President 
of the United States, • • • in Regard to the Seizure g! 
the American Barque Panchita on the Coast of Africa, s. 
Ex. Doc. 61, 35th Cong., 1st iesi:7 1-)6.--
55u.s., Congress, Senate, Message of the President of 
the United States, ••• concerning ~ Recent Search~ 
Seizure of American Vessels ~ Foreign Armed Cruisers in 
the Gulf of Mexico, s. Doc. 59, 35th Cong., 1st sess.,-s. 
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the steamers Water Witch, Arctic, Fulton, and Despatch, and 
the brig Dolphin. rhis force was considered "effective'' by 
the Secretary of the Navy, "because in the execution of 
their mission, no one of them would have hesitated to resist 
a ship of the largest class.n56 
As was the case during the Quasi-War with France and 
the p:tracy patrols of the 1820 and 1830s, the presence of a 
large number of warships to protect American commerce in the 
West Indies resulted also in the capture of slavers. On 21 
August 1858 the United States brig Dolphin, Lieutenant John 
N. Maffitt, was cruising the north coast of Cuba when a brig 
under American colors was sighted standing in toward Key 
Verde. Upon investigation by the Americans, the brig proved 
to be Echo with 318 Africans on board. rhe vessel was 
seized and a prize crew placed on board under Lieutenant 
J. M. Bradford and taken to Charleston. The Africans were 
soon retu~ed to Africa in the man-of-war steamer Niagara. 
The captain of Echo was placed in Dolphin and taken to 
Boston for trial.57 
Maffitt learned that more slavers were expected, 
possibly to attempt a landing along the Gulf coast of the 
United States and the Navy Department sent the steamer 
Despatch, Lieutenant Enoch Parrott, to intercept them, 
56u.s., Congress, Senate, Report£! the Secretary of 
the Navy [1858], S. Ex. Doc. 1, 35th Cong., 2nd seas., 3. 
57catterall, Judicial Cases, 459; and U.S. Congress, 
Senate, Report of the Secretary of the Navy [1S58], s. Ex. 
Doc. 1, 35th Cong.:-2nd sess., 5, 13-14. 
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but nothing came of the attempt. 
In 1854 and 1855 an American adventurer, Edward Augustus 
Hopkins established himself in Paraguay and began to manu-
facture bricks, lumber, textiles, and cigars. In 1854 a 
break occurred between Hopkins and Paraguayan President 
Carlos Antonio Lopez, and Lopez attempted to drive Hopkins 
out of business. At the same time the United States had an 
exploring expedition on the Paraguay River under Lieutenant 
·rhomas J. Page in the steamer Water Witch. Page attempted 
to mediate the dispute but earned only the enmity of Lopez. 
In Fubruary 1855 after Water Witch had run aground it was 
fired upon, and one man killed. 
An insult to the national honor, and a threat to 
American mercantile interests in South America had been 
made and Congress voted ten thousand dollars for an expedi-
tion against Paraguay.58 ·ro obtain the necessary number of 
vessels for the expedition the Navy leased several small 
steamers from private individuals. After securing redress 
for the insult to the United States and receiving compen-
sation for the death of the seaman, the expedition 
returned to the United States, and the steamers were 
purchased into the Navy. Eight small steamers were assigned 
to duties suppressing the slave trade. Four went to the 
coast of Africa and four were sent to cruise about Cuba; 
58o. P. Fitzgerald, "Profit and Adventure in Paraguay," 
in Clayton R. Barrow, Ed., America Spreads Her Sails: u.s. 
Seapower in the 19th Century {Annapolis, l97J), 70-75.--
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two, Crusader and Mohawk, on the north side of the island 
and two, Wyandotte and Water Witch on the south.59 
The four vessels accounted for eight of the nine 
slavers taken in Cuban waters between 1858 and 1861. On 18 
November 1859 Lieutenant T. Augustus Craven in Mohawk 
discovered and captured the brig Cygnet of Baltimore as 
she had just finished off loading her slaves. Cygnet was 
towed to Key West and turned over to the United States 
marsha1. 60 
Mohawk seized another American slaver on 26 April 
1860. The bark Wildfire was towed to Key West with five 
hundred slaves on board, arriving there on the thirtieth. 
About two weeks later Wyandotte, Lieutenant Fabius Stanly, 
arrived in Key West with the slaver William having on board 
some five hundred fifty slaves. Maffitt, now commanding 
Crusader, had the best luck. Between May and August 1860 
he succeeded in seizing three slavers, the bark Bogota on 
2) May, the brig William g. Kibby on 23 July, and the brig 
Joven Antonio on 14 August. 61 
S9u.s., Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy[1859], s. Doc. 2, ;6th Cong., lstsess., 11)8-114~-
60rbid., 1144; and Crawford to Russell, Jl Dec. 1859, 
BSP, Class A, 1860, LXX, 21. 
61 F. J. Moreno to J. Thompson, 1J May 1860, U.S., 
Congress, House, Message from the President of the United 
States, ••• relative to the Capture of the Slaver 
"William" near the Isle of Pines, with Five Hundred and 
Fifty African-Negroes-on~oard, H. Ex. Doc. B)l ;6th Cong., 
1st sess., 2; and Mareno to Thompson, 10 May 1~60, ibid., 
Senate, Message from the President of the United States, 
relative to the Capture of the Slaver "Wildfire," .Q!! the 
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The Civil War removed the United States Navy from 
cruising in the suppression of the slave trade, but several 
factors combined to end the traffic to Cuba. ·rhe Lyons-
Seward Treaty granted the Royal Navy a limited right of 
search over American vessels. But the most important was 
the fact that Spanish cruisers became very active in Cuban 
waters, recapturing some 1900 contraband slaves in 1861 
alone. 62 By the end of the Civil War the Cuban slave trade 
was effectively ended. 
There were three periods when the United States Navy 
captured slavers in the waters of the West Indies. The 
first was during the Quasi-War with France, then in the 
campaign to eradicate piracy around Cuba, and finally on 
the eve of the Civil War when transgressions upon American 
merchantmen led to an increased United States naval presence 
in the Caribbean. In all three cases the capture of slavers 
was a by-product of American naval efforts to protect the 
mercantile commerce of the United States. 
Coast of Cuba, ~ Lieutenant Craven, of the United States 
Steamer-MOhaWk, S. Ex. Doc. 44, 36th Cong., 1st sess., 4. 
For Maffitt's captures see: Ibid., House, African Slave 
Trade, H. Ex. Doc. 7, 36th Cong., 2nd sess., 516-17. 
62crawford to Russell, 30 Sept. 1861, BSP, Class A, 
1862, LXI, 16. 
142 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VI 
11 LEGITIMATE INTERPOSITION:" BRAZIL, 1825-1852 
Brazil achieved its independence from Portugal in 
1825, and for most of the next twenty years there was almost 
continual strife on the Atlantic coast of South America. 
Difficulties over the possession of the Banda Oriental del 
Uruguay, present day Uruguay, resulted in a blockade of 
Buenos Aires by the Brazilian navy in the 1820s. 'rhe port 
was again blockaded by the French in the late 18JOs. Addi-
tionally, numerous separatist movements within Brazil soon 
after its independence caused more unrest. In 1827 the 
Secretary of the Navy stated that "some of our merchant 
vessels on that coast have been captured, and otherwise 
interrupted, for real or pretended violations of blockades 
and of the laws of the country. A part of them have been 
released upon application and remonstrances of our naval 
officers •••• 111 American merchant vessels caught in the 
blockade could usually depend upon an American naval officer 
to use his good offices to the advantage of the merchant 
and sometimes obtain his release. 
As was the case in the Caribbean, unsettled conditions 
1 11 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Showing 
the Condition of the Navy in the Year 1827," American State 
Pa4ers: Naval Affairs, III, 50; and for 1828, ibid., III, 
21 , hereafter cited ASP:NA. 
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also led to piracy. In 18)2 Francis Baylies, a special 
minister of the United States sent to Argentina to negotiate 
a dispute over fishing rights at the Falkland Islands, 
described an incident to his brother-in-law Colonel John 
E. Wool. Baylies had stopped in Rio de Janeiro and wrote 
that "since we have been here a ship was entered in the 
harbor, robb 1d and the throat of the mate cut." 2 Such 
conditions on the coast of South America made the maintenance 
of a naval force on the coast for the protection of commerce 
a necessity. 
The first United States ship sent to the Brazilian 
coast was the sloop-of-war Cyane, commanded by Jesse D. 
Elliott, in late 1825. His sailing orders were fairly 
standard for ships assigned to the coast of South America, 
and reflected the interchangeable nature of the slave trade 
and piracy. "I enclose for your information and direction, 
Copies of the Acts of Congress relating to Piracy and the 
Slave Trade, together with the general Instructions on these 
points given to the Commanders of our Cruising Vessels.") 
The purpose of this cruise was not the suppression 
of the slave trade 1 but it was rather, as Samuel Southard 
2samuel Rezneck, "Documents. An American Diplomat 
Writes About Latin America in 18)2," The Americas, XXVIII 
( 1971), 208. 
3sailing Orders to J. D. Elliott, 23 Nov. 1825, Letters 
Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Officers, 1798-1868 
(M-149), Roll 16:264, Naval Records Collection of the Office 
of Naval Records and Library, Record Group 45, National 
Archives, hereafter cited Officers, Ships of War. 
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said, "the general interests of our commerce, and a 
communication with the public agents of the government in 
that quarter. 114 Few, if any, Americans were engaged in the 
Brazilian slave trade at this time. Because of an 1815 
treaty between Portugal and England that gave the Portuguese 
a free hand in the slave trade south of the Equator and of 
an Anglo-Brazilian treaty in 1826 that declared the slave 
trade to be piracy and allowed the Royal Navy to seize 
Brazilians engaged in the traffic to Brazil.; This was to 
be the case until about 1840 when a significant change in 
Anglo-Portuguese relations was made that affected the 
Brazilian slave trade. 
Throughout the remainder of the 1820s it appears that 
the orders issued to Elliott were generally given to other 
commanding officers and commodores of the Brazil station. 6 
But by the early 1830s even the brief mention given to the 
slave trade in Elliott's orders had been dropped.? It is 
411Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, ••• 
Showing the Operations of that Department in 1825, 11 ASP:NA, 
II, 100. 
;Hobert Conrad, "The Contraband Slave 'rrade to Brazil, 
1831-1845, 11 Hispanic Americen Historical Review, XLIX 
(1969), 617, 620. 
6sailing Orders to B. V. Hoffman, 7 Apr. 1826, Officers, 
Ships of War, Roll 16:362; Sailing Orders to J. Biddle, 1 
June 1826, ibid., Roll 17:121; Sailing Orders to J. 0. 
~reighton, 21 July 1828, ibid., Roll 18:78; and Sailing 
urders to J. Gallagher, 15 Nov. 1828, ibid., Roll 18:1;6. 
7sailing Orders to s. Cassin, ibid., 30 June 1829, 
Roll 18:298-99; Sailing Orders to J~ Zantzinger, 25 
Apr. 1833, ibid., Roll 22:217-18; and Sailing Orders to 
A. S. Campbell, 24 May 1834, ibid., Roll 23:29. 
145 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
possible that instructions concerning the slave trade were 
passed from commodore to commodore as part of their standing 
orders on the station, but the lack of even a single mention 
in the orders from the Secretary of the Navy reflected either 
a lack of concern or a lack of American involvement in the 
trade to Brazil. 
During this first decade the form of the squadron was 
established. Cyane had made but a brief cruise along the 
coast, but the vessels sent there afterwards made cruises 
of about three years duration, which, except for the African 
squadron, was standard. ·rhe Brazil s, J.tion encompassed the 
area from the Amazon River south to Cape Horn and eastward 
to the coast of Africa. The United States Navy assigned an 
average of four vessels to cover this area. 8 
In addition to their duties on the South American 
coas~ naval vessels assigned to that station often had extra 
duties. In 18)2 the brig Boxer, Benjamin Page, Jr., was 
assigned to the Brazil station, but enroute it was to touch 
at Liberia and "cause inquiries to be made there particularly 
respecting the Piracies lately committed near that settle-
ment. . . . Without any unnecessary delay, on the Coast 
of Africa, you will proceed thence to the Northern Coast of 
Brazil, • • .. 9 In 18)6 W. E. McKenney, commanding the . . 
8u.s., Co~ress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of 
the Navy [1852], S. Doc. 1, )2nd Cong., 2nd seas., 291. 
See also Appendix D. 
9sailing Orders to B. Page, Jr., 9 Jan. 18)2, Officers, 
Ships of War, Roll 20:215. 
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brig Dolphin, also stopped at various settlements on the 
African coast: Gambia, Bissau, Nunez, Cape Mesurado, 
Bassa Cove, and Cape Palmas before going to Brazil. 10 A 
year later the razee frigate Independence carried the 
United States minister to Russia, Mr. George M. Dallas, 
to Cronstadt before sailing to the Brazil station. 11 
By the late 1830s a dispute between Argentina and 
France had resulted in the latter•s blockade of Argentina. 
The United States Navy had an even greater responsibility 
to avoid any confrontation with either of those nations. 
However, Secretary of the Navy James Kirke Paulding 
stated, in 1838, that no additional force was required. 
The next year he changed his mind and reported that "the 
novel system of a war of blockade, so vexatious to neutral 
commerce" increased the necessity of a naval force in 
the area. 12 
It was not long before the demands for an increased 
naval presence on the South American coast were voiced. 
A significant change in the nature of the Brazilian slave 
trade was about to take place. As late as 1837 Secretary 
of the Navy Mahlon Dickerson 1s orders to Commodore J. B. 
10
sailing Orders tow. E. McKenney, 3 Sept. 1836, ~., 
Roll 25:224; and u.s., Congress, Senate, Report of the 
Secretary of the Navy [1836], S. Ex. Doc. 1, 24thlCong., 
2nd sess.,~6o. 
11Ibid., (1837], S. Ex. Doc. 1, 25th Cong., 2nd sess., 
715-26. 
12 J Ibid., (1838_, s. Ex. Doc. 1, 25th Cong., 3rd sess., 
594; and [1839], S. Ex. Doc. 1, 26th Cong., 1st sess., 532. 
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Nicolson would make no mention of the slave trade. 13 Warren 
s. Howard and Leslie M. Bethell point ont that as late as 
1838 there had been but an occasional use of the American 
flag in the trade to Brazil. But after 1839 the use of 
the American flag in the Brazilian slave trade increased 
rapidly. 14 Portuguese and Brazilian slave traders began 
illegally to assume United States nationality simply by 
hoisting American colors. Under this guise, these slavers 
could reduce the chances of being searched by British 
warships off the African and Brazilian coasts. 15 
The reason for this sudden and dramatic incraase in 
the use of the American flag to cover the slave trade is 
obvious. By treaty Portuguese vessels had been free to 
engage in the slave trade openly south of the Equator; north 
of that line British men-of-war could seize Portuguese 
vessels only if slaves were actually on board. While a 
Portuguese law of 1836 declared the slave trade illegal, 
violations were not punished and the law was effectively 
nu11. 16 
13sailing Orders to J. B. Nicolson, Officers, Ships of 
War, Roll 24:55-57. 
14warren s. Howard, American Slavers and the Federal 
Law, 1§11-1862 (Berkeley, 1963), 43-44; and Leslie M. 
Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave ·rrade: Britain, 
Brazil, and the Slave Trade Question (Cambridge, 1970), 189. 
.. o# 
J._Jibid., 190. 
16Leslie M. Bethell, "Britain, Portugal and the Sup-
pression of the Brazilian Slave ·rrade: 'rhe Origin of the 
Palmerston Act of 1839," English Historical Review, LXXX 
(1965), 765, 768. 
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The British government attempted to negotiate a treaty 
with Portugal to end the slave trade--eventually issuing 
an ultimatum--but the Portuguese refused, at the last moment, 
to have anything to do with the treaty. 17 Finally, on 24 
August 1839 the British Parliament passed the Palmerston 
Bill which unilaterally authorized the Royal Navy to seize 
slave ships registered in and sailing under the flag of 
Portugal and to try them in British courts. 18 In the House 
of Commons the Act was approved without dissent, but in the 
House of Lords, Wellington, and a few others, opposed the 
measure. Wellington pointed out that "the greatest judge 
who ever presided in an Admiralty Court" (Lord Stowell) had 
stated in the Le Louis case of 1817 that in peace time, 
unless otherwise conceded by treaty, the searching of foreign 
vessels was illegal. 19 The Brazilian government objected 
to the Palmerston Act, pointing out that even the United 
States "a Republic founded on the principles of equality 
and liberty" objected to the searching of her merchant 
vessels on the seas merely because of suspicion that they 
might be involved in the slave trade. 20 
About this time, 1842, the British had on the coast 
of Brazil two 50-gun and two 44-gun frigates, three 26-gun 
and one 20-gun sloops-of-war, seven 16-gun and six 10-gun 
17 Ibid., 775. 
18conrad, "Contraband Slave Trade, 11 631-32. 
19Bethell, "Palmerston Act," 779. 
20conrad, "Contraband Slave Trade, 11 633 
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brigs, two steamers and thirteen smaller vessels. 21 It is 
little wonder then that with this squadron to enforce the 
wishes of Parliament the Portuguese flag began to be 
replaced by the American. Table 1 shows this increased 
use of the American flag. Until the middle of 1840 few 
slavers used the flag of the United States in the Brazilian 
slave trade; thereafter it is in almost constant use, 
comprising about th ty-four percent of the departures from 
Rio de Janeiro and thirty-six percent of the arrivals in 
that port from Africa. 
A notorious American slaver captain, Joshua M. Clapp, 
expressed the reason why the American flag was used: 
Question: Why are the American vessels preferred for 
the coast trade [African slave trade] more than those 
of any other foreign nations? 
Answer: Because our flag is more respected by cruisers 
on the coast than any other, except the French.z2 
Throughout 1840 and 1841, when the use of the American 
flag was rapidly increasing as a cover for the slave trade, 
the United States government took little or no heed of it. 
Secretary of the Navy Able P. Upshur's orders to Commodore 
Charles Morris in 1841 make no mention of the slave trade. 
21 Charles Morris to Able P. Upshur, 20 May 1842, Letters 
Received by the Secretary of the Navy From Commanding 
Officers of Squadrons (M-89), Roll 14:50, Naval Records 
Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, 
Record Group 45, National Archives, hereafter cited 
Squadron Letters. 
22u.s., Congress, House, Correspondence Between the 
Consuls of the United States at Rio de Janeiro, &c, with 
the Secretary of State, .2n the SUbJect of the Africaii'Siave 
Trade, H. Ex. Doc. 61, )Oth Cong., 2nd sess., 23, hereafter 
cited H. Ex. Doc. 61. 
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·rABLE 1 
TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE HARBOR OF RIO DE JANEIRO 
AND THE COAST OF AFRICA, 18)7-1849 
I .. 
i: lo:ISC. ' FRENCH 
POBl~UGUESE 
~ 
ffi~~~--~--~+-~~~7=~~~~~-+--r-i-~----~~ 
~~~~---+-+-+-+~-+~~~~~~~~---~ 
z 
Notes: British Sessional Papers, Class A, 18)7-38, L, 1.51, 
1.54, 1.5.5-.56, 1.58, 161, 16), 171, 179, 269, 273, 278; 18)9, 
XLVIII, 207 [This data was for the months July through 
October. I have reduced it by 2.5% to reflect the quarterly 
basis of the other returns.] Class B, 1840, XLVI, 
810-11, 81.5; XLVII, 1JJ-J4; 1841, XXX, .580, .582; 1842, 
XLIII, 7.52, 7.5.5, 7.58, 760, 762; 184), LVIII, 777, 780, 784; 
1844, XLVIII, )10, )14, )17, )20; 184.5, L, 3.57, 3.59, )61, 
36.5; 1846, LI, 411, 413, 41.5, 417; 1847, LXVII, 2.59, 26), 
266; 1847-48, LXIV, 748-49, 7.51-.52, 763, 76.5, 767, 769; 
1849, LV, 476, 479, 481, 484; 18.50, LV, 606, 608, 610, 
612-13. Pagination as in British Parliamentary Papers, 
1731-1900, Edgar L. Erickson, ed. 
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James K. Paulding 1s orders to Commodore G. C. Ridgley in 
February 1840 are rather lengthy and explain the necessity 
of cautious dealings with the French blockade of the Rio de 
la Plata and the view of the American government on effective 
blockades, but there is nothing on the slave trade to Brazil. 
And the Secretary 1s Annual Reports for 1840 through 1842 
reflect an equal lack of concern. The report for 1840 
suggests augmenting the Brazil squadron because of the 
continuing conflict between Argentina and France. rhe 
following year the Secretary states that "nothing of partic-
ular interest has occurred in the operations of this 
squadron." In 1842 there is not even that illuminating 
statement. 23 
By 184) the American flag was used in a significant 
portion of the carrying trade between Brazil and Africa. 
Since Africa produced few exportable commodities, and since 
many of the vessels entered Brazilian ports in ballast, i.e. 
with no goods on board, it may be fairly assumed that most 
of these vessels were engaged in the slave trade. In 1843 
six of thirty vessels departing Rio did so under the colors 
of the United States, while six of the fifteen returning 
23Lawrence F. Hill, "·rhe Abolition of the African 
Slave Trade to Brazil," Hispanic American Historical Review, 
XI (19)1), 179; Sailing Orders to G. C. Ridgley, 19 Feb. 
1840, Officers, Ships of War, Roll )0: )48-52; Sailing Orders 
to C. Morris, 20 Oct. 1841, ibid., Roll )):246-47; U.S., 
Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of the Navy [1840], 
H. Doc. 2, 26th Cong.: 2nd sess., 4o;; ibid., Senate, 
Report of the Secretary of the Navy L1841]; s. Doc. 1, 
27th Cong.:-2nd seas., )20; and ibid., House, Report of the 
Secretary of the Navy, H. Doc. 2, 27th Cong., )rd sess., .5)0. 
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vessels used the flag of the United States. Indeed the 
British commissioners at Rio complained in 1844 that most of 
the successful slaving voyages that year had been made using 
the American flag. And British naval officers complained 
that their efforts to stop the sla~e trade were being 
nullified by the widespread use of the American flag. 24 
But in 1845 the British were to give an even greater 
impetus to the illegal use of the American flag. In the 
middle of that year Parliament passed the Aberdeen Act, 
another unilateral act on the part of the British,which 
declared Brazilian slavers to be pirates and that the Royal 
Navy could seize them as such. Brazil had previously 
recognized that to be the case; however, there was now a 
significant difference. In March 1845 Brazil had notified 
the British minister to Rio that as of the thirteenth of 
that month the 1815 treaty that granted a mutual right of 
search between the two parties was to be terminated. 'rhe 
treaty, originating in the Anglo-Portuguese agreement of 
1815, had been carried over into Anglo-Brazilian relations 
after the latter's independence. But the treaty expired in 
1845 and Brazil had no wish to revive it. The British 
reasoned that Brazil should have no objection of the Royal 
Navy continued seizing slavers under the Brazilian flag, 
24Reports of the British Commissioners at Rio de Janeiro, 
British Sessional Papers, Class A, 1844, XLVIII, )14, )17, 
)20; 1845, L, J37, Edgar L. Erickson, ed., hereafter cited 
BSP; Conrad, "Contraband Slave Trade," 6)6-)7; and Bethell, 
Slave Trade Question, 192. 
154 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
even though there was no treaty. In 1849 Palmerston carried 
the implications of British reasoning even further and sent 
orders for the squadron under Admiral Barrington Reynolds 
to enter Brazilian territorial waters in order to seize 
slavers attempting to take refuge there, much to the dismay 
of the Brazilian government. 25 
The presence of the American flag in the Brazilian 
trade again made a significant increase, and American 
officials finally began to take notice. In addition, 
American-built vessels and documents were easily acquired 
by taking advantage of an early law designed to befefit the 
infant American merchant marine. Sea-letters--temporary 
papers issued by an American consul that denoted a change 
in ownership of a vessel--were issued with no restriction as 
to the destination of the vessel. Ships built in the United 
States could be sold in Brazil to another American who then 
obtained a sea-letter, or proof that the vessel was American. 
The vessel could then be sold or "chartered" to a third 
party with the transaction being completed on the African 
coast. The sea-letter and American flag provided a certain 
degree of immunity from search by the Royal Navy. Apparently, 
in the majority of cases, the American vessel was not used 
to carry slaves, but was more often an auxiliary or tender 
2
.5wilbur Devereux Jones, "Origins and Passage of Lord 
Aberdeen's Act," Hispanic American Historical Review, 
XLII (1962), 507; and Richard Carl Froehlich, "The United 
States Navy and Diplomatic Relations with Brazil, 1822-1871," 
(Ph. D. diss., Kent State University, 1971), 246. 
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to a slaver. 
One of the chief facilities sought by the owners 
of slavers is the means of sending over their 
"equipment 11 to the African coast; this equipment 
[i.e. cooking coppers, shackles, extra food and slave 
deck] is generally sent over in foreign bottoms, 
and United States' ones are preferred not only for 
their superior shape for sailing, but from the cir-
cumstance of the United States flag protecting them 
from our cruisers. • •• The United States' 
vessel intended for the Slave Trade keeps the United 
States flag flying until the very last moment, •• 
• and it is not until the vessel is actually under 
weigh, on its r~gurn to Brazil, that the flag is 
changed • • • • 
The American vessel could then be used to decoy cruisers of 
either Great Britain or the United States and so allow the 
slaver a clear escape route. 27 
·ro end the improper use of sea-letters and the American 
flag, the United States minister to Brazil offered several 
drastic measures. First, Robert c. Schenck proposed that 
all trade in American vessels between Africa and Brazil 
ought to be prohibited. This would end the abuse of sea-
letters. If this were not possible, he then proposed to 
prohibit the export from the United States to Brazil 
26Lord Howden to Viscount Palmerston, 12 Nov. 1847, 
BSP, Class B, 1847-48, LXIV, 7)1. 
27c. Hotham to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 7 Apr. 
1847, ibid., 444; U.S., Congress, House, Message from the 
President of the United States transmitting copies of 
despatches from the American minister at the court of Brazil, 
relative to the S'I'ave trade, &c, H. Ex-.-Doc. 148, 2Bth Cong., 
2nd seas., 1; Schenck to Webster, 26 Apr. 1852, ibid., 
Senate, Message from the President of the United States 
communicating, • • • correspondence between Mr. Schenck, 
United States Minister to Brazil, and the Secretary of 
State, in relation to the African Slave Trade, S. Ex. Doc. 
47, ))r~Cong., 1st-seSS:, ), hereafter cited s. Ex. 
Doc. 47. 
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or Africa of articles used specifically for procuring 
slaves. Next he attacked the issuance of consular sea-
letters to vessels sold either in Brazil or Africa, except 
for the specific purpose of returning to the United States. 
Finally, if none of these could be accomplished, he advised 
using force and increasing the American naval presence on 
both coasts. 28 
During the last decade of the Brazilian slave trade, 
about 1842 to 1852, a change took place in the American 
awareness of what was happening on the coasts of Brazil. 
One student of the Brazil squadron maintains that this 
change in policy came about in 1842. But while the slave 
trade was then mentioned, there was certainly little 
enthusiasm for a vigorous attack upon it. The American 
charg~ d'affaires at Rio, William Hunter, notified Commodore 
Charles Morris in February 1843 that he had received infor-
mation from Williams. Ousley, the British minister to 
Argentina, that four or five suspected slavers flying the 
Allierican flag would probably soon arrive from the coast of 
Ai.' .i:''ica. Morris replied: 
If the information received and communicated by the 
British Legation with respect to vessels under the 
flag of the United States, had specified more partic-
ularly upon what part of this coast their arrival 
was expected, it could have been much more useful. 
Any effort to interrupt particular vessels with 
the Small force under my orders, upon a Coast of two 
thousand miles in extent without any intimation of 
their ports of destination, would evidently have 
very small chances of Success. 
28 Ibid., 5-6. 
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Morris did go on to say that he would have John Adams keep 
an eye open while she made a cruise to the Rio de la 
Plata. 29 
Morris must have been unbelieveably uninformed of 
conditions in his station if he was not aware of the area of 
Brazil in which slavery thrived, and in which slaves would 
have been landed. The majority of slavers landed their 
cargoes within a reasonably close proximity of Rio de 
Janeiro, about one hundred fifty miles north or south of 
that city. As Joao Panid4 Calogeras in his history of 
Brazil states: 
The favorite section was the strip of coast between 
Cabo Frio and Santos: north and south of this area 
disembarkments were exceptional. The choice of 
landing place was dictated by the proximity and 
absorptive capacity of the markets of central 
Brazil and~~he facilities afforded by local ac-
complices.-' 
More recent research by Curtin has confirmed Calogeras' 
statement. Cape Frio and Santos are almost equidistant 
north and south of Rio. As Curtin puts it, "imports into 
Brazil were highly concentrated." Figure 18 and Table 69 
in Curtin show that about seventy-three percent of the 
slaves imported into Brazil entered that country in the 
vicinity of Rio de Janeiro, or between Cape Frio and Santos. 
29oonald w. Giffin, "The American Navy at Work on the 
Brazil Station, 1827-1860," The American Nepture, XIX ( 1959), 
242-4); and C. Morris toW. Hunter, 16 Feb. 1843, Squadron 
Letters, Roll 15:95. 
3°Jo~o Pandi~ Calogeras, A History of Brazil, trans. and 
ed. Percy Alvin Martin (New York, 1963), 156. 
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These were used to supply the coffee and sugar plantations 
of the area.31 Secondly, Morris' squadron, compared with 
many American naval squadrons and other Brazil squadrons, 
was of fairly good size and therefore better able to patrol 
the coast. Finally, dispatching John Adams was a token 
gesture; there was apparently no provision for the ship to 
make a surveillance of the coast other than while in transit 
to la Plata. 
In 1845 the American minister to Rio de Janeiro, 
Henry A. Wise, wrote to Secretary of State John c. Calhoun 
that "the African slave trade 'thickens around us.'"32 rhe 
United States, however, was finally about to begin an 
effort to eliminate the use of the American flag in the 
Brazilian slave trade. 
The first significant statement reflecting this 
concern over the slave trade is found in the "Sailing 
Orders" sent by the Secretary of the Navy, George Bancroft, 
to the commodore-designate of the Brazil squadron, Louis 
Rousseau. Bancroft warned the commodore not to seize 
slavers within Brazilian waters without the express consent 
of that government, an obvious reference to the Aberdeen 
Act. But, he goes on, "your particular attention is called 
31Ibid.; and Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: 
A Census-\Madison, 1969), Figure 18:-Table 69, and 241. 
32u.s., Congress, House, Report of the Secretar~ of 
the Navy [1842], H. Doc. 2, 27th Cong7, Jrd sess.,4S: 
The report issued in Dec. 1842 would reflect the squadron 
composition in early 1843. Wise to Calhoun, 18 Feb. 1845, 
H. Ex. Doc. 61, 26, 
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to this subject, and you are instructed and expected to use 
all your rightful and legal powers for the suppression of 
the detestable and unlawful traffic in African slaves.33 
These orders mark a take-off point in the Navy's 
activities on the Brazilian station. A comparison of the 
letters and documents sent by the commanders of the Brazil 
squadron to the Secretary of the Navy before and after 1845 
reveals that prior to that year there were few mentions of 
the slave trade. In the years after 1845 a majority of 
the letters did.J4 It is true that not many slavers were 
taken and sent for adjudication in the United States in 
these years, but there had been none prior to 1845. Warren 
S. Howard maintains that American naval officers were 
reluctant to interfere with American ships. But this is 
not borne out by the evidence.35 
In December-January 1844-1845 Commodore Daniel Turner 
and Minister Wise cooperated in seizing the American brig 
Porpoise which was known to be acting as an auxiliary in 
the Brazilian Slave trade. The difficulty in this case 
was, that at the time of capture, Porpoise was inside the 
harbor of Rio. The seizure was a violation of Brazilian 
sovereignty. Brazilian vessels protested by surrounding 
Porpoise and demanding that the brig and its crew be released. 
33sailing Orders to L. Rousseau, 28 Oct. 1845, Officers, 
Ships of War, Roll 40:424-25. 
34squadron Letters, passim. 
35Howard, American Slavers, 44. 
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According to Howard, in the end "the Brazilians won out." 
However, Howard did not pursue the story to the end. A 
letter received by the Secretary of the Navy reveals that 
in May 1845 Porpoise departed Rio with the slaver's crew 
on board destined for Boston where the brig and her crew 
were to be turned over to the district attorney.J6 
Minister Wise had written to Secretary of State 
Calhoun at the beginning of the affair over Porpoise: 
I would have placed the criminals or persons 
charged on board the Raritan [flagship of the 
Brazil squadron] and I would have held them 
and the vessel until the demand for their 
extradition was refused or granted; and, if 
refused, I would have left the vessel in the 
harbor, ••• and I would have sent the persons 
accused and the witnesses in the Bainbri~ge, at 
all hazards, home to the United States.J 
Cooler heads prevailed and through diplomatic 
procedures Porpoise and her crew were released by the 
Brazilian government. England had justly earned the 
animosity of Brazilians because of the Palmerston and 
Aberdeen Acts. ·rhe United States was determined not to 
follow that example and forcibly remove vessels, even 
American vessels, from Brazilian territorial waters. 
In 1847 Commodore Rousseau was involved in a curious 
case which mixed piracy and the slave trade. Although 
the Navy was not successful in capturing the slaver, the 
affair illustrates the cooperation between civil and 
36Howard, American Slavers, 44; and D. ·rurner to G. 
Bancroft, 1J May 1845, Squadron Letters, Roll 18:1. 
37wise to Calhoun, 18 Feb. 1845, H. Ex. Doc. 61, 26. 
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military officials in Brazil. In that year the American 
whaling bark Fame entered Brazil in distress, apparently 
due to some storm damage. The bark was surveyed and, 
found not fit for sea, was condemned. The cargo was sold 
and part of the crew·rel~ased. But then the captain spent 
a large amount of money having her refitted and loaded for 
what was supposed to be another whaling voyage. Information 
was later received at Rio that Fame had been seen on the 
African coast and also that the owner had not received any 
communications from Fame's captain. The owner suspected 
"foul Play. 11 The Fame's captain had changed his plans 
while in Rio and had absconded with the bark for his own 
purposes. 
Several weeks later Rousseau learned that Fame was 
lying in a small harbor near Cape Frio, having landed about 
six hundred slaves. In the absence of small vessels to 
search for Fame in the shoal waters off the coast, Rousseau 
sent Lieutenant Isaac Strain in a boat. As minister Parks 
reported to Secretary of State James Buchanan, "great credit 
is due to Mr. Strain for the manner in which he executed his 
commission, cruising over two hundred miles in an open boat. 
But the bird had flown.n38 
Several weeks later Fame was discovered at Santos and 
Rousseau dispatched Bainbridge there. Her captain had 
instructions to ask the Brazilian authorities to turn the 
38 G. Parks to J. Buchanan, 20 Aug. 1847, ibid., 6. 
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vessel over to the United States, not because she was a 
slaver, but because "she was an American vessel which had 
been run away with by her Captn. " ·rhis was agreed to and 
an American guard was placed on board the bark. The guard 
was later removed when Brazilian authorities took posses-
ion of the vessel while awaiting negotiations between the 
American and Brazilian governments over the final dispo-
sition.39 
The year 1848 was particularly active for the Brazil 
squadron. The year began with the capture of the American 
slaver Laurens, this seizure being at sea, by the schooner 
On-ka-~-~· At this time the commodore of the Brazil 
squadron was Captain George W. Storer, an individual who 
was particularly dl.ligent in using his squadron to the 
maximum extent in order to end the slave trade. ·rhe 
seizure of Laurens illustrates the measures taken by Storer. 
He issued to Lieutenant Commanding Otway Berryman of 
On-ka-~-~ a copy of the orders issued to Commodore 
Matthew C. Perry in 1843 when he was given command of the 
first African squadron. These orders went into much 
detail concerning characteristics of slavers and the means 
used by them to prevent seizure. 
Storer learned that Laurens was a suspected slaver, 
and he ordered Berryman to follow her to sea. When Laurens 
was outside Brazilian waters On-ka-~-~ was to stop and 
39aousseau to G. Y. Mason, 10 Oct. 1847, Squadron 
Letters, Roll 19:123. 
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search her. If the evidence showed that she was a slaver 
she was to be sent to New York or Boston for adjudication. 
Following Storer's orders Berryman put to sea and seized 
Laurens on 23 January.40 
On-ka-~-e is of interest herself in that she was 
constructed on very radical lines. She had been privately 
built and had proved her speed in races with some of the 
fastest vessels then afloat. Purchased into the Navy, she 
was used as a dispatch and patrol vessel, and in this case, 
a capturer of slavers. On-ka-~-~. along with the brig 
Perry and the steamer Alleghany, vessels that were partic-
ularly successful in capturing slavers, demonstrated the 
necessity of having fast vessels on the slave patrol. It 
was these fast vessels which were able to catch and stop 
slavers once the illegal traders were at sea. 41 
Alleghany was the first United States steamer to 
capture a slave vessel. Commodore Storer had received 
information that the bark Louisa was a suspected slaver. 
Although Alleghany was undergoing repairs to her foremast 
and rigging, she was ordered to investigate the bark. 
Lieutenant Commanding William W. Hunter was in such a hurry 
that he left the steamer's foremast and yards in Rio. 
About noon on 28 May 1848, Alleghany overhauled Louisa 
40G. w. Storer to Mason, 28 Jan. 1848, ibid., Roll 20:86. 
41 Howard I. Chapelle, The History of the American Saili~ 
Navy: rhe Ships and ·rheir-n9velopment-rNew York, 1949), 4;~ 
57; and U. s. Naval History Division, Dictionary of American 
Naval Fighting Ships, V (Washington, D. C., 1970), 157. 
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some seven miles off shore. A boarding party with three 
officers was sent to examine the suspected slaver. The 
boarding party mustered the crew, checked their wages--
slavers often paid very high wages because of the risks 
involved--examined the ship's papers, the hold, and cargo. 
Although there was some reason to believe the bark was 
engaged in the slave trade, there was not sufficient 
evidence to justify her seizure. There were several 
passengers on board and in the hold were farina and water 
casks. The farina might be used to feed the slaves, but 
might also be legitimate trade goods, and casks of water 
might indeed be used for ballast. Large cooking coppers, 
shackles and materials for a slave deck were not found. 
Hunter had no other course but allow Louisa to proceed on 
her way. Later that year Storer learned that Louisa had 
been supplied with these articles by a steamer some days 
later. 42 
While the efforts of Storer and Hunter had not 
succeeded in capturing the slaver, they had at least caused 
the captain of the bark some embarrassment. When the bark 
had been boarded by Hunter's crew, the slaver captain had 
thrown overboard letters and instructions from the 
charterer to his connections on the African coast. 'rhis 
made trade much more difficult for the slaver. While 
42storer to Mason, 10 June 1848, Squadron Letters, Roll 
20:211; W. W. Hunter to Storer, 3 June 1848, ibid., 217; 
and Storer to Mason, 20 Dec. 1848, ibid., Roll 21:139. 
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AlleghanY was unsuccessful she did at least impede the 
traffic to some extent. It was not the last occasion this 
vessel was used in the slave patrol. Hunter and AlleghanY 
were used on at least two more occasions, investigating the 
suspected slavers Venus and Marion. 43 Within a decade 
steamers were to be widely used by the United States Navy, 
and some were specifically detailed to patrol in search of 
slavers. 
December 1848 was a busy month for the United States 
brig Perry, Lieutenant Commanding John A. Davis. Storer 
sent Davis to investigate three suspected slavers, Democrat, 
Ann D. Richardson, and Independence. ·rhe latter two were 
seized and sent to the United States. "'rhe first was not 
seized owing to the inexperience of the officers of the 
Perry who had not before been employed in this kind of 
service." He added that "the slave trade if not on the 
increase is decidedly not on the decline, .. 44 
An interesting game of cat-and-mouse was played out by 
the brig Perry and the suspected American slaver Flora in 
the harbor of Rio de Janeiro late December and early 
January 1848-1849. Storer had reason to suspect the brig 
Flora of being loaded with slave goods and bound for a 
voyage to the coast of Africa. He sent instructions to 
43For Hunter's activities in Alleghany see ibid., Roll 
21: passim; and Howard, American Slavers, 85-91. 
44storer to Mason, 20 Dec. 1848, Squadron Letters, Roll 
21:1J9. 
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Davis to keep a close watch on Flora. Between Christmas 
Day 1848 and 5 January Perry shifted anchorage several 
times as Flora tried to get out of the harbor. Joshua 
M. Clapp, Flora's captain, and the captain of Panther, a 
slaver captured off Cabinda in December 1845, realized that 
once outside Brazilian waters he would be liable to seizure. 
Finally, the game ended--temporarily--and lighters were 
seen alongside Flora. Later in the day the brig was 
noticeably higher in the water. Her incriminating cargo 
had been removed. 
Ironically, Clapp applied to Storer for assistance in 
getting to sea. Clapp maintained that the charter party, 
for whom he was taking a cargo to Montevideo, decided that 
it did not want Flora to sail, but instead wanted their 
cargo unloaded. Clapp asked Storer to intercede so that he 
could get underway. The charter party obviously did not 
want Clapp to sail with a cargo that would be seized as 
soon as the brig was outside Brazilian waters, and Clapp 
could not sail because he was being so closely watched. 
Storer refused to interfere in the matter between Clapp and 
the charterers. 45 After off loading, Flore did sail and was 
reloaded at sea. In June 1849 she was captured near Ihla 
Grande by Brazilian customs officers and the British Navy. 46 
When Storer left Rio for Montevideo he ordered Davis 
45Ibid., Roll 22:6-12. 
46storer toW. B. Preston, 14 July 1849, ibid., Roll 
22:105. 
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·- ·- ,, 
to maintain a constant lookout for slavers. If any were 
suspected Perry was to follow them until they were outside 
Brazilian waters. Then he could board and inspect them, and 
if evidence of illegal activity was found, send them to the 
United States. Storer must have felt fairly confident that 
Davis could carry out this assignment, for the Perry had 
more experience in this line than any other American man-of-
war.47 
Commodore Storer does not seem to have been one of 
those naval officers who continually requested an augmen-
tation in the size of his force. There had been many 
requests, both before and after Storer•s tour of duty off 
Brazil for an increase in the number of vessels, especially 
of the smaller classes, and for steamers. Commodore 
Rousseau in 1845, Gorham Parks, minister to Brazil in 1847, 
and Commodore Issac McKeever in 1850 all requested addi-
tional vessels to help suppress the slave trade. 48 But 
Storer used what was at hand. Although he certainly could 
not have expected much from her, Storer ordered the store-
ship Supply, Lieutenant A. Sinclair, to keep a watch on the 
American brig Imogene. There could have been little 
realistic hope that a storeship, a vessel built for 
carrying capacity, could possible overtake a slaver, a 
47storer to Davis, 19 Jan. 1849, ibid., 18. 
48Rousseau to Bancroft, 11 Jan. 1846, ibid., Roll 19: 
15; I. McKeever toW. B. Preston, 2 Sept. 1850, ibid., 
Roll 24:14; and Parks to Buchanan, 20 Aug. 1847, H. Ex. 
Doc. 61, 7. 
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vessel built for speed. But Storer used whatever means were 
available. Imogene eluded Supply and obtained slaves in 
Africa. In September 1849 it was learned that Imogene was 
returning to Campos with about five hundred slaves on board. 
Storer detailed the sloop-of-war John Adams to keep watch on 
the coast near that area. In October Imogene was discovered 
by a British steamer and the Portuguese captain of Imogene 
ran his brig ashore with all sail set and managed to escape 
with about one hundred slaves. rhe remainder were taken by 
the British. 49 
Storer made every effort to see that the United States 
lived up to its commitments with regard to the slave trade. 
His squadron had been quite active in suppressing the slave 
trade. Besides the many investigations, four vessels had 
been sent to the United States for adjudication. Each of 
the vessels required a prize crew which came from the 
vessels of the squadron. By December 1848 Storer had lost 
so many officers that he had to request the Secretary of 
the Navy to detail to the squadron three lieutenants, one 
passed assistant surgeon, four midshipmen and one sailmaker.5° 
During the years 1848 and 1849 the Brazilian squadron 
under Commodore Storer had been quite industrious, using 
all the facilities it had available, and cooperating with 
49storer to A. Sinclair, 7 July 1849, Squadron Letters, 
Roll 22:110; Storer to L. M. Powell, 14 Sept. 1849, ibid., 
1)2; and Storer to Preston, 19 Oct. 1849, ibid., Roll 23:9. 
5°storer to Mason, 20 Dec. 1848, ibid., Roll 21:145. 
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the American ministers in South America, in an effort to 
end the slave trade. In 1849 and especially in 1850 the 
Secretary of the Navy's Reports reflected this activity. 
The cruise of this squadron extending from the 
mouth of the river Amazon to Cape Horn, and 
occasionally eastward to the coast of Africa, 
its attention has been especially directed to 
the suppression, by legitimate interposition, 
of the African slave trade, still carried on 
to a considerable1extent between Brazil and the coast of Africa.' 
Around 1850 a change took place in the attitude of 
Brazilians toward the slave trade. They realized, in part 
at least, that Brazil's need for slaves was being used by 
Portuguese speculators to enrich themselves. Nineteen of 
thirty-nine prominent slave dealers in Brazil were Port-
uguese and these dealers were using the reluctance of 
Brazilians to abolish the traffic for their own purposes. 
Along with a wave of anti-Portuguese sentiment was the 
very real fact of intense British pressure to end the trade 
in slaves.52 But the most important cause in this change 
was not outside Brazil, but inside, and the government 
began to seize Africans illegally imported into the country, 
arrest slave traders, and confiscate their merchandise. By 
1851 the slave trade to Brazil had been dealt a blow from 
which it would never recover. 
51u.s., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
the Navl [1849], H. Ex. Doc. 5, )1st Cong., 1st sess., 427; 
and ibid., Senate, Report of the Secretary of the Navy 
[185~S. Ex. Doc. 1, )1s~Cong., 2nd sess~ ~. 
52calogeras, History of Brazil, 157, 158. 
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Although the trade died out rapidly after 1850 the 
Navy was still on watch. As Commodore McKeever explained 
to the Secretary of the Navy, "the enhanced price of slaves, 
••• proves at once ••• the necessity of continuous 
watchfulness lest the prospect of additional gains become 
a new stimulus to the slave-traders' efforts.n53 In late 
1851 correspondence between the United States minister at 
Rio, H. C. Schenck, and Commodore McKeever revealed that 
there was still cooperation between the two arms of the 
government for the suppression of the slave trade.54 But 
by the fall of 1851 there was little in the way of the slave 
trade for the American Navy to suppress. ·rhe Brazilians 
had taken the matter into their own hands and made partici-
pation in the slave trade a difficult endeavor. 
Although there was some piracy off Brazil, its role 
··~ 
in the establishment of an American naval squadron on that 
station was much less than in the case of the West Indies. 
Conditions of warfare and blockade necessitated an American 
presence off Brazil. But in both instances permanent 
squadrons were deployed to protect commerce. In the 
Caribbean the seizure of pirates had coincidently led to 
the seizure of slave traders. But off Brazil it was not 
53McKeever tow. A. Graham, 13 July 1851, Squadron 
Letters, Roll 24:)7. 
54schenck to McKeever, 4 Sept. 1851, s. Ex. Doc. 47, 7; 
McKeever to Schenck, Oct. 1851, ibid., 8; and Schenck to 
Webster, 26 Apr. 1852, ibid., 4. 
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until the British forced slave traders to seek the cover of 
the American flag that the United States mounted an effort 
to end the traffic under its flag. Initially, naval officers 
had received only general instructions "relating to Piracy 
and the Slave trade," and since there was little piracy and 
less slave trade under the American flag there were no 
slavers seized. 
But in the mid and late 1840s these conditions changed. 
The American government issued explicit orders to its 
naval officers to eliminate the traffic. The close cooper-
ation between the civilian and military officers led to the 
seizure of a number of slavers. A similar situation 
occurred in the West Indies in the late 1850s when naval 
steamers were deployed and given specific orders to appre-
hend slavers. In both cases naval officers under definite 
orders with regard to the slave trade were able to make 
captures. But in the case of the Brazil squadron, the 
naval vessels would not have been on station if it had not 
been for an earlier need to protect American commerce. 
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CHAPTER VII 
"PRUDENCE AND DISCRETION:" AFRICA, 1843-1862 
As Americans saw it, the British abolition of colonial 
slavery was a declaration of economic warfare upon the 
United States. British diplomacy and the Royal Navy's 
activities in furthering the abolition of slavery and the 
slave trade were not directed toward humanitarian goals, but 
rather had the objective of interfering with the commerce of 
maritime nations. And the United States was a leading rival 
of England's merchant marine. British planters and mer-
chants benefitted when Brazil and Cuba were deprived of their 
cheap labor supply. Treaties giving the Royal Navy the 
right to seize slavers, under other than the British ensign, 
not only deprived foreign planters of the benefit of slave 
labor, but those same blacks added to the labor supply in 
Britain's colonies. Recaptured slaves were freed in British 
islands where they had the choice of starving or working for 
planters under conditions little better than slavery. And 
slave traders did not face death or even imprisonment if 
captured by British authorities. They were released so they 
could carry more Africans to the New World and swell, in the 
same manner, the labor supply in British colonies. 1 
1 Warren S. Howard, American Slavers and the Federal 
Law, 1837-1862 (Berl,<~ley, 1963), 4-5. --
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Reinforcing this sceptical view of British motives 
were the activities of the Royal Navy off Africa in the mid-
1830s. The stopping and searching of American merchant-
men by eager naval officers of Great Britain--the "numerous 
crop of unfortunate insidents" described by Hugh Soulsby--
merely proved that the Royal Navy was aiding British 
merchants by interfering with American trade. And it 
brought with it the memory of impressment as practiced 
before the War of 1812. 2 
The desire to secure American merchants from British 
harassment--protection of commerce--was one of the areas of 
concern that brought together Lord Ashburton of Great 
Britain and Daniel Webster of the United States. rheir 
negotiations resulted in Article Eight of the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty of 1842 that stipulated that the United 
States would maintain a squadron of at least eighty gw1s 
off the African coast. 
The United States African squadron was born in the 
Treaty of 1842 and it was deployed as much to protect 
the legitimate commerce of the United States as to inhibit 
the slave trade. ·rhe orders issued to Commodore Matthew 
c. Perry, first commander of the squadron, clearly portray 
the quandary in which the government found itself when it 
2Hugh G. Soulsby, The Hight of Search and the Slave 
Trade in Anglo-Americanlielations-,-1814-1862, "'.rhe Johns 
Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political 
Science," Series LI No. 2 (Baltimore, 1933), .51; and 
Howard, American Slavers, 9-10. 
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tried to undertake both jobs and still maintain American 
policy with regard to the sea.J 
The United States claimed that an American vessel at 
sea had the same freedom from trespass as did the soil of 
the nation. But what was an American vessel? Perry•s 
orders maintained that the ensign of the United States 
was prima facie 11 although not conclusive, proof of her 
nationality. 114 Slavers were pirates and therefore not 
entitled to wear the American flag. But this did not give 
other powers a right to visit such a vessel. Slave 
trading was piracy only under the laws of the United 
States and not by international agreement. 'rherefore, 
since the United States "do not claim that the mere 
hoisting of their flag shall give immunity to those who 
have no right to wear it, 11 foreign naval officers might, 
in accordance with the custom of the sea and if there 
were reasonable grounds of suspicion, board a vessel 
under the American flag to ascertain its true character. 
But they must bear the responsibility for their actions.5 
Such backing and filling on the part of the American 
government and Secretary of the Navy was undoubtedly 
confusing to the officers whose duty it was to carry out 
3u.s., Congress, House, Instructions to African 
Squadron, H. Ex. Doc. 104, 35th Cong., 2nd-sass., 3-7. 
These orders are given in their entirety in Appendix I. 
4Ibid., 4. 
5Ibid. 
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the orders. It was hardly necessary for the Secretary to 
add that this service required "the greatest prudence and 
the soundest discretion." 
It appears that President John ·ryler•s expectation 
that the Treaty would remove "all possible pretext, on 
the ground of mere necessity, to visit and detain our ships 
on the African coast because of alleged abuse of our flag 
by slave traders of other nations" was substantially 
fulfilled. 6 In order to obviate British visitations 
Perry was urged to cooperate with his British counterpart 
in suppressing the traffic. In a letter to Captain John 
Foote, the senior British officer on the coast, Perry 
stated his willingness to cooperate with the Royal Navy, 
but he admitted that the small size of the American 
squadron rendered joint cruising impractical. He would, 
however, arrange the movements of his vessels so as to 
cooperate best with the British. Carrying out this promise 
Perry ordered Porpoise, Lieutenant Thomas r. Craven, to 
sail to the river Gallinas and inqu;re how he might best 
help British forces in the vicinity.7 Perry's instructions 
to the commanders of vessels in his squadron warned that 
6 U.S., Congress, House, Message from the President of 
The United States, ••• , H. Doc. 192, 27th Cong., Jrd 
sess., J. 
?Perry to J. Foote, 20 May 1844, Letters Received 
by the Secretary of the Navy From Commanding Officers of 
Squadrons (M-89), Roll 101:253, Naval Record Collection 
of the Office of Naval Records and Library, Record Group 
45, National Archives, hereafter cited Squadron Letters; 
and Perry to ·r. ·r. Craven, 11 June 1844, ibid., 262. 
176 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
they were not to allow foreign men-of-war to search and 
detain American merchantmen. However, once a vessel flying 
an American ensign was inspected by an American officer and 
found to be fraudulently carrying that flag, the vessel might 
be turned over to a warship of any other nation. Perry's 
willingness to meet the British half way, and the presence 
of American men-of-war upon the African coast paid off in 
the cessation of offensive searches of American vessels by 
the Royal Navy. 8 Few, if any, complaints were made there-
after concerning British interruption of commerce upon the 
coast. 
While the United States squadron under Perry was 
successful in securing freedom of navigation for America's 
legitimate commerce, its success in curtailing the slave 
traffic is less positive. In the report for 1844, Secretary 
J. Y. Mason reported that it was believed the squadron had 
"exercised a favorable influence in preventing the slave 
trade." But only the year before the British commissioners 
at Sierra Leone reported that "unhappily for the cause of 
Humanity, the Slave Trade has greatly increased during the 
year 184J •••• "9 It is possible that the United States 
Navy had made traders on the west coast reluctant to pursue 
8 U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of 
the Navy [184J], H. Ex. Doc. 2, 2Sth-cong., 1st sess.--, 485. 
9Ibid., House, Report of the Secretary of the Navy 
[1844], H. Doc. 2, 28th Cong., 2nd sess., 51~ and G. 
MacDonald to J. Hook, )1 Dec. 184), British Sessional 
Papers, Class A, 1845, XLIX, 2, hereafter cited BSP. 
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their business. This does not seem likely. Ships of the 
line visited vessels of many nations and this may have 
tended to reduce the illicit use of the American flag on 
the western coast. But in the time Perry was commodore, 
1843-1845, the squadron seized only one vessel, and this 
because its mate had been murdered. Lieutenant Craven 
searched Uncas, and was certain that the vessel was intended 
for the slave trade. But he had no proof. Craven sent 
Uncas to New Orleans with a prize crew so that the murder 
and the circumstances of its being on the African coast 
could be investigated. Uncas was not formally arrested 
and no disposition was made in her tria1. 10 
In the mid 1840s the Brazilian trade entered a boom 
period. rhis, and the unilateral policies of Britain, 
caused the American flag to become extensively used in 
the slave trade. In January 1845 Charles W. Skinner 
relieved Perry as commodore of the squadron. In the 
eighteen months that Skinner was in command, his ships 
succeeded in capturing six slavers. One of these, the ship 
Pons of Philadelphia, was taken by Commander Charles H. 
Bell in the sloop Yorktown off Cabinda with 913 slaves on 
10J. Tattnell to Perry, 11 Mar. 1844, Squadron Letters, 
Roll 101:240; "Monthly Reports from Porpoise," ibid., 309-
15. Perry requested his commanding officers to submit 
monthly reports regarding "names, national character, 
employment, cargoes and all other particulars of vessels 
fallen in with" whether at sea or at anchor. Although the 
United States did not recognize a right of search or 
visitation, American officers could board a vessel if 
permission was first received from the master. General 
Order No. 10, 26 Nov. 1844, ibid., 224. 
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board. These were taken to Monrovia and the survivors were 
11 
set free. Pons was taken to Philadelphia and confiscated. 
Another slaver, Spitfire, was taken in a joint 
endeavor by boats of the United States brig 'rruxton and 
the Royal Navy steamer Ardent. Her Majesty's commissioners 
at Sierra Leone were delighted with the success of the 
American squadron and with the cooperation between the two 
navies. "'rhe American squadro:1 has of late extended some 
vigilance, having captured the schooners "Merchant" and 
"Spitfire;" and the disposition to cooperate with our 
cruizers, • cannot but tend, if generally acted upon, 
to break up that systematic assistance rendered to the 
Sl T d b A ' it • II 12 ave ra e y mer~can c ~zens, •••• 
What is perhaps remarkable is the fact that Skinner's 
squadron was considerably under strength for a good deal 
of the time. Skinner wrote to the Navy Department com-
plaining of the situation. The sloops-of-war Marion and 
~ had been ordered to his squadron, but by October 1845 
they had not yet arrived. His force at that time was down 
to two ships and a storeship, the last Skinner planned to 
use to provide a show of force. 13 
11u.s., Congress, House, Message from the President of 
the United States, Transmitting information in reference to 
the African Sguadron, H. Ex. Doc. 73, )1st Cong., 1st sess., 
2-3; C. Skinner to G. Bancroft, 17 Jan. 1846, Squadron 
Letters, Roll 102:99; and Howard, American Slavers, 215 
12M. L. Melville and J. Hook to Lord Aberdeen, 31 Dec. 
1845, BSP, Class A, 1847, LXVII, 107. 
13Skinner to Bancroft, 20 Oct. 1845, Squadron Letters, 
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In 1846 fear caused the squadron to lapse into a period 
of inactivity. In April Lieutenant John E. Bispham of the 
brig Boxer captured the brig Malaga loaded with merchandise 
for a slaving voyage, but with no slaves on board. The 
brig was sent to Massachusetts for trial. Then in August 
Commander Lewis E. Simonds of the sloop-of-war Marion seized 
the brig Casket under similar circumstances and sent her 
also to Massachusetts for trial. In both cases the vessels 
and crews were released and the arresting officers were not 
issued a certificate of probable cause. 
These certificates stated, in effect, that there was 
sufficient evidence to justify suspicion of guilt and to 
warrant an arrest, although the parties were not guilty. 
Without such certificates the arresting officers were held 
liable for their actions. The owners of Malaga and Casket 
were not long in bringing suits for damages against the 
two officers. For more than two years, until the suits 
finally failed in the courts, American naval officers were 
less than enthusiastic in their patrols of the African 
coast. Carrying out their orders could lead to their 
financial ruin. 14 
Thus for several years after 1846 the squadron made no 
captures and American naval units made no cruises south of 
the Equator. In February 1848 the British commissioners at 
Loanda reported that they had not seen an American man-of-war 
Roll 102:8). 
14Howard, American Slavers, 102-07. 
181 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
for almost a year, when Boxer had last made an appearance 
in that port. 15 
These were also the years of the Mexican War, and most 
Amt=:ricall naval vessels were recalled home. While the 
African squadron was not abolished, few vessels remained 
on the coast, and a good portion of the squadron was 
assigned other duties. The Mexican War reached to the 
Mediterranean in 1847 when an American vessel, Carmelita, 
was seized and taken into Barcelona by Unico, a vessel under 
Mexican colors. At the end of 1846 there were no American 
men-of-war assigned to the Mediterranean and the capture 
of Carmelita necessitated the deployment of a vessel to 
that area to protect American interests. The frigate United 
States and sloop-of-war Marion were detached from the 
African squadron to cruise in the Mediterranean. rhe removal 
of these ships, and the departure of the brig Dolphin for 
home put the squad.ron far below its treaty strength, but 
the Secretary of the Navy reported that measures were 
being taken to return the squadron to its required leve1. 16 
Despite these difficulties, the Secretary optimis-
tically reported that the squadron was carrying out its 
"humane duty" and that "it is not known that a vessel, with 
American papers, has escaped seizure, where there was just 
l5G. Jackson and E. Gabriel to Lord Palmerston, 14 Feb. 
1848, BSP, Class A, 1849, LV, 117. 
16u.s., Co~ress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of 
the ff6vy [1847], S. Ex. Doc. 1, )Oth Cong., 1st sess., 
945- • 
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reason to suspect she was engaged or intended for employment 
in the violation of our laws or the dishonor of our flag.n 17 
The Secretary was not informed on the status of the slave 
trade. The British reported that the American flag was 
extensively used between Benguela and Mayumba, well south 
of the Equator. As late as January 1849 the commissioners 
at Loanda reported that they still had not seen or heard 
of an American man-of-war to the south of the line since 
1847. 18 
In December 1849 this situation changed. At Porto 
Praia the British commodore, Arthur Fanshawe, wrote to 
his American counterpart, Francis H. Gregory, that he had 
good reason to believe that Americans were actively engaged 
in the slave trade on the southern coast from the Congo 
to Benguela, and hoped that Gregory would be able to employ 
some of his cruisers in that vicinity. The following day 
Gregory responded in a cordial note that "my Government 
••• command[s] me in every lawful way, to use my utmost 
exertions for the suppression of the Slave Trade, so far 
as citizens of the United States may be found engaged in 
it; and it will also afford me great pleasure to act in 
concert with you • . . . 
17Ibid., 946. 
18Jackson and Gabriel to Palmerston, 29 Jan. 1849, BSP, 
Class A, 1850, LV, 224. 
19A. Fanshawe to F. H. Gregory, 26 Dec. 1849, ibid., 
421-22; Gregory to Fanshawe, 27 Dec. 1849, ibid.,~ and 
Fanshawe to the Secretary of the Admiralty, JO Aug. 1850, 
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In mid-March the United States brig Perry, Lieutenant 
Commanding Andrew H. Foote, arrived in Loanda. The following 
month John Adams joined Perry on the south coast. John 
Adams did not stay long in Loanda, but returned shortly 
with the polacca brigantine Excellent as a prize. John 
Adams had seized Excellent in cooperation with Her Majesty's 
steamer Cyclops. The British steamer had been observing 
Excellent, which was under American colors, for several days 
before John Adems arrived. A boarding party from the American 
warship, accompanied by an English officer, inspected, and 
seized the brigantine as a slaver. Despite her name, 
Excellent was a "very small and old vessel, so that the 
traffickers will have lost little by her capture, • .. ~ 
United States cruisers were soon to make much more 
impressive captures. On 6 June Perry was cruising off 
Ambriz when she fell in with Martha, a large ship that had 
formerly been a Liverpool packet. Upon boarding it was 
discovered that Martha had a slave deck laid and was ready 
to receive a cargo. No papers were found on board, but a 
writing desk was seen thrown overboard. It was found 
floating near the ship. The desk was recovered &ld papers 
were found which showed that the ship was American. A 
three-fifths owner of Martha was Joshua M. Clapp. Foote 
ibid., 1S51, LVI pt. 1, 542. 
20Jackson and Gabriel to Palmerston, 10 Mar. 1850, 
ibid., 243; G. F. Hastings to L. M. Powell, 23 Apr. 1850, 
ibid.,463-64; and Jackson to Palmerston, 17 June 1850, 
ibid., 252-53. 
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sent Martha to New York with a prize crew and his only two 
lieutenants. 21 
Two months later Foote was again successful in 
capturing a slaver, this time under more difficult cir-
cumstances. On 25 August Perry entered Loanda with the 
brigantine Chatsworth. Foote had been notified of the 
presence of the brigantine at Ambriz by Commander Harvey 
of Her Majesty's sloop Kingfisher. Upon inspecting 
Chatsworth Foote felt that the brigantine was a slaver, 
but her papers appeared in order. Instead of releasing her, 
Foote took her to Loanda to let the commodore make the 
final decision. Gregory decided that there were no grounds 
for seizing the vessel, whatever his suspicions may have 
been, and Chatsworth was released. 
Foote, not convinced that Chatsworth was the irmocent 
trader that she appeared, departed Loando, and by a 
circuitous route, was soon off Ambrizette, a few miles 
north of Ambriz. There he found Chatsworth and Louisa 
Beaton. The captain of the latter vessel stated he had 
seen Chatsworth in Rio de Janeiro and that the owner of the 
brigantine had admitted to him that the vessel had carried 
a cargo of slaves to Brazil on her previous voyage and 
was about to make another cruise to Africa for the same 
purpose. Foote boarded Chatsworth again and took her into 
21Ibid., 253; A. H. Foote to Gregory, 9 June 1850, 
Squadron Letters, Roll 105:216; and Andrew Hull Foote, 
Africa and the American Flag (New York, 1854), 285-90. 
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custody. She was sent to Baltimore and condemned. 22 
In short order three American slavers had been seized 
by American men-of-war on the south coast. By the early 
1850s the squadron was doing all that it had been assigned. 
The slave trade on the west coast, north of Cape Palmas, 
had been curtailed and existed only on the south coast, 
and even in that area there was reported to be a "lull" 
in the traffic due to the active cooperation between American 
and British forces, and the suppression of the Brazilian 
trade. 23 
With the success of the Anglo-American efforts came a 
reconsideration of the African squadron. ·rhe Secretary of 
the Navy, in his reports for the years 1851 and 1852, 
proposed that the squadron be recalled. ro insure against 
a resurgence of the trade he proposed that the Brazil 
squadron be strengthened and that vessels from this 
squadron make occasional visits to Africa. Ehis was a plan 
reminiscent of that used, with little success, in the 
1820s and 18)0s. The Home squadron would be adequate to 
ensure that the American flag was not abused in the waters 
around Cuba. In 1853 a new Secretary was appointed who 
advised that the squadron off Africa be retained to provide 
22Jackson to Palmerston, 18 Sept. 1850, BSP, Class A, 
LVI pt. 1, 274; Jackson to Palmerston, 26 Aug. 1850, ibid., 
272; and Foote, Africa, )01-2). 
23u.s., Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of 
the Navy [1850], S. Ex. Doc. 1, )1st Cong., 2nd seas., 195; 
and MacDonald to Palmerston, 31 Dec. 1850, BSP, Class A, 
1851, LVI pt. 1, 182. 
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protection to the rapidly increasing trade with Africa as 
well as to inhibit the slave trade. Whether the decision 
was based upon the necessity of continuing the anti-slaver 
efforts, the need to protect American commerce, or inertia, 
the squadron was not removed from the coast. 24 
From the statements of British officers, and the 
commissioners at Loanda, it appears that the 11 lull 11 in 
the traffic continued into 1856. In September 1855 the 
British commodore, John Adams, advised the Admiralty that 
what little traffic in slaves that still existed was 
carried on in American vessels. rhe next year George 
Jackson and Edmund Gabriel reported that "the Traffic has 
been a state nearly of abeyance," although if constant 
vigilance was not maintained it could again return with 
its former vigour. 25 
United States naval vessels continued making visits 
to the southern coast, and on occasion captured slavers 
under American colors. American cruisers sometimes used 
the British ensign, a common ruse, to deceive slavers, as 
in the cases of B· N• Gambriel and Glamorgan. On 3 November 
1853 the frigate Constitution, cruising about sixty miles 
24u.s.~ Congress, House, Report of the Secretar~ of the 
Navy [1851J, H. Ex. Doc. 2, 32nd Cong., 1st sess., -5; 
ibid., Senate, Report of the Secretary of the Navy [1852], 
S. Ex. Doc. 1, 32nd Cong., 2nd sess., 293; and ibid., 
33rd Gong., 1st seas., 298-99. 
25J. Adams to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 24 Sept. 
1855, BSP, Class A, 1856, LXII, 130; and Jackson and 
Gabriel to the Earl of Clarendon, 16 Feb. 1856, ibid., 
1857, XLIV, 55. 
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south of the Congo River, fell in with H. N. Gambriel, a 
Baltimore-built schooner of about one hundred seventy ton. 
The schooner was at anchor and found fully equipped for the 
slave trade. In all probability she could easily have 
escaped Constitution, but the frigate hoisted the British 
flag. The schooner, feeling quite secure under the American 
flag, made no effort to escape. Once the two vessels closed 
there was no chance for the small schooner under the great 
guns of the frigate. 26 
Glamorgan was taken by Perry on 10 March 1854 after a 
long chase by the brig and her boats. About noon on the 
ninth, while cruising off the Congo, Perry discovered a 
vessel well out to sea. Perry hoisted British colors and 
the chase American, but Lieutenant Richard L. Page, com-
manding Perry, gave no indication of making to intercept 
Glamorgan. However, in the light winds Page maneuvered the 
brig to keep Glamorgan in sight. By the next morning the 
two vessels were only three miles apart. Perry put her 
largest quarter boat in the water to give chase, but after 
an hour it had gained but little. This boat was hoisted 
in and replaced with the lighter cutter. After four hours 
of pulling, the cutter came up with Glamorgan, whose captain 
said that only Americans would be allowed to board. Upon 
26Jackson and Gabriel to the Earl of Malmsbury, 25 Jan. 
1853, ibid., 1854, LXXIII, 88; I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 10 
Nov. 1~ Squadron Letters, Roll 107:36; and Jackson and 
Gabriel to Clarendon, 19 Nov. 1853, BSP, Class A, 1854, 
LXXIII, 128-29. 
188 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
discovering that the boat was indeed American, Glamorgan's 
captain burned the American ensign to get rid of the 
evidence. But the damage was done. The vessel was found 
fitted for the slave trade and had been inspected by British 
officers before. Since her papers had been in order she 
could not be detained by the British. Glamorgan was sent to 
Boston with a prize crew for trial, and was eventually 
condemned. 27 
These two seizures, coming about the same time, are 
interesting in that in both cases, American men-of-war 
disguised themselves by wearing the British flag. But there 
is an important difference. Perry was reported to be a very 
fast vessel. She was relatively small, could use the light 
winds, and with skillful handling close with an equally 
fast vessel. The British flag was used as a tactical 
weapon to gain an advantage. If the conditions had been 
reversed, however, and Constitution had met Glamorgan on 
the open sea with light winds rather than H. ~· Gambriel 
at anchor, it is very unlikely that Constitution could have 
closed with the slaver, with or without the use of a 
disguise. What were needed on the coast were small, fast 
vessels or steamers rather than frigates. 
Commodore Isaac Mayo realized this and on several 
27R. L. Page to Dobbin, 11 Mar. 1854, Squadron Letters, 
Roll 107:55; Jackson and Gabriel to Clarendon, 17 Mar. 
1854, BSP, Class A, 1854-55, LVI, 78; Jackson and Gabriel 
to Clarendon, 28 Mar. 1854, ibid., 82; and Howard, American 
Slavers, 217. 
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occasions requested that Constitution be replaced. In July 
1853 Mayo requested a small steamer to augment his command, 
and in November he was more forceful: 
Nothing could be more gratifying to my professional 
pride, than to serve with the Constitution for my 
Flag Ship. Possessing every admirable quality that 
can commend a vessel to her Officers and Crew: 
Swift, Staunch, Strong and Very commodious, her 
past history had endeared her to every American 
heart, especially the heart of every American 
seaman. Were I to listen to the promptings of my 
own interest, I would be False to those of my 
government, and I therefore feel compelled to 
state that, she is entirely unfit2§or the duty on which she is at present employed. 
It was not until 1859 that a steamer was employed on the 
station. 
Between March 1854 when Glamorgan was seized, and 
September 1858, only one slaver was seized by the American 
squadron on the coast of Africa. United States warships 
still made occasional visits to the southern coast, and 
these, in the opinion of the British commissioners at 
Loanda, were made to further American commercial interests 
rather than to suppress the slave trade. 29 Whatever the 
reason for the presence of the United States Navy, or the 
lack thereof, the slave trade on the African coast had 
reached a low level. While Americans did not make a capture 
for four and a half years, the years 1852 to 1856 represent 
28Mayo to Dobbin, 21 July 1853, Squadron Letters, 
Roll 107:19; and Mayo to Dobbin, 10 Nov. 185), ibid., 
36. 
29Jackson and Gabriel to Clarendon, 2) Feb. 1855, BSP, 
Class A, 1856, LXII, 100. 
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a low period in British efforts also.3° This diminution can 
be accounted for by conditions in Cuba, the only remaining 
market for slaves. In the mid-1850s Cuba suffered an eco-
nomic crisis. The world demand for sugar increased and the 
Cuban production expanded to meet the demand, but so did the 
production of European sugar beets. This resulted in a de-
pression lasting from 1856 to 1859. During these same years 
the Governor of Cuba, Jos~ Gutierrex de la Concha, made it 
known that he was determined to eradicate the slave trade to 
the island. There was still a demand for labor, but moves 
were made to supply the demand with free white or Chinese 
coolie laborers.31 
In the fall of 1857 American warships began to make more 
frequent visits to the south African coast. Dale arrived at 
Loanda in early October and immediately left for the River 
Congo when she learned that there might be slavers in the 
vicinity. A few days later Cumberland arrived bearing the 
flag of Commodore Thomas A. Conover. Upon the arrival of 
these two vessels, three slavers left the Congo to avoid 
being inspected by the Americans. Dale, acting upon infor-
mation from the British, succeeded in capturing~· ~· Lewis 
and sent her to Norfolk, where the libel was dismissed.32 
3°christopher Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade 
(London, 1949), 276; also-s9e Table-2.---
31Arthur F. Corwin, Spain and the Abolition of Slavery 
in Cuba, ~-1886 (Austin, l907T,-r)4-J8. 
32Gabriel to Clarendon, 15 Oct. 1857, BSP, Class A, 
1857-58, LXI, 97; Gabriel toT. Conover, 13 Oct. 1857, 
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After 1858, as activity on the coast began to increase, 
the Navy made several changes. In 1859 William Inman 
succeeded Conover as commodore of the squadron, the supply 
depot was removed from Porto Praia to Loanda, and four 
steamers were added to the squadron. Inman seems to have 
been a tough, and successful, commander. His general orders 
required that all vessels of the squadron, whenever they 
met the flagship, hold themselves ready for an inspection of 
the ship and its exercises. The captain would, in port, 
report to the commodore on the vessel's performance of duty 
and conditions on board. And the commodore also expected 
the sharp execution of maneuvers. Although only two slavers 
with slaves on board had been taken by American warships 
between 1853 and 1859, Inman gave instructions as to the care 
of the Africans. He also detailed the documentation to 
accompany the release of the freed slaves at Monrovia and 
the surrender of the slave vessel to government authorities 
in the United States. In 1860 these provisions were used to 
a considerable extent. Seven laden slavers were taken by 
Inman's squadron that year.33 
Some of these seizures resulted only in the frustration 
ibid., 98; Gabriel to Clarendon, 26 Nov. 1857, ibid., 102; 
Gabriel to Clarendon, 20 Nov. 1857, ibid., 101; and Howard, 
American Slavers, 218. 
33u.s., Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of 
the Navy [1859], S. Doc. 2, )6th Cong., 1st seas., 1149; 
W. Inman, General Orders, 11 Oct. 1859, Squadron Letters, 
Roll 110:57; 3 Oct. 1859, ibid., 58; 14 Oct. 1859, ibid., 
59; 19 Oct. 1859, ibid., 60; and Howard, American Slavers, 
59. 
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and disappointment of the naval officers. A case in point 
is the history of the bark Orion. On 10 April 1859, when 
Orion was in the Congo, she was boarded by Lieutenant Com-
mander Burton of Her Majesty's steamer Triton. Burton was 
suspicious of Orion because of what he considered incorrect 
papers. He believed that Orion was fraudulently wearing 
the American flag. Burton decided to hold the bark until 
he met an American warship to whom he could give custody 
of the vessel. On the nineteenth Orion was turned over to 
the United States sloop-of-war Marion, Commander rhomas W. 
Brent, who seized the bark and dispatched her to New York. 
On board were found two sets of slave coppers, planks, 
provisions, and water casks. In December 1859 Orion was 
once again seized by a British cruiser, the steamer Pluto, 
this time with over eight hundred slaves in her hold. Orion 
had been released by the American court and had returned to 
Africa with the identical cargo and with the former mate in 
command. Orion was taken to St. Helena. Commodore Inman 
sent the steamer Mystic there to request that the bark be 
turned over to the United States for trial.34 
American officers faced a very serious problem which 
34cdr. Courtenay to H. Wise, 10 May 1859, BSP, Class A, 
1860, LXX, 121; Inman to I. ·roucey, 15 Dec. 1859, Squadron 
Letters, Roll 110:154; U.S., Congress, Senate, Report of 
the Secretary of the Navy [1859], s. Doc. 2, )6th Cong:: 
1st seas., 1149-50; Gabriel to Lord J. Russell, 20 Dec. 
1859, BSP, Class A, 1860, LXX, 94-95; Inman to D. F~y, 
14 Dec. 1859, Squadron Letters, Roll 110:155; Gabriel to 
the Earl of Malmsbury, 10 May 1859, BSP, Class A, 1860, 
LXX, 51-53; and Gabriel to Russell, 25 Feb. 1860, ibid., 
1861, LXIV, 55. --
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amounted to conflicting orders. rhe instructions given to 
the squadron since its formation, had provided general 
guidelines for determining whether a vessel was engaged in 
the slave trade or was a legitimate merchant vessel. These 
instructions amounted to what was an "equipment clause." 
But the Secretary's instructions did not constitute law, and 
Congress never enacted legislation as to what constituted a 
slaver. Although by the law of 1794 it was illegal to 
"build, fit, equip, load, or otherwise prepare" any vessel 
for the traffic in slaves, these terms had never been 
defined. It was easy to evade the law by describing the 
cargo accurately and giving a legitimate reason, such as 
whaling, for the voyage. 
H. V. Hunt reported in 1860 that three vessels seized 
by Commander John Calhoun of the U.S.S. Portsmouth and two 
by Lieutenant Le Roy of the steamer Mystic had been released 
by the court in New York. Calhoun told Huntly that he and 
other officers, in contrast to orders encouraging arrests 
based on equipment, "would not again molest any vessel unless 
he actually found slaves on board." "Presumptive proof," 
said Jackson and Gabriel, "such as the existance of planks 
or mats or an excess of water or any article of food on 
board, [is] insufficient for the detention of any vessel 
bearing the United States' flag, provided her papers [are] 
regular.35 
35Jackson and Gabriel to Clarendon, 21 Feb. 1854, ibid., 
1854-55, LVI, 80; H. V. Huntly to Russell, 18 Nov. 1860. 
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In spite of the difficulties and frustrations, American 
officers were lauded for their zeal, and the Americans and 
British generally worked closely to eradicate the traffic. 
American officers were not blamed for the restrictions 
placed upon them by the narrow interpretation of the courts. 
There was but one noticable exception to this general rule. 
In 1859 Benjamin J. Totten commanded the United States 
sloop-of-war Vincennes. It was usual for an American 
commander, upon arrival in Loanda, to obtain information 
on the slave trade in the area. On 22 August the British 
commodore, Charles Wise, notified Totten that there were 
several slavers cruising between Ambriz and the Congo waiting 
for cargoes. Wise requested that Totten investigate the 
matter. Similar information was provided Totten by Edmund 
Gabriel. Whether Gabriel merely relayed the information 
provided by Wise or initiated it on his own is unclear. But 
Totten's reply to Gabriel was not. 
As I am about to leave this port, and have not the 
requisite time to reply to your letter as fully as 
I would wish, I must content myself by simply re-
minding you that the Government of the United 
States claims to be quite competent to correct 
any deplorable and flagrant abuses of their flag 
on this or any other coast, and also that the 
Commander of the United States' vessels on this 
coast need no other advise of inducements than are 
contained in the instructions received from their 
own Government for the performance of their 
duties.36 
Totten's letter must have caused Gabriel to raise his 
ibid., 1862, LXI, 24, 25. 
36B. J. rotten to Gabriel, 23 Aug. 1859, ibid., 1860, 
LXX, 74. 
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eyebrows. More than likely he knew the substance of the 
squadron's orders, especially that part concerning coop-
eration between English and American forces. Certainly he 
had communicated similar information to American officers 
many times before. Gabriel's letter to Lord John Russell 
reflected his dismay over Totten's lack of cooperation.J7 
The matter did not end with Totten's letter, for his 
subsequent actions made the situation worse. Commodore 
Wise requested the use of Vincennes' boats and offered to 
have the steamer Triton tow them to Fanda Bay where both 
British and American officers could investigate any slavers 
there. Totten agreed and apparently followed his boats in 
Vincennes. On the twenty-sixth of August Triton came upon 
Memphis, and Lieutenant Burton asked Totten if he desired 
Triton to get up steam and tow Vincennes' boats to the sus-
pected slaver so that they could search it together. Totten 
declined the offer, stating he would close the vessel in his 
own ship. But Totten did nothing except sail off to Porto 
Praia. Commodore Wise maintained that 11 an examination of 
her, • must have resulted in the capture of that noted 
slaver. r.38 
Totten was the only American officer whom the British 
accused of negligence of duty. Six months earlier, however, 
37Gabriel to Russell, 20 Sept. 1859, ibid., 7). 
38wise to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 2) Sept. 
1859, ibid., 1)9; Wise to F. Grey, 20 Sept. 1859, ibid., 
140. --
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Totten in Vincennes had taken the American bark Julia Dean 
for participating in the trade. His conduct seems erratic, 
and there is a very unusual letter from one of Totten's 
lieutenw1Ls to Commodore Inman placing Totten on report 
for drunkenness.39 
Totten's attitude was not the norm, and Anglo-American 
cooperation continued. In February 1860, Commander Hewett 
of Her Majesty's steamer Viper discovered a vessel at Penta 
de Lenha which aroused his suspicions. After taking pre-
cautions to prevent the vessel from shipping slaves, Viper 
went in search of an American man-of-war. Hewett found the 
sloop-of-war Portsmouth, Commander Colhoun, who immediately 
sent his boats, with Lieutenant George Brown, to accompany 
Viper. Upon investigation it was found that the vessel 
described by the shipping papers did not conform to the 
actual vessel. The slaver, Virginian, was a brigantine of 
one hundred fifty to one hundred eighty tons with an ellip-
tical stern. Papers found in the vessel described a brig 
of two hundred twenty tons having a square stern. ·rhe 
brigantine was seized and sent for adjudication. 40 
39conover to Toucey, 12 Mar. 1859, Squadron Letters, 
Roll 109:142; I. W. A. Nicholson to Inman, 23 Jan. 1860, 
ibid., Roll 110:308. 
40Inman to Toucey, 13 Feb. 1860, ibid., 347; Gabriel 
to Russell, 11 Feb. 1860, BSP, Class A, 1861, LXIV, 37; 
and J. Calhoun to Toucey, 8 Feb. 1860, Letters Received 
by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanders, 1804-
1886 (M-147), Roll 63:60, Naval Records Collection of 
the Office of Naval Records and Library, Record Group 
45, National Archives, hereafter cited Commanders 
Letters. 
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Not all seizures depended upon information from the 
British. In May 1860 Portsmouth was at Porto Praia. It 
was the long-standing procedure to visit American vessels 
wherever found. On the third of May Calhoun sent boarding 
parties on board all American vessels in the harbor. Lieu-
tenant T. Abbott was suspicious of one, Falmouth, but the 
vessel could not be seized while under Purtuguese juris-
diction. The next day Calhoun called upon the Governor 
General of the island and requested that Falmo~th be ordered 
to sea. The following morning Falmouth and Portsmouth 
p~oceededtosea and when outside Portuguese waters, Falmouth 
was boarded, searched, and seized for being intended for 
the slave trade. The brig was sent to New York where she 
was condemned. 41 
The United States squadron was busy in 1860. In 
September and October six slavers arrived at Monrovia and 
freed some forty-two hundred slaves. Four of these--Erie, 
Storm King, Cora, and Bonito--were captured on the African 
coast carrying about three thousand slaves. It was believed 
by the English commodore on the west coast "that a severe 
blow has been inflicted on this illegal traffic" because the 
United States was taking a more active role in the suppres-
sion of the trade. 42 
41J. s. Nicholas to Inman, 21 Dec. 1859, Squadron Let-
ters, Hell 110:158-59; Calhoun to s. R. Betts, 7 May 1860 
Commander's Letters, Roll 64:86; and Howard, American 
Slavers, 220. 
42J. H. Hollingworth to Her Majesty's Acting Judge 
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The seizures continued into 1861. On 21 April, after 
war had broken out in the States, one of the most important 
captures was made by the sloop-of-war Saratoga. The former 
American clipper ship Nightingale was discovered lying at 
anchor off Cabinda by Saratoga. Upon boarding she was 
found loaded with 961 slaves. The survivors were set free 
at Monrovia and Nightingale was condemned at New York. 4J 
The squadron had been so active that, in his report of 
the capture of Nightingal~ Commodore Inman had to include 
a request for nine lieutenants, four lieutenants of Marines, 
one paymaster, one master, thirteen midshipmen, one sail-
maker, one hundred seamen and six marines to fill vacancies 
in the squadron due to manning the prizes.44 
'rwo more slavers were captured by the African squadron 
after the commencement of hostilities in the United States, 
but the more urgent needs of war necessitated the recall 
of the squadron. On 9 May Secretary of the Navy Gideon 
Welles sent orders for all but one of the vessels of the 
squadron to return home. Such orders were expected and by 
7 July all the units of the squadron, with the exception of 
at Sierra Leone, 9 Nov. 1860, BSP, Class A, 1861, LXIV, 19; 
Inman to Toucey, 2 May 1860, Squadron Letters, Roll 111:12; 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of the Navy 
[1860], s. Doc. 1, 36th Cong., 2nd sess., 1); Como. Edmon-
stone to H. Keppel, 24 Mar. 1861, BSP, Class A, 1862, LXI, 
76; and Howard, American Slavers, 221-23. 
43Huntly to Russell, 6 May 1861, ibid., 36; Inman 
to Toucey, 6 May 1861, Squadron Letters, Roll 112:251; 
and Howard, American Slavers, 222. 
44Inman to Toucey, 6 May 1861, Squadron Letters, Roll 
112:251. 
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Saratoga were at St. Paul de Loanda in anticipation. Around 
the first of August Inman received the expected orders and 
all but Saratoga sailed for the United States. Saratoga 
continued on the African coast until January 1862 when she 
received orders to patrol the Straits of Gibralter. 45 With 
her departure,the United States African squadron ceased to 
exist for the duration of the war. 
The African squadron was unique in that it was created 
for two purposes, protection of commerce and the suppression 
of the slave trade. Except for a few attacks upon merchant-
men by Africans, the only protection American commerce 
required was from interference by British men-of-war intent 
upon suppressing the traffic in African slaves. With 
"prudence," "discretion," and a great deal of cooperation 
the United States Navy accomplished its first mission, 
commerce protection, in short order. 
Accomplishing the second mission took more time. As 
slaving waxed and waned in response to stimuli in the 
Americas, so the Navy's efforts responded to slavers. ·.rhe 
Anglo-Spa.rd.sh mutual search treaty, and the Aberdeen and 
Palmerston Acts led slavers to seek cover under the Americ~~ 
45u.s., Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of 
the Navy [1861], S. Doc. 1, 37th Cong., 1st sess., 92; 
Huntly to Russell, 7 July 1861, BSP, Class A, 1862, LXI, 
41; and U.S., Office of Naval Records and Library, Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of 
the Rebeiii~ 1st ser., I (Washington, D.C.--, 1~)~3=­
b5," 272. 
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flag. The American Navy reacted, capturing a number of 
slavers and sending them to the United States for adjud-
ication. With few exceptions British naval and diplomatic 
officers praised the activity of American naval efforts. 
But neither British nor American naval patrols could alone 
end the slave trade. This could only be done by individual 
countries closing their boarders to the entry of African 
slaves. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
I' he United States Navy was created to protect American 
maritime commerce and interests. Established initially in 
response to attacks by Barbary pirates, it was expanded 
to deal with threats to the merchant marine throughout 
the world. Until after the Civil Wa~ commerce protection 
remained the most important mission of the American Navy. 
In 1800, however, the Navy was given another role, the 
suppression of the African slave trade. How did these two 
missions affect each other? It has been the opinion of 
some students of the subject that the emphasis placed upon 
commerce subtracted from the Navy's ability to curtail the 
traffic in slaves. 1 
Before making any judgment, several factors affecting 
the Navy's role in the suppression of the slave trade should 
be considered. By law, American men-of-war could arrest 
only American citizens and American vessels involved in the 
slave trade. But what was an "American" ship? To be 
considered such, a vessel had to be American built, which 
,. many were. They also had to be registered in the foreign 
trade of the United States. Warren S. Howard estimates that 
1w. E. Burghardt DuBois, The Suppression of the African 
Slave-Trade to the United States of America, 1bJ7-1870 
(New York, 1~6;-reprint, 1969), 158-60; and WarrenS. 
Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, ~-1862 
(Berkeley, 1963), 41. - -
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only one percent of the slavers satisfied these criteria. 2 
But the British commissioners in Rio de Janeiro estimated 
that in the 1840s about thirty percent of the slavers using 
that port were American. 
This is a significant discrepancy. But it can be 
resolved by considering "American" in terms understood by 
those concerned. As Perry•s orders stated, the flag of the 
United States was prima facie evidence that the vessel 
flying it was American. And a vessel built in the United 
States was assumed to be American. But once sold to a 
citizen of another country, the vessel lost its American 
registry. It appears that the majority of vessels that 
were called American, were, in reality, foreign-owned vessels 
that had been built in the United States, carried false 
American papers, and illegally assumed the American flag. 
By participating in the slave trade they were "prostituting" 
the American flag. 
In this aspect, the Navy's primary mission, the 
protection of American interests, corresponded with the 
suppression of the slave trade. The government did not 
condone the use of the American flag as a cover for slavers. 
The Navy was ordered to prevent this abuse by arresting 
slavers who sought protection from the Royal Navy under the 
flag of the United States. It was in the national interest 
not to permit slavers this cover. 
2Howard, American Slavers, 20. 
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Another consideration is the comparative size of the 
British and American Navies. The Royal Navy was many times 
larger than the American. England was thus able to employ 
more vessels in the slaver routes than were the Americans. 
The importance of this is apparent if one considers the 
men-of-war and slavers off the African coast to be objects 
moving about tn a random manner. This assumption is valid 
since each was generally ignorant of the other until they 
came within visual contact. rhe capture of a slaver occurred 
upon the contact of a warship and a slaver. It follows 
then that the more objects there are of either type moving 
about, the greater will be the chances of a contact, hence 
more captures. England had more ships on station than did 
the United States and made more captures of slave ships, 
but it does not follow that the Royal Navy was better than 
the American. 
rhe American Navy was small, but increasing its size 
was not as simple a matter as W. E. F. Ward implied. "The 
crux of the matter," he stated, "is that if the Government 
and people of the United States had sincerely wished to 
end the slave trade, they could easily have done so ••• 
by providing a naval squadron strong enough to carry out a 
system of joint cruising.") To accomplish this would have 
entailed an expensive ship-building or ship-purchasing 
program or to have removed vessels from other necessary 
3w. E. F. Ward, The Royal Navy and the Slavers, The 
Suppression of the Atlantic Slave Trade (New York, 19b9T, 161. 
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assignments. But when the Navy did have an unexpected 
increase in the number of ships, after the Paraguan expedi-
tion, the African squadron was increased by four small 
steamers, and four more were situated around Cuba to sup-
press the slave trade. 
How successful, then, was the United States Navy in 
suppressing the traffic in African slaves under the cover 
of the American flag? The efforts of the Royal Navy are 
the most significant of the navies that were engaged in the 
task, and will be the model of what could be done by a 
naval force. Table 2 compares the efforts of the Royal Navy 
and the United States Navy off Africa between 184) and 1861. 
Columns 1, 2, and J compare the sizes of the two navies. 
Columns 4 and 5 show that Great Britain applied more ships 
to their African squadrons than did the United States, but 
the next two columns indicate that the United States assigned 
a greater portion of its naval force to the African squadron 
than did England. 
Columns 8 and 9 confirm what might be expected. Since 
England had more vessels off the African coast than did 
the United States, vessels of the former captured more 
slavers. But it is the final two columns that begin to 
make a comparison of the effectiveness of the two naval 
forces. These show the number of slavers seized by each 
navy on a per ship basis. For example, in 1845 the Royal 
Navy had twenty-seven vessels assigned to the station and 
these captured eighty-one slavers, or three slavers for 
205 
R
eproduced with perm
ission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without perm
ission.
rABLE 2 
COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN SQUADRONS ON WEST COAST OF AFRICA, 1843-1861 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Ratio Percent 
USN Ship on Assigned Slavers Captures 
Total Ships to Station to Station Captured Per Ship 
Year RN USN RN RN USN RN USN RN USN RN USN 
1843 497 45 1:11 12 5 2.42 11.1 31 0 2.58 o.oo 
1844 502 41 1:12 21 5 4.18 12.2 42 1 2.00 0.20 
1845 520 40 1:13 27 5 5.19 12.5 81 5 3.00 1.00 
1846 521 45 1:12 33 4 6.31 8.89 41 4 1.24 1.00 
1847 535 53 1:10 36 3 6.72 5.67 74 0 2.06 o.oo 
1848 550 40 1:14 32 5 5.81 12.5 86 0 2.69 o.oo 
1849 560 45 1:12 31 6 5.52 13.4 55 0 1.78 0.00 
1850 528 39 1:14 29 7 5-50 17.9 60 3 2.07 0.43 
1851 528 37 1:14 31 5 5.88 13.6 14 0 0.45 o.oo 
1852 510 44 1:12 28 5 5.48 11.4 4 1 0.17 0.20 
1853 498 39 1:13 19 4 3.82 10.3 5 3 0.26 0.75 
1854 494 44 1:11 18 3 3.65 6.82 0 1 0.00 0.33 
1855 560 37 1:15 12 4 2.14 10.8 3 0 0.25 o.oo 
1856 844 32 1:26 13 3 1.54 9.38 4 0 0.31 0.00 
1857 801 36 1:22 15 5 1.87 13.9 20 0 1.34 o.oo 
1858 789 36 1:22 18 6 2.28 16.5 14 2 0.78 0.33 
1859 785 48 1:16 13 9 1.67 18.9 21 4 1.62 0.44 
1860 666 45 1:15 15 8 2.25 17.8 10 8 Oc67 1.00 
1861 688 6 1:10 1 8 2.28 11.6 4 0.60 o. 0 
Sources: Col 1: BSP, Navy, Number of Ships ••• in the Naval Service ••• 17 3-1 59, 1 0, 
XLII,554-57; ibid., Number of Steam and Effective Sailing Vessels ••• 1860, 1860, XLII,599; 
and ibid., 18~XXXVIII,589. Col 2: u.s. Cong., Sen., Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy-ri96o], SED 1, 36th Cong., 2nd seas., 4-28. Col 4: BSP, Slave rrade, Vessels-in ••• 
slave trade suppression ••• 1845, XLIX, 639; ibid., 1852-53, XXXIX, 230-33; ibid., 1861, 
LXIV, 348-50; and ibid., Navy, Number ••• of ships ••• on the different stations ••• 1847-68, 
XLV, 638-39. Col 5: See Col 2. Col 8: BSP, Slave ·rrade, 1850, LV,79-87; ibi.d., 1852-53, 
XXXIX,235-40; ibid., 1854, XLII,547; ibid., 1861, LXIV,360; ibid., 1865, LVI,529. Col 9: 
See Appendix E. 
1\) 
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each government vessel. The United States Navy had five 
ships on station. These captured five slavers, or one 
slaver per cruiser. 
Comparing Columns 10 and 11 on a yearly basi~ there are 
only four years in which the United States Navy performed, 
ship for ship, better than the Royal Navy: 1842, 1853, 1854, 
and 1860. This is not too favorable a showing. 
But this comparison is based on the assumption that the 
two navies were permitted to seize all vessels they came 
upon. This was not the case. American commanders could 
only apprehend slavers under the American flag. British 
commanders, because of England's many mutual search and 
arrest treaties, could take vessels of almost all other 
nations. Table 1 gives an indication of how many "American" 
vessels were involved in the traffic. ·rhese, of course, 
are those operating out of Rio de Janeiro and are indica-
tive of only a portion of the years the squadrons were on 
the African coast. If it is assumed, however, that the 
figures for Rio are representative of the remainder of 
Brazil and for Cuba, it is possible to come to a more 
realistic interpretation of ·rable 2. In the years 1840 
to 1849, 179 vessels were identified by the British 
commissioners in Rio de Janeiro as leaving for the African 
coast on slaving voyages. Of these, 66 were identified as 
American. For the same years, 383 vessels entered Rio 
from Africa, 89 of which were American. American vessels 
thus comprised an average of 27.5 percent of the vessels 
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involved in the slave trade to Rio. 
If it is assumed that this 27.5 percent was reasonably 
constant--vessels shifted flags as necessary, but at any 
one time 27.5 percent were wearing American colors--it 
follows that of every one hundred slavers on the African 
coast the British could capture 72.5 and the Americans 27.5, 
a ratio of 3.64 to 1. The British could seize 3.64 slavers 
to each one available for the United States squadron. If 
Column 11 is multiplied by this adjustment factor of 3.64, 
it will indicate how many sl~.vers the American Navy would 
have captured if the British and American Navies had been 
allowed to seize equivalent numbers. Applying this adjust-
ment indicates that the American Navy performed as well as, 
or better than, the Royal Navy in nine of the nineteen years: 
1845, 1846, 1852, 1853, 1854, 1858, 1859, 1860, and 1861. 
If the factor is applied for the average of the whole period 
represented by Table 2, the Royal Navy had a capture~per­
ship ratio of 1.35, the United States Navy a ratio of 1.31, 
a favorable comparison. 
Between 1847 and 1849 American naval officers made no 
real attempt to suppress the slave trade because of adverse 
court decisions. If the figures for these years are 
eliminated, the American ratio increases to 1.69, somewhat 
better than the British. The conclusion, based on these 
assumptions, is that the United States Navy, ship for ship, 
performed as well as the Royal Navy, the one that has been 
set as the example of what could be done by a naval force 
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to suppress the African slave trade. 
The Navy could arrest something less than one-third 
of the slavers on the African coast. But another factor 
enters which tends to reduce this number. Slave traders 
were free to employ whatever flag would benefit them the 
most. If a ship of the Royal Navy came upon a slaver, the 
latter would hoist an American flag and perhaps avoid 
inspection and seizure. After the establishment of the 
United States African squadron, the British were very cir-
cumspect about boarding a vessel under American colors. 
They did so only when there was great doubt as to the val-
idity of the use of the American colors. And even if the 
British did board a suspicious vessel, if the ship's 
papers appeared in order, the British were reluctant to 
interfere with it. The same was true in the event American 
officers discovered a suspicious vessel. 
But, if capture were inevitable, a slaver would sooner 
surrender to a British man-of-war than to an American. 4 rhe 
British merely confiscated the vessel, and released the 
crew. There are cases of legitimate merchantmen augmenting 
their crews by shipping seamen released by the British on 
the African coast.5 American naval officers arrested indi-
viduals and sent them to the United States for trial. ·rhe 
4Howard, American Slavers, 20. 
5ward, Royal Navy, 177; and George E. Brooks, Jr., 
"Enoch Richmond Ware, African Trader: 18)9-1850 Years of 
Apprenticeship," The American Neptune, XXX:4 (1970), 
2)1. 
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penalties were imprisonment and possibly death upon con-
viction. It is little wonder then, that a slaver facing 
certain capture, would choose to surrender to the Royal 
Navy rather than to the United States Navy. This also 
tended to reduce the number of slavers available to be 
captured by the American Navy. 
There was a group of officers who have also been held 
responsible for reducing the number of slavers captured by 
the United States Navy. Southern naval officers have been 
blamed for the squadron•s supposed lack of success. Lord 
Palmerston stated in 1861 that "the Southern captain shuts 
his eyes to what is going on, and runs off to Madeira for 
supplies or water; but the cruisers commanded by the North 
do give us very effective and vigilant cooperation." ·rhis 
statement has been used by both Christopher Lloyd and 
William L. Matheison without question. 6 In March 1860 the 
New York Times editorialized about the poor performance of 
the squadron, but stated that they had ;;too much confidence 
in the force of discipline and of professional honor" of 
the naval service to blame the poor showing of the squadron 
on 11 the abstract opinions of Southerners in the service 
[which might be] allowed to influence the mode in which 
national ships do a plain and honorable duty."? The fact 
6christopher Lloyd, The Nav1 and the Slave Trade: The 
Suppression of the African Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury (New York, 1949), 174; and William L. Matheison, Great 
Britain and the Slave Trade, 1§12-1865 (London, 1929), 163. 
7New York Times, 19 Mar. 1860. 
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that it was even necessary to mention that Southern officers 
might be influenced by the sentiment of their section 
indicates that the idea had currency. 
The idea that Southerners in the naval service adversely 
influenced the African squadron in the suppression of the 
slave trade was prevalent not only in the 1860s but has 
reappeared more recently in one of the best general works 
on the slave trade. In Black Cargoes the authors state that 
southern efforts in the late 1850s to reopen the slave trade 
"encouraged American naval officers--many of whom were 
Southerners--to be tolerant of slavers and lackadaisical 
in pursuing them." 8 
Statements blaming Southerners for the inefficiency of 
the squadron have been followed by rebuttals. The New York 
Times editorial was refuted, a few months later, in a letter 
to the New York Herald by an ·officer in Marion, a ship of 
the African squadron. ·rhe author, possibly Thomas w. Brent, 
Marion's commanding officer, took offence that the rimes 
should even mention Southern influence in the naval service. 
Referring to himself as a "hot bed" Southerner, he insisted 
that the Times editorial "which charges, though indirectly, 
the naval officers of the United States African squadron with 
lukewarmness and sectional interest" was only an "expos~ of 
the writer's absurd ignorance about such matters." 9 ·.rhe 
8naniel P. Mannix, Black Cargoes: ! History of the 
Atlantic Slave Trade, 151S-1~~f' in collaboration with 
Malcolm Cowley (New York, 19 , 273· 
9New York Herald, 11 Oct. 1860. 
211 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
author of the Herald letter appears to have misinterpreted 
the Times' editorial. 
The letter to the Herald appeared the following month, 
edited and printed in the African Repository, the organ of 
the American Colonization Society. From there it was picked 
up by Willis D. Boyd who stated that the writer of the 
Repository article was placing the blame for the laxity of 
the Navy with regard to the slave trade on Southerners, a 
complete misinterpretation of the thesis of the original 
article. In the twisting of interpretation, a letter by a 
Southern naval officer defending the unprejudiced conduct of 
Southern naval officers has ended up being the documentary 
justification for their condernnation. 10 
Only one author has attempted to refute, with examples, 
the charges against Southern officers. WarrenS. Howard 
cites the activities of William McBlair and Thomas W. Brent 
as examples of Southerners who performed well, while Benjamin 
·rotten, of New Jersey, was the only officer to be the subject 
of an official letter of complaint from the British govern-
ment. And there is the case of John N. Maffitt, of Georgia, 
who between 1858 and 1861 succeeded in seizing five slavers 
in the West Indies. Although Maffitt captured more slavers 
than any other single commander, he was, during the Civil 
10American Colonization Society, The African Repository 
and Colonial Journal, XXXVI (1860), 3~[New York, Kraus 
Reprint Corporation, 1967]; and Willis D. Boyd, "'rhe American 
Colonization Society ~d the Slave Recaptives of 1860-1861: 
An Early Example of United States-African Relations," 
Journal of Negro History, XLVII (1962), 110. 
212 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
War, the commander of the c.s.s. florida, one of the most 
11 
successful Confederate commerce destroyers. 
These are, however, only examples. It is necessary to 
examine a greater number of indivuduals in order to determine 
whether they were exceptions or typical of the officers from 
their own section. Seventy-one indivi.duals are herein used 
for this analysis. ·rhey comprise the commanding officers of 
the vessels assigned to the African squadron throughout its 
existence from 1843 to 1861, the commanding officers of the 
vessels in the Brazil squadron between 1843 and 1851, and the 
four commanders of the steamer assigned to the Cuban coast 
after. the purchase of the additional vessels for the Paraguan 
expedition of 1858. rable 3 gives the results. 
TABLE 3 
ANALYSIS OF OFFICERS BASED ON SEC'l~IONAL CI·TIZENSIDP 
Number Officers Captures Capture 
Officers Percent Making Percent Made by per 
§ection From Of Total Ca:Etures Of ·rotal Officers Officer 
North 32 45.0 15 46.8 24 0.75 
Border 12 16.9 3 25.0 4 0.33 
South 27 38.1 11 40.7 23 0.85 
Total 71 29 40.7 51 0.72 (average) (average) 
Sources: Re:2orts of ~he Secretary of the ~avy, 184)-1861; 
Naval Register, 18~-1801; and u.s., Office of Naval Records 
and Library, Records of the Union and Confederate Navies 
Duri}7 the War of the Rebellion (Washington, D.C., 1894-
1917 , 27 vols. 
What the table shows is that those commanders from the 
11 Howard, American Slavers, 141. 
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border states of Delaware, Maryland, Tennessee, and Missouri, 
and the District of Columbia, were less successful than 
their Northern or Southern brothers. A slightly higher 
percentage of Northern commanders succeeded in capturing 
slavers than did those from the South, but this difference 
is probably not significant. ·rhe percentage of Southerners 
making seizures is equal to the average of all officers. 
However, of those officers making captures of slavers, 
Southern officers performed better than did their Northern 
comrades. 
Isaac Mayo was probably typical of the Southern officer. 
The British commissioners at St. Paul de Loanda described 
him as "a high-spirited and distinguished officer (although 
a southern man, and an extensive proprietor of slaves 
himself, and strongly imbued with southern feelings on the 
subject of slavery), expressed as fully determined, not only 
to carry out the instructions of his Government, but also to 
do his utmost to prevent this abuse to his country's flag. 1112 
It would appear that the "confidence in the force of dis-
cipline and of professional honor" which the New York 
Times editorialist placed in the officers of the United 
States Navy, whether from the North or South, was well 
founded. 
Finally, how did the Navy's obligation to protect 
12G. Jackson and E. Gabriel to the Earl of Clarendon, 
19 Nov. 1853, British Sessional Papers4 House of Commons, Accounts and Reports, Slave Trade, 185 , Class A, LXXIII, 
129; Edgar L. Erickson, ed. 
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maritime commerce affect its role in the suppression of the 
slave trade? Certainly, the necessity to send ships to the 
Mediterranean, the Pacific, and the East Indies reduced the 
number of ships available to patrol the slave routes. In 
this sense the need to protect commerce subtracted from the 
American effort to suppress the slave trade. Nevertheless, 
the United States applied a greater proportion of its naval 
strength to the African coast than did Great Britain. In 
absolute numbers, however, there were not enough vessels to 
patrol adequately the entire coast. And realistically, no 
number of naval cruisers could have suppressed the slave 
trade. This happened only when the tree major slave-holding 
countries--Brazil, Cuba, and the United States--themselves 
aggressively prohibited the entry of foreign slaves into 
their territories. 
But the protection of commerce affected the suppression 
of the slave trade in another, positive manner. rhe 
squadron system was developed as a result of the need to 
protect commerce. It was only through the deployment of 
squadrons, ostensibly to protect maritime commerce, that the 
Navy was able to perform as well as it did to suppress the 
traffic in slaves. A model for the way in which an attempt 
was made to suppress the traffic without a squadron is 
found in the activities of the Navy off Africa between 1819 
and 1843. For some twenty-four year~ American men-of-war 
were occasionally sent to Africa to inhibit the illegal 
trade. Only ten slavers were captured in that period, nine 
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of them in 1820 and 1821 when a small squadron was deployed. 
It was the squadrons that were more constantly in the 
vicinity of the slaver routes off Brazil, in the West 
Indies, and off Africa that were most able to suppress the 
slave trade. This effort by American naval officers compares 
favorably with that of the naval force of any other nation. 
rhe mechanism thus created for the protection of commerce 
was the vehicle by which the United States Navy most 
effectively helped suppress the illegal commerce in African 
slaves. 
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APPENDIX ~ 
ORDERS TO SQUADRON COMMODORES AND SHIP 1S CAPTAINS 
FROM THE SECREI'ARY OF THE NAVY1 
Lieut Ch~s. Wilkes Com~ Explg. Expedn 
&c. &c. &c. 
Navy Departmen~h 
August 11 1838 
Sir, 
The Congress of the 
United States, having in view the important interests of our 
Commerce embarked in the Whale Fisheries and oth~h adventures 
in the great Southern Ocean, by an act of the 18 of May 
1836, authorising an Expedition to be fitted out for the 
purpose of Exploring and Surveying that Sea, • • • • 
Com~ Isaac Hull 
Comd$ Medt~ Squad~ 
New York. 
XXV:404 
Navy Departm~nt 
Novf 30~ 1838 
Sir, • • • 
The great object contemplated by the employment of a 
Naval force in the Mediterranean is to maintain a friendly 
relation with the Barbary States and the powers boardering 
on that Sea; and to afford protection to the Commerce of 
the u. States. 
Com~ Ale~ander Claxton 
Com$ u.s. Squadron 
in the Pacific Ocean 
Sir, • • • 
XXVI:112 
Navy Department 
~lay 9th 1839 
rhe primary objectives of the Government of the u.s. in 
1Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Officers, 
1798-1868 (M-149), Naval Record Collection of the Office of 
Naval Records and Library, Record Group 45, National Archives. 
The volume and page numbers are given at the end of each 
excerpt. 
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maintaining a naval Force in the Pacific Ocean, have always 
been, and still are, the protection of [our] Commerce and 
the improvement of Discipline, • • • • 
XXVI:432 
Lieut J. S. Pa~ne r Navy Department 
Comdg U. S. iiP~gsch. Grampus Octr 9t.n 1840 
Boston 
Sir, • • • 
The Department has been informed that 
outrage and robbery were committed on board the Ship Transit 
of New York in Feby 18)8, and more recently on board the Brig 
Robert of the same place, by a native Chief, styled King 
Sarrati, in the river Nunez.-- You will therefore visit that 
river, and enquire into the facts, and afford your aid in 
preventing the rscurrence of such outrages. 
XXIX:559 
S[ailing]. O[rders]. 
Com. Chas. Stewart Navy Department 
Comdg. Home Squadron 
New York 
February 4 1842 
Sir, It is desirable in employing a 
11 Home Squadron," of which you have been appointed to the 
Command, that the Government may have at all times a portion 
of our Naval force in a state of readiness and discipline 
to meet any extraordinary emergency that may arise, and 
calling for the prompt application of this force, to protect 
our rights and commerce, and to enforce the laws in respect 
to Piracy of whatever kind it may be. 
XXXII:28-29 
S[ailing]. O[rders]. 
Comm° F. A. Parker, Navy Department 
Comdg. U. S. Squadron April 26, 1843 
destined for the East Indies. 
Sir. • 0 • 
The leading objects of your proposed cruise are: First, 
to protect the interests of the United States, and their 
citizens on the coast of China. 
XXXIV:442 
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TYPES OF UNITED STATES MEN-OF-WAH 
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Figure 1 
Explanatory Diagram of a Ship-Rigged Vessel 
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Figure 2 u.s • .s. Pennsylvania 
A 120-Gun Ship of the Line Built 1822-37 
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Figure 3 U~S.S. Macedonian 
. # 
A Double-Banlted Frigate Built 1832 
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Figure 5 u.s.s. Perry 
A Man-of-War Brig Built 184J 
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Ship 
Alligator 
Bainbridge 
Boxer 
APPENDIX "C 
CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN MEN-OF-WAR MAKING CRUISES ~ AFRICA IN 
SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES LAWS AGAINST THE SLAVE THADE1 
Sailing Vessels 
Class Guns ronnage Length Beam ft in ft in 
Schooner 12 17768 95 86 0 24 7 
Brig 12 259 100 0 25 0 
Schooner8 10 194 88 0 23 6 
Constitution Frigate 44 1,576 175 0 43 6 
Cumberland Frigate 44 1,726 175 0 45 0 
Cumberland Razee Sloop 24 175 0 46 6b 
Cyane Ship Sloop 24 539 110 0 29 0 
Dale Ship Sloop 16 566 117 7 33 10 
Decatur Ship Sloop 16 566 117 7 33 10 
Dolphin Brigantinec 10 224 88 0 25 0 
Germantown Ship Sloop 20 939 150 0 36 0 
Depth 
ft in 
10 4 
11 0 
10 6 
14 3 
14 5 
14 4 
8 6 
15 0 
15 0 
11 0 
16 8 
1\) 
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Ship Class Guns Tonnage Le!!Sth Beam Depth ft in ft in ft in 
Grampus Schooner 10 171~ 92 6 24 6 9 6 
Hornet Ship Sloopd 18 44~ 3 106 9 29 7 14 0 
Jamestown Ship Sloop 20 985 157 6 35 0 16 2 
John Adams Ship Sloop 18 127 0 34 0 15 3 
Macedonian Frigate 36 1,341 164 0 41 0 18 0 
Marion Ship Sloop 16 566 117 7 33 10 15 0 
Perry Brig 10 280 105 0 25 6 12 3 
Porpoise Brigantine0 10 224 88 0 15 0 11 0 
Portsmouth Ship Sloop 20 1,022 151 10 38 1 17 2 
Preble Ship Sloop 16 566 117 7 33 10 15 0 
Saratoga Ship Sloop 20 882 164 4 35 3 16 ~ 
Shark Schooner 12 17768 93 86 0 24 7 10 4 
St. Louis Ship Sloop 18 127 0 34 0 15 3 
rruxtun Brig 10 329 100 0 27 4 1J 0 
United States Frigate 44 1,576 175 0 43 6 14 3 
Yorktown Ship Sloop 16 566 117 7 33 10 15 0 
l\) 
l\) 
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1Howard I. Chapelle, The History of the American 
Sailing Navy (New York, 19~; u.s., Congress, House, 
Report of the Committee ~ the Suppression of the Slave 
·rrade, H. Rept. 92, 17th Cong., 1st seas.; u.s., Congress, 
House, Instructions to the African Squadron, H. Ex. Doc. 
104, 35th Cong., 2nd sess.;and u.s., Congress, House, 
African Squadron, H. Ex. Doc. 73, 31st Cong., 1st seas. 
&u.s., Congress, House, Instructions to the African 
Squadron, H. Ex. Doc. 104, 35th Cong., 2nd seas. lists 
Boxer as a brig, however, Chapelle ~dentifies her as a 
schooner. 
bExtreme beam. rhe other measurements are molded 
beam. The difference between extreme beam and molded 
beams is that the former is measured to the outside of 
the hull planking and the latter to the outside of the 
frames. 
cu.s., Congress, House, Instructions to the African 
Squadron, H. Ex. Doc. 104, 35th Cong., 2nd sass. lists 
Dolphin and Porpoise as brigs, however Chapelle identifies 
them as brigantines. 
dHornet was built as a brig, then altered to a ship. 
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Steam Vessels1 
Ship Guns rype Tonnage Speed Acquired U.S.N. 
Mohican 8 Screw 994 10.5 1859 
Mystic 5 Screw 541 6.5 1858 
Niagara 12 Screw 4,582 14.5 1857 
San Jacinto 12 Screw 1,567 1850 
Sumter 5 Screw 464 1859 
1u.s., Office of Naval Records and Library, Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of 
the Rebeiiion, 2nd ser:-(washington, D.C., 
Ship 
Consort 
Erie 
Relief 
Southampton 
Supply 
Guns 
6 
4 
6 
2 
4 
1 Stores hips 
Tonnage 
2)0 
468 
567 
547 
78 9 
117 11 
109 0 
152 6 
-~.--1921 , I. 
25 4 
32 4 
JO 0 
27 0 
Depth 
ft in 
14 6 
12 0 
16 0 
1 Howard I. Chapelle, The History of the American Sailing 
Navy (New York, 1949); and U.S., Congress, House, Instru\."'--
tions to the African Squadron, H. Ex. Doc. 104, J5th Cong., 
2nd seas. 
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APPENDIX D 
EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES MEN-OF-WAR, 1840-18601 
October 1840 
In Commission 26 Number of ShiES EmElOled 
Guns Mounted 599 J Mediterranean 
5 Brazil 
African Coast J Pacific 
Brigantine Dolphin, 10 J West Indies 
Schooner Grampus, 10 2 East Indiee 
2 East Coast u.s. 
2 Africa 
J Florida J Exploring Expedition 
October 1841 
In Commission JJ Number of ShiES Emploled 
Guns Mounted 669 J Mediterranean 
6 Brazil 
African Coast 6 Pacific 
None J West Indies 
2 East Indies 
2 East Coast u.s. 
7 Florida 
J Exploring Expedition 
1 Special Service 
November 1842 
In Commission 29 Number of ShiES Emploled 
Guns Mounted 816 4 Mediterranean 
6 Brazil 
African Coast 9 Home 
None 6 Pacific 
1 East Indies 
2 Florida 
1 Special Service 
1u.s., Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretarl of 
the Navl [1861], S. Ex. Doc. 4, )6th ~ng., 2nd sess.,--
Ir-'28. 
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In Commission 4.5 
Guns Mounted 1,1.52 
African Coast 
Frigate Macedonian, 46 
Sloop Saratoga, 2o 
Sloop Decatur, 16 
12 Brigantine PorEoise, 
Storeship Consort, 2 
In Commission 41 
Juns Mounted 836 
African Coast 
Frigate Macedonian, 
Sloop Saratoga, 2o 
Sloop Jamestown, 22 
Sloop Yorktown, 16 
Sloop Decatur, 16 
In Commission 40 
Guns Mounted 866 
African Coast 
Sloop Jamestown, 22 
Sloop Yorktown, 16 
Sloop Marion. 16 
46 
November 
November 
October 
Brig Truxton, 10 
Storeship Southampton, 6 
1843 
Number of ShiES EmElo~ed 
.5 Mediterranean 
6 Brazil 
8 Pacific 
9 Home 
4 East Indies 
.5 Africa 
8 Special Service 
1844 
184.5 
Number of ShiES EmElOled 
.5 Mediterranean 
3 Brazil 
7 Pacific 
6 Home 
3 East Indies 
.5 Africa 
11 Special Service 
1 Lakes 
Number of ShiES EmEloled 
1 Mediterranean 
.5 Brazil 
10 Pacific 
11 Home 
2 East Indies 
.5 Africa 
.5 Special Service 
1 Lakes 
November 1846 
In Commission 4.5 
Guns Mounted 870 
African Coast 
Sloop Marion, 16 
Brig Boxer, 10 
Brigantine Dolphin, 10 
Storeship Southampton, 6 
Number of ShiES EmEloyed 
0 Mediterranean 
2 Brazil 
1.5 Pacific 
19 Home 
4 Africa!! 
4 Special SArvice 
1 Lakes 
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November 1847 
In Commission 53 
Guns Mounted 753 
Number of Shi~s Em~loled 
4 Mediterranean 
3 Brazil 
African Coast 12 Pacific 
Sloop Jamestown, 22 27 Home 
Brig Boxer, 10 3 Africa 
Brigantine Dolphin, 10 3 Special Service 
1 Lakes 
November 1848 
In Commission 40 Number of Ships Emploled 
Guns Mounted 791 7 Mediterranean 
4 Brazil 
African Coast 10 Pacific 
Sloop Portsmouth, 22 7 Home 
Sloop Decatur, 16 5 Africa 
Sloop Yorktown, 16 3 Special Service 
Brig Bainbrigge, 10 2 Lakes 
Brigantine Por~oise, 8 2 East Indies 
November 1849 
In Commission 45 Number of Shi~s Emploled 
Guns Mounted 864 6 Mediterranean 
3 Brazil 
African Coast 11 Pacific 
Sloop Portsmouth, 22 13 Home 
Sloop Decatur, 16 6 Africa 
Sloop Yorktown, 16 2 East Indies 
Brig Bainbridge, 10 3 Special Service 
Brig Perry, 8 1 Lakes 
Brigantine Por~oise, 8 
November 1850 
In Commission 39 
Guns Mounted 780 
Number of Ships Employed 
6 Nediterranean 
4 Brazil 
African Coast 10 Pacific 
Sloop Portsmouth, 22 5 Home 
Sloop John Adams, 20 7 Africa 
Sloop Yorktown, 16 4 East Indies 
Sloop ~' 16 2 Special Service 
Brig Perry, 8 1 Lakes 
Brig Bainbridge, 6 
Brigantine Porpoise, 8 
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November 1851 
In Commission J7 
Guns Mounted 575 
African Coast 
Sloop Germantown, 22 
Sloop John Adams, 18 
Brig perry, 8 
Brig Bainbridge, 6 
Brigantine Porpoise, 8 
In Commission 44 
Guns Mounted 647 
African Coast 
Sioop Germantown, 22 
Sloop John Adams, 18 
Sloop Dale, 16 
Brig Perry, 8 
Brig Bainbridge, 6 
October 1852 
Number of Ships Employed 
2 Mediterranean 
3 Brazil 
11 Pacific 
9 Home 
5 Africa 
4 East Indies 
2 Special Service 
1 Lakes 
Number of Ships Employed 
4 Mediterranean 
J Brazil 
7 Pacific 
11 Home 
5 Africa 
8 East Indies 
2 Special Service 
1 Lakes 
J Exploring Expedition 
November 185J 
In Commission J9 
Guns Mounted 606 
African Coast 
Frigate Constitution, 50 
Sloop Marion, 16 
Sloop Dale, 14 
Brig Perry, 8 
In Commission 44 
Guns Mounted 708 
African Coast 
Frigate Constitution, 50 
Sloop Marion, 16 
Sloop Dale, 14 
October 1854 
Number of Ships Employed 
J Mediterranean 
J Brazil 
4 Pacific 
6 Home 
4 Africa 
10 East Indies 
J Special Service 
1 Lakes 
5 Exploring Expedition 
Number of Ships Employed 
4 Mediterranean 
4 Brazil 
7 Pacific 
7 Home 
J Africa 
9 East Indies 
4 Special Service 
1 Lakes 
5 Exploring Expedi t i''n 
2J5 
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October 18.5.5 
In Commission 37 
Guns Mounted .539 
African Coast 
Sloop Jamestown, 22 
Sloop St. Louis, 20 
Sloop Dale, 14 
Brigantine Dolphin, 6 
Number of Ships Employed 
4 Nediterranean 
4 Brazil 
.5 Pacific 
.5 Home 
4 African 
.5 East Indies 
3 Special Service 
1 Lakes 
6 Exploring Expedition 
October 18.56 
In Commission 32 
Guns Mounted .589 
African Coast 
Sloop Jamestown, 22 
Sloop St. Louis, 20 
Brigantine Dolphin, 6 
In Commission 36 
Guns Mounted 6.53 
African Coast 
October 18.57 
Razee Sloop Cumberland, 24 
Sloop Vincennes, 18 
Sloop St. Louis, 20 
Sloop Dale, 14 
Storeship Supply, 4 
In Commission 36 
Guns Mounted 613 
African Coast 
October 18.58 
Razee Sloop Cumberland, 24 
Sloop Vincennes4 18 Sloop Marion, 1 
Sloop Dale, 14 
Brig Bainbridge, 6 
Steamer Niagra, 4 
Number of Ships Employed 
3 Mediterranean 
4 Brazil 
6 Pacific 
.5 Home 
3 Africa 
4 East Indies 
6 Special Service 
1 Lakes 
Number of Ships Employed 
2 Mediterranean 
2 Brazil 
8 Pacific 
6 Home 
.5 Africa 
6 East Indies 
6 Special Service 
1 Lakes 
Number of Ships Employed 
2 Mediterranean 
10 Brazil 
6 Pacific 
.5 Home 
6 Africa 
4 East Indies 
2 Special Service 
1 Lakes 
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In Commission 48 
Guns Mounted 706 
African Coast 
Sloop Constellation, 20 
Sloop Portsmouth, 16 
Sloop Vincennes4 18 Sloop Marion, 1 
Steamer San Jacinto, 15 
Steamer MOhican, 6 
Steamer Mystic, 5 
Steamer Sumter, 5 
Storeship Supply, 4 
In Commission 45 
Guns Mounted 577 
African Coast 
Sloop Portsmouth, 16 
Sloop Constellation, 20 
Sloop Saratoga, 18 
Steamer San Jacinto, 15 
Steamer MOhican, 6 
Steamer Sumter, 5 
Steamer Mystic, 5 
Storeship Relief, 2 
October 1859 
October 1860 
Number of Ships Employed 
2 Mediterranean 
6 Brazil 
9 Pacific 
13 Home 
9 Africa 
5 East Indies 
3 Special Service 
1 Lakes 
Number of Ships Employed 
4 Mediterranean 
5 Brazil 
7 facific 
14 Home 
8 Africa 
5 East Indies 
2 Special Service 
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Slave Ship 
Marsouin 
Betsy 
Prudent 
Phoebe 
unnamed 
Alexandrine 
Tentativa 
Eugene 
unnamed 
unnamed 
Neptune 
Merino 
APPENDIX E 
VESSELS CAPTURED BY SHIPS OF 'l'HE UNITED STATES NAVY 
FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE SLAVE TRADE 
Rig Date Location U.S.N. Ship Commander 
-----
6/1799 West Indies Governor Jay Leonard 
Sloop 25/6/00 West Indies Experiment Maley 
Sch. 19/7/00 West Indies Ganges Mullowny 
Sch. 21/?/00 West Indies Ganges Mullowny 
-----
2/01 West Indies Chesapeake Barron 
Brig 1/1/10 Off New Orleans Read 
Sch. 15/11/17 Amelia Island Saranac Elton 
Sch. 17/1/17 Gulf of Mexico Hoffman 
Sch. 8/17 Off New Orleans Boxer Porter 
Sch. 8/17 Off New Orleans Boxer Porter 
Brig 2)/1/18 Amelia Island John Adams Henley 
Sch. 12/6/18 Off Pensacola Surprise McKeever 
Sources 
a 
b:III,281 
b:VI,85 
b:VI,16J 
b:VII,116-17 
e 
c:XI,J80-81 
c:XI,J6J 
c:XI,J52 
c:XI,)52 
d 
f 
l\) 
\...) 
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Slave Ship Rig Date Location U.S.N. Ship Commander Sources 
Louisa Sch. 18/6/18 Off Pensacola Surprise fwlcKeever f 
Endymeon Sch. 1820 African Coast Cyane Trenchard d, j 
Esperanza Sch. 1820 African Coast Cyane Trenchard d, j 
Plattsburg Sch. 1820 African Coast Cyane Trenchard d, j 
Science Sch. 1820 African Coast Cyane Trenchard d, j 
Alexander Brig 1820 African Coast Hornet Read d, j 
J eune Eugene Sch. 1821 African Coast Alligator Stockton d, j 
Mathilde Sch. 1821 African Coast Alligator Stockton d, j 
Daphne Sch. 1821 African CCiast Alligator Stockton d, j 
Eliza Sch. 1821 African Coast Alligator Stockton d, j 
La Pense~ Brig 11/12/21 West Indies Hornet Henley j, h:III,79 
Mary Sch. 3/22 West Indies Porpoise g 
Theodore Brig 10/7/22 Off Matanzas Hornet Henley g 
Fenix Sch. 5/6/30 Off Cape Haiti Grampus Mayo h:III,865-70 
Emperor Sch. 5137 Bahama Banks i 
Sarah Anne Sch. 3/3/40 River Pongas Grampus Paine d 
1\) 
\...) 
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Slave Ship Rig Date Location U.S.N. Ship Commander Sources 
Uncas Brig J/1/44 Off Gallinas Porpoise T.J. Craven k 
Porpoise Brig 1/2)/45 Rio de Janeiro Raritan Gregory 
Spitfire Sch. 2/)4/45 River Pongas Truxton Bruce k 
Albert Brig 6/45 Bah! a Bainbridge Mattison 
Merchant Sch. 12/)/45 Sierra Leone James1town Cunningham k 
Pons Bark 11/45 Cabinda Yorktown Bell k 
Panther Ship 12/15/45 Cabinda Yorktown Bell k 
Patuxent Sch. 9/27/45 Off Cape Mount Yorktown Bell k, 1 
Robt Wilson Sch. 1/15/46 Porto Praia Jamestown Cunningham k, 1 
Malaga Brig 4/1)/46 Cabinda Boxer Bispham k 
Casket Brig 8/2/46 Cabinda Marion Simonds k 
Chancellor Ship 4/10/46 Off Cape Palmas Dolphin Pope k, 1 
Laurens Bark 1/23/48 Off Rio de Janeiro On-ka-hy-e Berryman 1 
Ann D. 
Richardson Bark 12/11/48 Off Rio de Janeiro Perry Davis 1 
Independence Brig 12/1)/48 Off Rio de Janeiro Perry Davis 1 
1\) 
~ 
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Slave Ship Rig Date Location U.S.N. Ship Commander Sources 
Susan Brig 2/6/49 Rio de Janeiro Perry Davis 1 
Excellent Brigt. 4/50 Off Ambriz John Adams Powell k 
Martha Ship 6/6/50 Off Ambriz Perry Foote k 
Chatsworth Brigt. 9/11/50 Off Ambrizette Perry Foote k 
Advance Sch. 11/3/52 Porto Praia Germantown Nicholas k 
Rachel P 
Brown Sch. 1/23/50 Porto Praia Germantown Nicholas k, 1 
H N Gambril Sch. 11/3/53 Off Congo River Constitution Rudd k, 1 
Wm J Lewis Bark 11/3/53 Congo River Dale McBlair k, 1 
Glamorga"'l. Brig 3/10/54 Off Congo River Perry Page k 
Bramen Brig 56 African Coast n 
Echo Brig 8/21/.58 Cuba Dolphin f>1affi tt 1 
Brothers Ketch 9/8/.58 Off Nayumba Marion Brent k, 1 
Julia Dean Bark 12/28/58 Cape Coast Castle Vincennes 'rotten 1 
Orion Bark 4/21/59 Off Congo River Marion Brent 1, n 
Ardennes Bark 4/27/59 Off Congo River Marion Brent 1, n 
l\) 
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Slave Ship Rig Date Location U.S.N. Ship Commander Sources 
Emily Ship 9/21/59 Off Loango Portsmouth Colhoun 1, n 
Cygnet Brig 11/18/59 Cuba Mohawk T A ~l Craven 1 
Delicia Brig 12/21/59 Off Cabinda Constellation Nicholas 1 
Virginian Brigt. 2/6/60 Off Congo River Portsmouth Colhoun 1 
Wildfire Bark 4/26/60 Cuba Mohawk ·r A M Craven 1 
Falmouth Brig 5/6/60 Off Porto Praia Portsmouth Colhoun 1, n 
William Bark 519/60 Cuba Wyandotte Stanly 1 
Bogota Bark 5/23/60 Cuba Crusader Maffitt 1 
Thomas 
Achorn Brig 6/29/60 Cabinda Mystic Le Hoy 1, n 
Triton Brig 7/16/60 5o10'S 11010 1W Mystic Le Hoy 1 
Wrn H Kibby Brig 7/23/60 Cuba Crusader fvlaffitt 1, n 
Storm King Brig 8/8/60 Off Congo River San Jacinto Dornin 1 
Erie Ship 8/8/60 Off Congo River I1ohican God on 1, n 
Joven 
Antonio Brig 8/14/60 Cuba Crusader Naffitt 1 
Cot• a Bark 9/26/60 African Coast Constellation Nicholas 1, m, n 
N 
~ 
N 
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Slave Ship Rig Date 
Bonita Brig 10/10/60 
·ruccoa Brig 12/20/60 
Mary J 
12/21/60 Kimball Bark 
Express Sch. 2/25/61 
Nightingale Ship 4/21/61 
-rriton Brig 5/20/61 
Falmouth Brig 
Location 
African Coast 
Cuba 
Cuba 
African Coast 
African Coast 
African Coast 
African Coast 
U.S.N. Ship Commander Sources 
San Jacinto Dornin m 
Mohawk r A M Craven m 
Mohawk 
Saratoga 
Saratoga 
T A M Craven m 
raylor m 
Taylor m, n 
Constellation Nicholas m, n 
Sumpter Armstrong n 
Sources-: (a-r Helen Honor ( runnicliff) CatteraYl~- ed., Judicial Cases Concernin~ American 
Slavery and the Negro, II (Washington, D.C., 1929), 280; (b) u.s., Office of Naval 
Records and Library, Naval Documents Related to the Quasi-War Between the United States 
and France: Naval Operations from February 1797 to December-1801 (Washington, D.C., 
1935-1938); (c) 'rhomas B. Wait, ed. and publ., State Papers and Publtck Documents of the 
United States, •••• 3rd ed. (Boston, 1819); (d) U.S., Congress, House, African COlon= 
ization--Slave Trade--Commerce, H. Rept. 283, 27th Cong., Jrd sess., )61-62, 664; (e) 
Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanders, 1804-1886 (M-147), Naval 
Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, Recora Group 4;, National 
Archives; (f) u.s., Congress, House, Lieutenant Isaac M'Keever, H. Rept. 150, 19th Cong., 
1st sess.; (g) Great Britain, Parliament (Commons), Accounts and Papers, Slave Trade, 
Class B, 182), XIX, 414, 416-17; (h) U.S., Congress, American State Papers: Naval 
Affairs, 4 vols.; (i) Great Britain, Parliament (Commons), Accounts and Papers, Slave 
Trade, Class A, 1837-38, L, 132; (j) U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Committee gn 
the Suppression of the Slave rrade, H. Rept. 92, 17th Cong., 1st seas., 5-6; (k) U.S., 
Congress, House, Instructions to the African Squadron, H. Ex. Doc. 104, 35th Cong., 2nd 
1\) 
~ 
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sess., J1-J2; {1) u.s., Congress, House, African Slave Trade, H. Ex. Doc. 7, )6th Cong., 
2nd sess., 516-17, 628-31; (m) U.S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy [1861], s. Ex. Doc. 1, 37th Cong., 1st sess., 97; and (n) u.s:; Congress, Senate, 
Letter of the Secretary of the Interior, S. Ex. Doco 53, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., 2-J. 
l\) 
$ 
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APPENDIX ,!! 
PORTIONS OF PUBLIC ACTS PROHIBI'.riNG THE SLAVE 'I'RADE 
PERTAINING TO THE NAVY 
1 
An Act to prohibit the carrying 2B the slave-trade from the 
United States to anz foreign place Sl£ country. Annals 
of Congress, )rd Cong., 1st seas., 1794, IV, App. 1425. 
Be it enacted, &c., ·rhat no citizen or citizens of the 
United States, or foreigner, or any other person, coming into, 
or residing within, the same, shall, for himself or any other 
person whatsoever, either as master, factor, or owner, build, 
fit, equip, load, or otherwise prepare, any ship or vessel, 
within any port or place of the said United States, nor shall 
cause any ship or vessel to sail from any port or place with-
in the same, for the purpose of carrying on any trade or 
traffic in slaves to any foreign country; or for the purpose 
of procuring from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, the 
inhabitants of such kingdom, place, or country, to be tr&ls-
ported to any foreign country, port, or place whatever, to be 
sold or disposed of as slaves. And if any ship or vessel 
shall be so fitted out, as aforesaid, for the said purposes, 
or shall be caused to sail, so as aforesaid, every ship or 
vessel, her tackle, furniture, apparel, and other appurte-
nances, shall be forfeited to the United States, and shall be 
liable to be seized, prosecuted, and condemned, in any of the 
Circuit Courts or District Court for the District where the 
said ship or vessel may be found and seized. • • • 
Approved, March 22, 1794. 
2 
An Act in addition to the .act, entitled "An Act to prohibit 
the carrzing ~ the slave trade from the United States 
to any foreign place .Q.!: country." Annals of Congress, 
bth Cong., 1st sass., 1800, X, App. 151) •••• 
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That it shall be 
lawful for any of the commissioned vessels of the United 
States, to seize and take any vessel employed in carrying on 
trade, business, or traffic, contrary to the true intent a:rJ.d 
meaning of this or the said act to which this is in addition; 
245 
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and such vessel, together with her tackle, apparel, and guns, 
and the goods or effects, other than slaves, which shall be 
found on board, shall be forfeited, and may be proceeded 
against in any of the district or circuit courts, and shall 
be condemned for the use of the officers and crew of the 
vessel making the seizure, and be divided in the proportion 
directed in the case of prize: And all persons interested in 
such vessel, or in the enterprise or voyage in which such 
vessel shall be employed at the time of such capture, shall 
be precluded from all right or claim to the slaves found on 
board such vessel aforesaid, and from all damages or retri-
bution on account thereof: And it shall moreover be the duty 
of the commanders of such commissioned vessels, to apprehend 
and take into custody every person found on board of such 
vessel so seized and taken, being of the officers or crew 
thereof, and him or them convey, as soon as conveniently may 
be, to the civil authority of the United States, in some one 
of the districts thereof, to be proceeded against in due 
course of law. • •• 
Approved, May 10, 1800. 
3 
An Act to prohibit the introduction (importation] of slaves 
into an~ port ££ place within the jurisdiction of the 
United tates, from and after the first day of January, 
in the year of our Lord ~ thousand eight hundred and 
eight. Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 2nd sess., 1807, 
XVI, App. 1268-~. . .. 
SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, ·rhat ••• it shall 
be lawful for the President of the United States, and he is 
hereby authorized, should he deem it expedient, to cause any 
of the armed vessels of the United States to be manned and 
employed to cruise on any part of the coast of the United 
States, or territories thereof, where he may judge attempts 
will be made tu violate the provisions of this act, and to 
instruct and direct the commanders of armed vessels of the 
United States to seize, take, and bring into any port of the 
United States, all such ships or vessels, and moreover to 
seize, take, and bring into any port of the United States, 
all ships or vessels of the United States, wheresoever found 
on the high seas, contravening the provisions of this act, 
to be proceeded against according to law, and the captain, 
master, or commander of every such ship or vessel, so found 
and seized as aforesaid, shall be deemed guilty of a high 
misdemeanor, and shall be liable to be prosecuted before any 
court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof; and 
being thereof convicted, shall be fined not exceeding ten 
thousand dollars, and be imprisoned not less than two years, 
and not exceeding four years. And the proceeds of all ships 
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and vessels, their tackle, apparel, and furniture, and the 
goods and effects on board of them, which shall be so seized, 
prosecuted, and condemned, shall be divided equally between 
the United States and the officers and men who shall make 
such aeizure, take, or bring the same into port for condem-
nation, whether such seizure be made by an armed vessel of 
the United States or revenue cutter thereof; and the same 
shall be distributed in like manner as is provided by law for 
the distribution of prizes taken from an emeny: Provided, 
That the officers and men, to be entitled to one-half of the 
proceeds aforesaid, shall safe keep every negro, mulatto, or 
person of color, found on board of any ship or vessel so by 
them seized, taken, or brought into port for condemnation, 
and. shall deliver every SlJCh negro, mulatto or person of 
color to such person or persons as shall be appointed by the 
respective States to receive the same; • • • • 
Approved, Ma~c~ 2, 1807. 
4 
An Act in addition to 11 An Act to prohibit the introduction 
--rimportation] of slaves into any port gr place within 
the jurisdiction of the United States, from and after 
the first day of January, in the year of .Q!!£ Lord ~ 
thousand eight hundred and eight, 11 and to repeal certain 
parts of the same. Annals of Congress,1,5th Cong., 
1st sess., 18~XXXII, APPa 2.573-74 •••• 
SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, rhat the first six 
sections of the act to whi~h this is in addition, shall be, 
and the same are hereby, ~epcaled: Provided, rhat all of-
fences committed under the said sections of the act aforesaid, 
before the passing of this act, shall be prosecuted and pun-
ished, and any forfeitures which have been incurred under the 
same shall be recovered and distributed, as if this act had 
not been passed. 
Approved, April 20, 1818 • 
.5 
An Act in addition to the acts prohibiting the Slave rrade. 
Annals of Congress, 1.5th Cong., 2nd seas., 1819, XXXIV, 
App. 2.5'1Pi-46. 
Be it enacted, &c., That the President of the United 
States be, and he is hereby, authorized, whenever he shall 
deem it expedient, to cause any of the armed vessels of the 
United States to be employed to cruise on any of the coasts 
of the United States, or Territories thereof, or of the coast 
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of Africa, or elsewhere, where he may judge attempts may be 
made to carry on the slave trade by citizens or residents of 
the United States, in contravention of the acts of Congress 
prohibiting the same, and to instruct and direct the comman-
ders of all armed vessels of the United States, to seize, 
take, and bring into any port of the United States, all ships 
or vessels of the United States, wheresoever found, which may 
have taken on board, or which may be intended for the purpose 
of taking on board, or of transporting, or may have trans-
ported, any negro, mulatto, or person of color, in violation 
of any of the provisions of the act, entitled "An act in 
addition to an act to prohibit the importation of slaves into 
any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United 
States, from and after the first day of January, in the year 
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eight, and to re-
peal certain parts of the same," or of any other act or acts 
prohibiting the traffic in slaves, to be proceeded against 
according to law. And the proceeds of all ships and vessels, 
their tackle, apparel, and furn;.ture, and the goods and 
effects on board of them, which shall be so seized, prose-
cuted, and co11demned, shall be divided equally between the 
United States and the officers and men who shall seize, take, 
or bring, the same into port for condemnation, whether such 
seizure be made by an armed vessel of the United States or-
revenue cutter thereof. And the same shall be distributed in 
like manner as is provided by law for the distribution of 
prizes taken from an enemy. Provided, 1'hat the officers and 
men, to be entitled to one half Qf the proceeds aforesaid, 
shall safe keep every negro, mulatto, or person of color, 
found on board of any ship or vessel so seized, taken, or 
brought into port, for condemnation, and shall deliver every 
such negro, mulatto, or person of color, to the marshal of 
the district in which they are brought, if into a port of the 
United States, or, if elsewhere, to such person or persons 
as shall be lawfully appointed by the President of the United 
States, in the manner hereinafter directed, transmitting to 
the President of the United States, as soon as may be after 
such delivery, a descriptive list of such negroes, mulattoes, 
or persons of color, that he may give directions for the dis-
posal of them. And provided further, rhat the Commanders of 
such commissioned vessels do cause to be apprehended, and 
taken into custody, every person found on board of such ves-
sel, so seized and taken, being of the officers or crew 
thereof, and him or them cvnvey, as soon as conveniently may 
be, to the civil authority of the United States, to be 
proceeded against, in due course of law, in some of the 
districts thereof. • •• 
SEC. J. And be it further enacted, That a bounty of 
twenty-five dollars-be-paid to the officers and crews of 
the commissioned vessels of the United States, or revenue 
cutters, for each and every negro, mulatto, or person of 
color, who shall have been, as hereinbefore provided, 
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delivered to the marshal or agent duly appointed to receive 
them: And the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized 
and required to pay, or cause to be paid, to such officers 
and crews, or their agent, the aforesaid bounty, for each 
person delivered as aforesaid. • •• 
249 
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the 
duty of the commander of any armed vessel of the United States, 
whenever he shall make any capture under the provisions of 
this act, to bring the vessel and her cargo, for adjudication, 
into some of the ports of the State or rerritory to which 
such vessel, so captured, shall belong, if he can ascertain 
the same; if not, then to be sent into any convenient port of 
the United States. • •• 
SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, rhat a sum not 
exceeding one hundred thousand dollars, be, and the same is 
hereby, appropriated to carry this law into effect. 
Approved, March J, 1819. 
6 
An Act to continue in force "An act tQ protect the commerce 
of the United States, and punish the crime of piracy," 
~ also to make further provision for ;unishing the 
crime of piracy. Annals of Congress, 1 th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1820, XXXVI, App. 2b24-25. • •• 
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted~ That if any citizen 
of the United States,~eing of the crew or ship's company of 
any foreign ship or vessel engaged in the slave trade, or any 
person whatever, being of the crew or ship's company of any 
ship or vessel owned in whole or in part, or navigated for, 
or in behalf of, any citizen or citizens of the United States, 
shall land, from any such ship or vessel, and on any foreign 
shore seize any negro or mulatto, not held to service or 
labor by the laws of either of the States or Territories of 
the United States, with intent to make such negro or mulatto 
a sla~e, or shall decoy, or forcibly bring or carry, or shall 
receive, such negro or mulatto on board any such ship or 
vessel, with intent, as aforesaid, such citizen or person 
shall be adjudged a pirate, and on convic·cion thereof before 
the Circuit Court of the United States for the district 
wherein he may be brought or found, shall suffer death. 
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That if any citizen 
of the United States,~eing of the crew or ship's company of 
any foreign ship or vessel engaged in the slave trade, or any 
person whatever, being of the crew or ship's company of any 
ship or vessel, owned wholly or in part, or navigated for, 
or in behalf of, any citizen or citizens of the United States, 
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shall forcibly confine, or detain, or aid and abet in forcibly 
confining, or detaining, on board such ship or vessel, any 
negro, or mulatto, not held to service by the laws of either 
of the States or Territories of the United States, with intent 
to make such negro or mulatto a slave, or shall, on board any 
such ship or vessel, offer or attempt to sell, as a slave, 
any negro or mulatto, not held to service as aforesaid, or 
shall, on the high seas, or any where on tide water, transfer, 
or deliver over, to any other ship or vessel, any negro, or 
mulatto, not held to service as aforesaid, with intent to 
make such negro or mulatto a slave, or shall land, or deliver 
on shore, from on board any such ship or vessel, any such 
negro or mulatto, with intent to make sale of, or having 
previously sold, such negro or mulatto, as a slave, such 
citizen, or person, shall be adjudged a pirate, and, on 
conviction thereof before the Circuit Court of the United 
States for the district wherein he shall be brought, or 
found, shall suffer death. 
Approved, May 15, 1820. 
7 
A treaty to settle and define the boundaries between the 
territories of the United States and the possessions of 
her Britannic Majesty in North America: for the final 
suppression of the African slave-trade: and for the 
giving BE of criminals, fugitive from justice, in 
certain cases. [Webster-Ashburton Treaty] Congres-
sional ~lobe, 27th Gong., )rd sess., 184), XII, JO. 
ARriCLE VIII 
The parties mutually stipulate that each shall prepare, 
equip, and maintain in service, on the coast of Africa, a 
sufficient and adequate squadron, or naval force of vessels! 
of suitable numbers and description, to carry in all not 
less than eighty guns, to enforce separately and respec-
tively the laws, rights, and obligations of each of the two 
countries for the suppression of the slave-trade; the said 
squadrons to be independent of each other, but the two 
Governments stipulating, nevertheless, to give such orders 
to the officers commanding their respective forces as shall 
enable them most effectually to act in concert and co-
operation, upon mutual consultation, as exigencies may arise 
for the attainment of the two objects of this article: 
Copies of all such orders to be communicated by each 
Government to the other respectively. • •• 
Approved, August 29, 1842. 
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8 
An Act to amend an Act entitled "An Act in addition to the 
-- --rcts prohibiting-the Slave Trade." -congressionii GlObe, 
)6th Cong., 1st seas., 1860, XXIX, App. 481. • •• 
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the President 
of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to 
issue instructions to the commanders of the armed vessels 
of the United States, directing them, whenever it shall be 
practicable, and under such rules and regulations as he may 
prescribe, to pro~eed directly to the coast of Africa, and 
there deliver to the agent or agents of the United States 
all negroes, mulattoes, and persons of color delivered from 
on board vessels seized in the prosecution of the slave 
trade, afterwards bringing the captured vessels and persons 
engaged in prosecuting the slave trade to the United States 
for trial and adjudication. • • • 
Approved, June 16, 1860. 
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APPENDIX G 
A NO'rE ON NAVAL RANKS l 
----
During the Civil War the system of naval ranks was 
established in a form much like it is today. Before that 
time, however, it was in a state of flux--new ranks being 
added to the structure or changes made in the relationship 
between warrant and commissioned officers. 
There were three classes of officers in the "old navy." 
Petty officers were appointed by the commanding officer of 
the vessel inwhich they served; warrant officers received 
their authority from the President; and commissioned officers 
who were appointed by the President and donfirmed by the 
Senate. The last group were those charged with the respon-
sibility of, or were i~ preparation for, command at sea. 
Warrant officers were in charge of the various departments 
on board ship: carpenters, gunners, boatswains, sail 
makers, and the like. Of the warrant officers only two, 
sailing masters, who were charged with the safe navigation 
of the ship, and midshipmen, could aspire to command. 
When the Navy was founded in 1794 only two commis~ioned 
1 Lawrence Fasano, Naval Rank: Its Inception and 
Development: A Short History of the Evolution and 
Geneolo~y of the Naval Officer-rNew York, l9J6)~9-57, 
57-64, 5-~, lJJ-40; and James C. Tily, The Uniforms 
of the United States Navy (New York, 1964~19-20, 44-
rr5,~. 
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ranks were established, captain and lieutenant. However, 
the terms "lieutenant commanding" or "lieutenant commandant" 
was variously applied to lieutenants who commanded vessels 
too small to justify a full captain. Briefly, in 1799, then 
permanently in 1806 the rank ~aster commandant was created 
to denote indi vid.uals of intermediate rank who commanded the 
medium-sized vessels then coming into the Navy. This was 
shortened to commander in 1837. 'l'hat same year most masters 
were removed from the ranks in line for command. l'hose 
who remained were listed as masters "in line of promoti\Jn. il 
About the same time those midshipmen who passed the examin-
ation for a lieutenancy came to be called "passed midshipmen. 11 
In 1857 the rank of flag officer was created as a substitute 
for admirals, which ~k Congress had not approved. 
The year 1862 saw the greatest reorganization in the 
system of naval ranks. Flag officers beame rear admirals 
and commodores, lieutenant commander was establsihed as a 
permanent rank, masters were commissioned to take prece-
dence below lieutenants, and passed midshipmen were made 
ensigns. With the exception of a few superior ranks of 
admiral and the change of master to lieutenant (junior 
grade), the system created in 1862 remains. 
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APPENDIX H 
AMERICAN MEN-OF-WAR VISITING AFRICA, 1820-1842 
Name ·rype Commander Dates Sources 
Cyane Ship Sloop E. Trenchard Early 1820 ASP,I,652; SP 148 
Hornet Ship Sloop G. C. Read Summer 1820 ASP,I,676; LB; SP 148 
John Adams Ship Sloop H. S. Wadsworth Aug 1820 ASP,I,652; LB; SF 148 
Alligator Schooner J. F. Stockton May-July 1821 LB; SP 148 
Alligator Schooner J. F. Stockton Nov-Dec. 1821 NA,II,98; SP 148 
Shark Schooner M. C. Perry Sept-Nov 1821 AN 182); SP148 
Shark Schooner M.G. Perry Sept-Nov 1822 AN 182) 
Cyane Ship Sloop R. T. Spence Spring 182) AN 182); ST 90 
Grampus Schooner J. D. Sloat April 1824 NA, I, 41 ; AN 1824 
Porpoise Schooner c. w. Skinner Aug 1824 LB; s·r 94 
Cyane Ship Sloop J. o. Creighton Aug 1825 NA,III,268 
Shark Schooner o. Norris Jan-Feb 1827 AN 1827; LB; NA,I,108; 
NA,IV,4J,57 
Ontario Ship Sloop J. B. Nicholson Dec 1828 ASP,III,146; AR IV,) 
1\) 
\.1\ 
~ 
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Name Type Commander 
Shark Schooner s. w. Adams 
Java Frigate E. P. Kennedy 
Boxer Schooner B. Page, Jr. 
Porpoise Schooner J. M. fwlclntosh 
John Adams Ship Sloop J. F. Voorhees 
Erie Ship Sloop J. Percival 
Ontario Ship Sloop W. D. Salter 
Dolphin Schooner W. E. Kennedy 
Potomac Frigate J. J. Nicholson 
Peacock Ship Sloop E. P. Kennedy 
Enterprise Schooner A. S. Campbell 
Dolphin Brig C. H. Bell 
Grampus Schooner J. s. Paine 
Dolphin Brig C. H. Bell 
Grampus Schooner J. s. Paine 
Dates 
Dec 1828 
Feb 1831 
April 1832 
Feb 1833 
Dec 1833 
June 1835 
Summer 1835 
Fall 1836 
Nov 1836 
Winter 1836-37 
Winter 1836-37 
Early 1840 
Early 1840 
Early 1841 
Early 1841 
Sources 
AN 1828 
AR VII:5; HR 111-12; ST 
166; AN 1830; AN 1831 
AR VIII:5; NA,IV,); AN 1832 
LB; AN 1833; NA,VI,6 
AH X: 1 
NA,I,189 
AN 1835; NA,I,191 
AN 1836; AN 1837; NA,I,202 
AN 1836; AN 1837; AR:XIII,4 
AN 1836 
AN 1836 
AN 1839; AN 1840 
AN 1839; AN 1840 
AN 1840; AH XVII:11 
AN 1840 
1\) 
\.1\ 
\.1\ 
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Name 
Cyane 
Vandalia 
Type Commander 
Ship Sloop W. K. Latimer 
Ship Sloop W. \-1. Ramsay 
Dates 
Mid 1841 
July-Oct 1842 
Sources 
AR SVII:11; HH 11J 
LB; AN 1842 
Abbreviations: 
AN Secretary of the Navy Annual Repo~ 
AR African Repository and Colonial Journal 
ASP American State Papers: Naval Affairs 
HH u.s., Congress, House, Report on African Colonization and 
Slave Trade, H. Rept. 283, 27th Cong., Jrd seas., 184J. 
LB Logbook, National Archives, Record Group 80 
NA Correspondence of the Secretary of the Navy Relating to 
African Colonization (M-205), Naval Record Collection of 
the Office of Naval Records and Library, Record Group 45, 
National Archives 
SP John R. Spears, The American Slave-Trade: An Account of Its 
Origin, Growth, and Suppression (New York, 1900; reprint,I9b7). 
ST P. J. Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-
1865 (New York, 196TT: 
l\) 
\.1\ 
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APPENDIX I 
INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMODORE MATTHEW C. P~Y 
FROM SECREl'ARY 0~. THE ~ f!. P. UPSHUR 
NAVY DEPARTMENT, March JO, 184) 
SIR: You will proceed as soon as possible with the 
squadron under your command to the coast of Africa. You are 
charged with the protection of American commerce in that 
quarter, and with the suppression of the slave trade, so far 
as the same may be carried on by American citizens, or under 
the American flag. 
The commerce of the United States with the western coast 
of Africa is rapidly increasing and becoming every day more 
and more valuable. Heretofore it has been conducted under 
many circumstances of disadvantage, in consequence of the 
unprotected condition in which it has been left. In the con-
duct of your command you will be careful to ascertain its 
present condition and its probable future course and extent, 
and you will afford to it all the aid and support which it 
may require. The rights of our citizens engaged in lawful 
commerce are under the protection of our flag, and it is the 
chief purpose, as well as the chief duty of our naval power, 
to see that these rights are not improperly abridged or in-
vaded. To what extent your interposition for this purpose 
may be required, it is impossible to foresee. The department 
relies with full confidence on your judgement and discretion, 
so to employ the force under your command as to protect the 
rights and interests of your own countrymen, without violating 
those of any other people, and therefore deems it unnecessary, 
as indeed it would be almost impossible, to give you specific 
instructions upon the subject. 
In regard to the other branch of your duties, viz: the 
suppression of the slave trade, the following views and in-
structions are given for your guidance: 
The United States are sincerely desirous wholly to sup-
press this iniquitous traffic, and with that view have 
declared it to be piracy. They have recently, by their treaty 
with England, come under specific stipulations upon the sub-ject, to which your particular attention is called. I enclose 
1 u.s., Congress, House, Instructions to the African 
Squadron, H. Ex. Doc. 104, J.5th Gong., 2ndsess., 18.59, J-7. 
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a copy of the treaty lately concluded between the two coun-
tries, and refer you to the eighth article of it. The object 
which the two governments have in view, and the mode in which 
they propose to accomplish it, will be at once perceived from 
the pla:~ language of this article. 
I need not, I am sure, impress upon you the importance 
ef [sic] strictly observing this stipulation, and of preserv-
ing inviolate the pledged faith of your country upon this 
point. Nevertheless, the following suggestions may be found 
useful in enabling you to tlDderstand fully and precisely the 
view of your own government upon this delicate and interesting 
subject. 
This government does not acknowledge a right in any other 
nation to visit and detain the vessels of American citizens 
engaged in commerce. By the general consent of all civilized 
nations, vessels suspected of acts which are piracy by the law 
of nations may be so visited, for the purpose of ascertaining 
their true character. Even in this case, however, there must 
be probable cause that a reasonable ground of suspicion 
exists, and the visit must be made in good faith, and must be 
conducted and limited to the sole purpose above mentioned. 
Any wrong done in the exercise of this privilege, beyond what 
its legitimate object requires, makes the visiting power a 
trespasser. It is also to be observed that the piracy of 
which I speak is piracy by the laws of nations, and not that 
which is made so by the municipal laws of any particular coun-
try. Of this latter character is the slave trade, which is 
declared to be piracy by act of Congress. The right therefore 
which, by the general consent of nations, exists in regard to 
vessels suspected of being en(i"~,6ed in piracy, does not extend 
to those suspected of being (;. ... ployed in the slave trade. As 
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to them, there is no right of visitation or search, so far as 
American vessels are concerned, except by our own vessels-of-
war. But the claim of the United States that their trading 
vessels should not be visited for any purpose (except on sus-
picion of piracy) by the cruisers of other nations, presupposes 
that the vessel visited is really American. In what manner 
this fact is to be ascertained is the only question which 
presents any difficulty. The flag which the vessel wears is 
prima facie, although it is not conclusive, proof of her 
nationality; it is a mere emblem, and it .loses its true char-
acter when it is worn by those who have no right to wear it. 
Any vessel which displays the American flag claims to be 
American, and therefore may be rightfully boarded and examined 
by an American cruiser, if there be any circumstances attending 
her to justify a suspicion that she is not what she professes 
to be. But this privilege does not extend to cruisers of any 
other nation; that is, it cannot be conceded to them as a 
right. The United States certainly do not claim that the mere 
hoisting of their flag shall give immunity to those who have 
no right to wear it; such a pretension would subject their 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
flag to degradation and dishonor, because it would make it a 
cover for piracy and other crimes of similar atrocity; but 
they do claim that their own citizens who rightfully display 
it shall have all the protection which it implies. Whenever, 
therefore, a cruiser of any other nation shall venture to 
board a vessel under the flag of the United States, she will 
do it upon her responsibility for all consequences. If the 
vessel so boarded shall prove to be American, the act will not 
be justified to you, but the injured party will be left to 
such redress, either in the tribunals of England or by an 
appeal to his own country, as the nature of the case may 
require. If the vessel prove not to be American, the United 
States have no cause of complaint, notwithstanding she has 
worn their flag. 
These principles are believed to be well understood and 
settled. Indeed, the article of the treaty to which I have 
called your attention was agreed to with the obvious view of 
preventing all difficulty or disagreement upon this point. 
The United States, in stipulating to keep a squadron of not 
fewer than eighty guns on the coast of Africa, meant to give 
to England and all the world an assurance of her determinatiom 
and ability to protect her own flag aga~nst abuse, and thus to 
remove all pretext for any interference with it by othe&• 
nations. England accepted this stipulation as satisfactory, 
so far as she was concerned, and therefore she has no reason, 
and I trust has no wish, to invade the rights of the United 
States in that respect. I advert to the subject here only to 
put you in possession of the views of your own government for 
your guidance in forming such arrangements as you may find it 
convenient to make for co-operation with British cruisers. I 
should consider it highly desirable that a vessel of each 
nation should, as far as possible, cruise 1n company with a 
vessel of the other, so that each may be in a condition to 
assert the rights and prevent the abuse of the flag of its own 
country. In this way all just grounds of difference or colli-
sion will be removed, while this har~onious co-operation of 
the two powers will go far to insure the full accomplishment 
of their common object in the suppression of the slave trade. 
On approaching the coast your first object will be to 
make yourself acquainted with the actual condition of the 
great interests which are entrusted to your protection. With 
this view you will communicate, as far as you conveniently 
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can, with the several accredited agents of our gevernment, with 
the colony of Liberia, and with any and all sources of infor-
mation on which you may venture to rely. Your operations 
against the slave trade will, or course, be influenced in a 
great degree by this information. Your own observation and 
experience, while heretofore in service upon that coast, will 
enable you to direct your inquiries in a proper channel, and 
has already supplied you with much valuable information. 
The cunning of the slave trader, however, is constantly 
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devising new disguises and schemes of deception by which he 
may elude detection and escape the consequences of his 
crimes. To some of these it may be useful to call your at-
tention. 
It is not to be supposed that vessels destined for the 
slave trade will exhibit any of the usual arrangements for 
that business. They take especial care to put on the ap-
pearance of honest traders, and to be always prepared as if 
engaged in pursuits of lawful commerce. It is their practice 
to run into some river or inlet where they have reason to 
believe that slaves may be obtained, make their bargain with 
the slave factors, deposit their handcuffs and other things 
calculated to betray them and then sail on an ostensible 
trading voyage to some neighboring port. At the appointed 
time they return, and as the slaves are then ready to be 
shipped they are taken on board without delay, and the ves-
sel proceeds on her voyage. 
Thus the slavers do not carry within themselves any 
positive proof of their guilt, except before they reach the 
coast, and after they leave it with slaves on board. Never-
theless, there are a variety of signs and indications by 
which their true character may, at all times, be conjectured. 
Among these are the following: 
1. Double sets of papers.--It is well known that false 
papers may be easily obtained, and at very little cost. No 
vessel engaged in honest commerce requires them. 
2. An unusual number of water casks or tanks; a supply 
of provisions beyond what the ostensible voyage would re-
quire; and any other preparation or arrangement not usual in 
the trade in which the vessel professes to be engaged. 
). The log-book should be particularly examined. It is 
understood to be a common practice among slavers to keep 
two logs--the one representing the true route, and the other 
a false one. By exhibiting the false log they represent 
themselves as having been in positions which would not expose 
them to the suspicion of slave trading; but this fraud may 
be easily detected by judicious questioning. 
4. The shipping list may afford strong presumptive 
evidence upon the subject. In consequence of the great ex-
posure, hardships, and hazards of the slave trade, the wages 
of sailors engaged in it are generally much higher than are 
pc;j,d in any regular and lawful trade; and, of course, it 
may reasonably inferred that a crew shipped at prices ex-
travagant and unusual are not destined for any usual sea duty. 
5. Consular certificates are often forged, and in lieu 
of the usual consular seal the impression is made with an 
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American half dollar. 
These are a few of the devices to which the slave trader 
resorts. In calling your attention to them, I have in view 
only to impress you with a deep sense of the artful character 
of the adversaries with whom you have to deal, and of the 
reckless disregard of all truth and honor as well as of all 
law and humanity. Nothing but the utmost vigilance and 
caution will enable you to detect them. I have no doubt that 
your own observation and sagacity will soon discover other 
contrivances for deceiving and escaping you, and I have as 
little doubt that you will apply, promptly and effectually, 
the requisite means of defeating all such attempts. 
The service in which you are engaged requires the great-
est prudence and the soundest discretion. It is to be borne 
in mind th&t while the United States sincerely desire the 
suppression of the slave trade, and design to exert their 
power in good faith for the accomplishment of that object, do 
not regard the success of their efforts as their paramount 
interest nor as their paramount duty. They are not prepared 
to sacrifice to it any of their rights as an independent 
nation, nor will the object in view justify the exposure of 
their own people to injurious and vexatious interruptions in 
the prosecution of their lawful pursuits. Great caution is 
to be observed on this point. There is reason to believe that 
the flag of the United States has been often used to cover the 
traffic in slaves, and it is supposed that no good citizen 
of the United States will compl~in that a cruiser of his own 
country, acting upon well grounned suspicion, visits his ves-
sel in order to ascertain her true character. But his is 
nevertheless not to be exposed to unnecessary and vexatious 
detention, nor to any harsh or uncivil treatment. On this 
point lam sure! need not give you instructions. While, 
therefore, the utmost vigilanc~ is to be exacted to detect 
slave traders, great care must be taken not unnecessarily to 
interrupt the citizens, whether of our own or of other 
countries, in their lawful pursuits. 
Your cruisine ground will extend from the Madeira and 
Canary Islands to the Bight of Biafra, and from the coast of 
Africa to the )Oth degree of west longitude. If, however, it 
should be found necessary in the prosecution of the objects 
of your cruise to go beyond these limits, you will not hesi-
tate to do so. 
I am respectfully yours, 
A. P. UPSHUR 
Commander M.C. PERRY 
Commanding United States naval forces, 
destined for the coast of Africa. 
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